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Thesis deals with the issue of the conceptualization, analysis and understanding of the 
Balkans after 1991 as a specific geopolitical area in order to examine the proclivity of the 
region towards conflicts and give general idea of the geopolitical position of the Balkans in 
local and global context. First, the definition of the Balkans and its borders in physic and 
politico geographical structure along with the historical definitions and geopolitical position 
settings and significance prior 1991 are tackled. Then follows the application of the 
geopolitical theories and concepts on the geopolitical map with the states of the Balkans after 
1991 in order to conceptualize the area and thus having a framework for examination and 
comparison of the territorial changes and geopolitical events that occurred in this historical 
period as well as for better understanding of strategic significance of internal and external 
geopolitical position of the Balkans. As a third step follows the explanation and outline of the 
greater territorial irredentist and geopolitical concepts of the Balkan nation states which have 
been revived and actualized in the period after 1991 serving as a background and basic 
platform for their geopolitical agenda. Lastly, the thesis tackles the territorial changes that 
came as a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and emergence of the independent nation 
states with their internal territorial divisions along ethnic and religious cleavages and their 
narrower as well as broader geopolitical significance. In the comprehensive review of the 
territorial changes related and accompanied by the events such as wars and involvement of 
the external greater geopolitical powers and players are included the identified findings of the 
conceptualization by the application of the geopolitical theories and concepts as well as 
greater territorial concepts of the states in order to show and understand their interrelation, 
compliance and significance. The thesis sums up with all of the findings brought together 
thus leading to a general conclusion for the geopolitical position of the Balkans after 1991 
and opinion for the prospects for the future evolving from it. 
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 Possibility of including 5th chapter about the key players-great powers 
USA/EU/NATO, Russia, Turkey and their reengagement on the Balkans (as a 
another reason/incentive for geopolitical struggle and activeness/conflicts) , 
although they will be constantly mentioned throughout other chapters in historical 
and actual positions and activities. (Geopolitical and foreign policies as 
euroatlantism of USA/EU/NATO, euroasianism of Russia and neootomanism of 
Turkey should be examined with their prospect and influence on the Balkans). 
Regarding that some of the Balkan countries such as Greece, Bulgaria (and 
Romania) are members of the EU, having a opportunity to influence its foreign 
(and security) policy, the specific role of EU as a player/factor could be examined 
in this separate chapter.  
MAIN AIMS OF THESIS 
 
THE BALKANS, WITH ITS LONG TROUBLESOME HISTORY, THE 
DIFFICULT INTERNAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNOGRAPHY 
IS UNDOUBTEDLY GEOPOLITICALLY THE MOST ACTIVE REGION ON 
THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. BY APPLYING THE BASIC ACADEMIC 
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF THE GEOPOLITICS AND EXAMINING 
THE EVENTS AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES ON THE BALKAN AFTER 
1991, THE MAIN IDEA OF THE THESIS IS TO EXAMINE THE 
PRONENESS OF THE BALKANS FOR CONFLICTS REGARDING ITS 
GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN GLOBAL PROSPECT, LEVELS OF SOCIO-
POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A 
MAIN CAUSE OF INNER GEOPOLITICAL STRIFE AND INTEGRATION 




- THE EVENTS ON THE BALKANS FROM 1991 CAN BE EXAMINED 
THROUGH THE BASIC ACADEMIC THEORIES AND CONCEPT OF 
GEOPOLITICS IN ORDER TO BE PROVEN THE GEOPOLITICAL 
BACKGROUND AND INTERRELATION BETWEEN THE 
TERRITORIAL CHANGES AND THE GREAT NATIONAL CONCEPTS 
OF  THE BALKANS NATIONS AS A MAIN CAUSE OF THE 
CONFLICTS ON THE BALKANS 
- INTERNAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, ETHNOGRAPY, AS WELL AS 
SOCIO-POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL AND HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT ARE REASONS AND FACTORS FOR THE 
GEOPOLITICAL ACTIVENESS AND EVENTS/TERRITORIAL 
CHANGES/CONFLICTS ON THE BALKANS SINCE 1991 
- GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF THE BALKANS 
IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT ARE REASONS AND MAIN 
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EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT THE GEOPOLITICAL ACTIVENESS 
AND CONFLICTS ON THE BALKANS SINCE 1991 ARE LIKELY TO 
CONTINUE/APPEAR IN THE FUTURE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
THE METHODOLOGY OF WRITING, EXAMINING AND PROVING THE 
THESIS AND HYPOTHESES SHOULD INCLUDE APPLICATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE METHODS OF THE ACADEMIC THEORIES AND THE 




THE BASIC APPROACH SHOULD BE THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH IN 
EXAMINIG THE NUMEROUS AMMOUNT OF FACTS, THEORIES, 
CONCEPTS, REAL (HISTORICAL) EVENTS FOUND IN BOOKS, 
ACCADEMIC AND POPULAR NEWSPAPER ARTICLES, SCHOOL BOOKS, 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
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UCPMB- Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac 
UNPROFOR- United Nations Protective Force 
USA- United States of America  
USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VMRO-DPMNE- Vnatrešna makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Demokratska partija 
za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – 
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) 
WWII- World War Two 




Living in a certain place or region means to have mutual and unbreakable relations of 
interaction between the humans and the physical space. Based on the physical space, 
geographical position, resources and climate people have built their habits, culture, cognition, 
understandings and upon them societies and nation-states. Considering the limits of the 
physical space where empires were struggling among each other, thinkers, scholars and 
academics invented theories and concepts regarding the influences, meanings and in the same 
time possibilities of use of the physical space in order to fulfill the interests and gain 
advantage of their empires, therefore developing the geopolitics as a scientific branch. As the 
humanity was developing and improving it position, with rationalism, liberalism and 
humanism spreading around the world, the influences of geopolitical and geostrategic 
thinking became available even for the smaller nation states and their elites. In that prospect 
nation states of the Balkans with its strategically important geographical position, although it 
was already unremittingly present in geopolitics and geostrategies of the great powers, started 
to develop their own geopolitical and geostrategic concepts and theories regarding the 
interests and well being of their countries. That was a main reason for the Balkans to become 
one of the most active and affinitive places for conflicts and territorial changes. As Cold War 
ended, the Balkans was again the most active place in Europe and even in the world, where 
territorial changes occurred and geopolitical struggle revived, accompanied by bloody wars. 
The process of territorial changes and geopolitical shifting which is diminishing but active 
and whose consequences are still influential today, although on different levels, shows the 
relevance of the research on this topic. As Macedonian and a person who lives and plans to 
live in the future in Macedonia and therefore in this region and also believes in the life in 
peace as the highest value, academic research on this topic seemed to me an inevitable 
obligation and contribution in the commitment for the peaceful world.    
The main aim of this thesis is to show through the application of the geopolitical theories and 
concepts on the geopolitical landscape of the Balkans how much the territorial changes and 
consequent events that took place after 1991 up today are in accordance to them and therefore 
to draw conclusions whether and why the Balkans are prone to conflicts as well as defining 
its current geopolitical position in local and global context. As main reasons that are 
assumptions for the affinity of the Balkans for conflicts, which have to be examined through 
the review of the territorial changes and their interrelation with the geopolitical map of the 
Balkans conceptualized by the application of the geopolitical theories on it and greater 
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territorial concept of the Balkan countries, are taken the internal political geography, 
geostrategy, ethnography, levels of the socio-political, economical and historical 
development, as well as its geopolitical position in global context. Therefore the thesis starts 
with defining the Balkans in geographical, historical and geopolitical meaning and settings, 
while the second chapter goes through defining the basic geopolitical theories and concepts 
applied and compared to the features in the Balkans. For the main and most important factor 
causing the territorial changes and geopolitical strife are taken the geopolitical concepts of 
the greater (territorial) states of the Balkan peoples, which are briefly outlined and explained 
in the third chapter. Geopolitical significance of the territorial changes - which are examined 
on external and internal level (i.e. territorial organization) of the countries - is exposed in the 
fourth chapter. Also, in order to be proven the main hypotheses about the geopolitical 
background and interrelation between the territorial changes and great national concepts the 
thesis contains constant mentions and analysis of the foreign policies and geopolitical 
concepts of the important key players – outer great powers interested and interfered in the 
Balkans. At the end the conclusion besides the affirmation of the hypotheses, opens the floor 
for the integration process as a possible solution. 
The methodology of writing, examining and proving the thesis and main hypotheses includes 
two types of methods: applicative and comparative method of the academic theories, real 
events and actual features and settings on the ground. Applicative and comparative methods 
are used intertwined and together in order to show the accordance of the actual features, real 
events with the tenets of the geopolitical theories and concepts and there to prove the 
causative and consequential interrelations assumed in the hypotheses. The basic approach on 
the development of the thesis is analytical approach in examining the numerous amounts of 
facts, theories, academic research papers and case studies, academic and popular news paper 
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CHAPTER I   DEFINING THE BALKANS 
There are numerous definitions about the Balkans, regarding the geography (physical and 
political), history, politics, ethnology, sociology, anthropology and culture. Despite the many 
differences regarding the borders and the countries included and considered as a part of the 
Balkans, it is generally acknowledged that it occupies the region of the peninsula in the 
southeastern part of Europe. More accurately it is located between Adriatic Sea on the west, 
Ionian Sea on the southwest, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas on the south, Black and 
Marmora Seas on the east, and the Danube River and Central European (Pannonian) plain on 
the north by which it is connected to the continental hinterland of Europe. There are 
numerous differences in the consideration which countries are part of the Balkans. 
Geographically, the Balkan Peninsula includes Albania, most of the former Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, southeastern Romania, northern Greece and European Turkey
1
. Historically and 
politically, these (six) countries have been referred as “The Balkan States”
2
. However, 
defining which countries are constituting the Balkans is quite difficult task and therefore the 
exact number of “The Balkan states” varies depending upon the definition. Another reason of 
the varying nature of the number of the Balkan countries is the frequent territorial changes, 
which will be examined as a main subject of this thesis.  Regarding their political culture, 
history and geographical position in the broadest context the region of the Balkans includes 
the territories or parts of the following countries: Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, 
Turkey, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. Some sources, such as Encyclopedia Britannica considers even Moldova as a part of 
the Balkans
3
. In narrower context, the Balkans is considered with the countries that have 
foremerly thoruogout the history been part of the Ottoman Empire.  Generally, the Balkans is 
comprised by the states of former Yugoslavia and its  neighboring states in the south. Bearing 
in mind that Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia are members of the European Union, we 
can include the Balkans as a part of it, although that is nowhere officially stated like that, and 
in the same time we can count European Union as player (part) in the  Balkns.  The name 
Balkans, comes from the Turkish word ‘balkan’ which means mountain
4
. However the name 
Balkans also comes from the name of the mountain range (also known as Stara Planina, 
meaning: ‘Old Mountain’) located in the eastern part of the peninsula, mostly on the territory 
                                                 
1
 Cohen, Saul (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p.218 
2
 Cohen, Saul (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p.218 
3
 Danforth, Loring (2014) Balkans. Encyclopedia Britannica -  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50325/Balkans  
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of Bulgaria. From the aspect of the political terminology, it is important to underline that 
region of the Balkans have been known under many other names.  As new political 
developments are taking place since 1991, considering European Union and NATO 
integration processes, a new terminological determination was developed regarding the 
Balkans. Therefore, this region, although with different scope of countries included, 
regarding their level of development in the integration processes or by the aspect of the 
geopolitical interests and analysis of the external great players (i.e. USA), is also known 
under the names Southeastern Europe or the Western Balkans. These names can be found in 
the terminology of the official documents and correspondence of European Union, NATO, 
World Bank, agencies of the UN, researchers and analysts relating to the countries that are 
comprising the Balkans. Regarding the negative connotation of the name Balkans and the 
implications of the derived term balkanization, which will be explained further below, more 
academics and scholars are proposing the replacement of the name the Balkans with the use 
of the terminology such as Southeast Europe. For the purposes of this thesis we will take in 
consideration the definition of the Balkans regarding political geography, history and the 
geopolitical settings and its significance prior 1991, up to the end of the Cold War.  
 
I.1. GEOGRAPHY 
Geographically, the Balkans is occupying the easternmost of the three southern European 
peninsulas. At a glance it is important to underline that political and geographical boundaries 
of the Balkans does not thoroughly match and overlap each other
5
. By the three sides, west, 
south and east, the borders of the Balkans are clearly defined and accepted by the 
geographers and other scholars, because the waters of Adriatic, Ionian, Mediterranean, 
Aegean, Marmara and Black Seas are washing the coasts.  However, regarding physical, but 
even more political geography most ambiguous is the northern border. As a rule, geographers 
concentrate their disputes over the northern and northwestern border
6
. Generally, from the 
prospect of the physical geography, the northern border of the Balkans is most often 
considered to begin at the mouth of the river Idria in the Gulf of Trieste, following the 
southeast foothills of the Julian Alps, and coinciding with the Sava and the Danube Rivers
7
. 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 Todorova, Marija (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University Press p. 26  
5
 Mileski, Toni (2005). Makedonija - Rubikova kocka na Balkanot. Filozofski fakultet, Skopje. p. 67-71 (on 
Macedonian)   
6
 Todorova, Marija (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University p.30 
7
 Todorova, Marija (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University p.30 
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From the point of political geography the definition of the borders, especially the northern 
one is important because the territories of the states are exciding and going over it, therefore 
including parts of other geographical regions. However, based on the political culture, 
history, civilization and culture in the aspect of the political geography and geopolitics as a 
part of the Balkans should be considered the whole territories of Serbia, Croatia even though 
their territories are including parts north from rivers Danube and Sava. In that prospect, 
besides the physic geographical (natural) northern boundary, in politico geographical and 
geopolitical meaning we can consider their national borders as a border of the Balkans. 
Historical belonging and occupation of the territories by the different cultural and religious 
civilizations and empires (which will be covered later) is another very important, sometimes 
deceive determining factor, about which countries are part and included and where are the 
exact boundaries of the Balkans. Accordingly, some geographers treat as Balkan, besides 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and all countries of the former Yugoslavia, only the Dobrudzha 
part of Romania and the European part of Turkey
8
. Others, well aware that the political-
geographic and physical-geographic boundaries do not coincide, tend to include all of 
Romania (sometimes even Moldova), but Turkey is excluded
9
. Some domestic politicians and 
scholars in former northern Yugoslav republics and regions, are excluding themselves from 
the Balkans, counting only Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo (formerly under Ottoman rule) as a part of the Balkans. Within these politico 
geographical boundaries exists very complicated mixture of ethnic structure of the population 
which is in direct relation with evolving of the specific kind of political culture, characterized 
with the great importance of the territory which leads to a strong expansionism and constant 
affinity for conflicts. Regarding the internal geography of the Balkans and its relation with 
the political phenomena, which is the main aspect how this thesis addresses the Balkans, it is 
very important to mention that the relief of the Balkans is mostly mountainous with river 
valleys which can perfectly use as natural boundaries. But this pattern is not always clearly 
kept or it is better to say that when it is kept it is an exception. In some cases the high 
mountain ranges and river valleys are natural ethnographical borderlines between peoples, 
but historical circumstances and the influence of the former imperial state boundaries and the 
strong and lively migration processes within them, resulted with a great extent of ethnically 
mixed population throughout the whole region. Because of these, and the specific process of 
the formation of the state boundaries (explained below in the part of the history), almost all of 
                                                 
8
 Todorova, Marija (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University p.30 
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the nations have compatriots living outside the state borders and usually there are settlements 
populated by the same ethnic group from the both sides of the borders.  As a result of this, all 
Balkan countries are multiethnic societies with complex internal ethnic structure and great 
conflict potential which is expressed in two ways: by internal struggle of the ethnic groups 
(for power and territorial division, explained later in this text in the cases of Macedonia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) or with the strong state supported nationalism with policies such as 
assimilation, displacement, ethnic cleansing and extermination. Finally, internal geographical 
features such as the relief of the Balkans actually has the most decisive influence for the 
existence and development of its own genuine (geo)political characteristics and its 
significance in broader strategic prospect. The best example is that, the valleys of Danube, 
the Sava, Morava (hence Vardar) served as the main gateways of migrating people and 
invading armies for centuries, while the Dinaric Alps and the other Balkan mountains served 
as a bastion against these movements
10
.    
Besides the internal geographical structure of the Balkan Peninsula, its geographical position 
in relations with and regarding other regions on a broader scale shows a great relevance and 
importance for global geopolitics. Bordering the Black Sea and Turkish Straits (Bosphorus 
and Dardanelles) the Balkans is a place which is strategically very important as a gateway to 
the Middle East and Asia and to the Central Europe in the opposite direction. Southern coast 
of the Balkans on the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea is strategically important regarding the 
proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the broader region of Levant 
(Eastern Mediterranean). Regarding the western coastline on the Ionian and Adriatic Sea, 
through the Otranto Strait, the Balkans is an entering point for the access in the interior of the 
Central Europe, although the important Central European powers were tellurocrats and 
therefore access from/to the sea was never of big importance for them. Hence, the Balkans in 
these boundaries was very interesting for the interests and strategies of Russia, Austro-
Hungary, Italy, Germany and also indirectly for Great Britain and France. Whether it was 
Russia that wanted access to warm water ports through the Turkish Straits and Aegean Sea, 
or Austro-Hungary the Aegean and Adriatic Sea, or Germany with its concept of 
Mitteleuropa and plans for the Berlin-Bagdad railway, the Balkans was geostrategically very 
(sometimes the most) important place which presented as a battlefield of their interests, on 
which the Balkan nations were bandwagoning often changing the side. Bearing in mind the 
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permanence and immutability of physical geographical future, the importance of the Balkans 
remains constant. In that prospect the Black Sea basin by which can be realized or blocked 
the Russian access to the Mediterranean, navigation of the Danube and its connection with 
the North Sea by channel through Rhine, as well as Aegean and Adriatic Sea basins shows 
that strategically the Balkans have important position as for internal and external players
11
.           
Regarding political geography, and geography at general, the Balkans is characterized with 
specifically features which are very important factors about the political phenomena taking 
place and developing in this region. Politico-geographical characteristics of the Balkans are 
resulting of the both factors: the circumstances evolving from the territory or physic-
geographical and the consequences of the human activities or the anthropo-geographical 
factor.  The first and basic characteristic of the political geographical features of the territory 
on the Balkans is the inconstancy or variability
12
. This basic politico geographical feature of 
the Balkans is two sided and can be seen in two inseparably connected phenomena: 
inconstancy of the shapes of the territories and the territorial organization and in the same 
time variability of the number of states, as main actors. Another basic feature of the Balkans 
in this prospect, closely related to the previous one, is the politico geographical dynamism 
which results and is determined by the physical geographical settings and complex internal 
and surrounding anthropogenic structure
13
. Evolving from these two basic features, political 
geography of this part of the planet and simply the Balkans can be characterized by the 
following appearances: divisiveness and particularity; antagonisms; border disputes; 
territorial pretentions and claims; spheres of interests; ethnic, national, religious and political 





Due to the favorable conditions for convenient and descent life, the Balkans has continual 
presence of population and organized way of life since the first and early ages of the 
historical development of the humanity. The Balkans is the birthplace or heartland of few 
ancient and medieval great empires, civilizations and cultures, such as: ancient Greek, ancient 
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Macedonian, Illyrian, Byzantine. Therefore, the Balkans is a region with long and 
troublesome history and very rich material culture. However, for the purposes of this paper 
we shall consider history in context of the geopolitics and territorial changes of the Balkans. 
Regarding the great historical (ancient and medieval) empires, they are very important; 
sometimes even the core elements of the nationalist theories and great state territorial 
concepts of the countries. Considering themselves as their descendants and therefore 
successors, Balkan states are calling upon the historical and natural right of acquisition of 
their territorial possessions. Historically, with all characteristics and meanings of its present 
day geopolitical context, the Balkans was discovered or became actual in the 19
th
 century, 
with the decline of Ottoman Empire which became interest for the European great powers 
who, through the support of the discontent Christian peoples wanted to acquire 
geographically strategic chokepoints and sphere of influence. This situation gave an impetus 
to the Balkan peoples, not just for liberating themselves and establishing national states, but 
also to create greater territorial concepts for their states upon which they will act in their 
foreign policies (especially with the great powers, as well as among them), provoking several 
wars. Since the beginning and throughout the whole 19
th
 century until the two world wars in 
the 20
th
 century, the Balkans was the most active place with the most territorial changes. 
From the beginning of the 19
th
 century until the Berlin congress of 1885, Serbia, Greece and 
Bulgaria were liberated from the Ottoman Empire and ever since they started struggling for 
the territories remained under Turkish rule. Standing behind their backs and supporting each 
of them in different periods, Russia and Austro-Hungary (which later annexed Bosnia) were 
also struggling for spheres of influence and territorial acquisitions for access to the warm 
water, militarily and economically strategic important ports in the waters of Aegean Sea. This 
struggle of newly founded Balkan states and their great power patrons resulted with another 
wave of territorial changes and reshaping of the politico geographical map. At the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century Albania emerged as a new nation state, while the territory of Macedonia 
was divided and partitioned among Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. Territorial changes on the 
Balkans continued in this period with the formation of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the 
First World War and Paris Peace Conference when territories in Macedonia, Dobrudja, 
Thrace were repartitioned between Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. Thus the term 
balkanization with meaning of fragmentation or division of a region or state into smaller 
states that are often hostile and non-cooperative with one another emerged and spread 
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throughout the world. The process of territorial changes on the Balkans was temporarily 
halted after the Second World War and during the Cold War, when a period of stability 
followed. After this historical period followed the last wave of territorial changes and 
reshaping of the Balkans, which is the main theme of this paper. Beginning with the political 
sphere, in one of its important aspects, the formation of state boundaries, there were several 
contending factors: the Ottoman administrative tradition; the aspirations of the national 
movements based on two (quite often incompatible) criteria: historic rights and self-
determination; and the strategic interests of the European powers who, as a whole, treated the 
Ottoman Empire as a pillar and the young Balkan states as a serious threat to the European 
balance of power
15
. The internal Ottoman provincial divisions had followed closely the 
boundaries of the numerous Balkan principalities in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; in 
this respect they seem to provide a clear, though not immobile, continuity from the pre-
Ottoman period (down to preserving the toponymy)
16
. In some instances, internal provincial 
frontiers were turned into state boundaries (like the vassal provinces of Wallachia and 
Moldavia, or Albania and Montenegro). In other cases an administrative unit, the Belgrade 
pashalak, became the nucleus for the future Serbian nation-state. Still, neither historic rights 
(based on the territorial zenith of the medieval Balkan states) nor issues of self-determination 
were, in the final account, instrumental in delineating frontiers
17
. At the very most, these 
elements shaped the controversial and incompatible Balkan irredentist programs. 
As a political background for the territorial changes and geopolitical struggle, besides the 
great geopolitical and territorial national concepts, the Balkans can be defined as place where 
specific political movements, ideas and trends emerged and clashed. This is mostly evident in 
historical aspect. The specific admixture of nineteenth century romanticism and Realpolitik 
on the part of the observers created a polarized approach of lobbying for or demonizing these 
populations
18
. Particularly evocative was the vogue of philhellenism that swept over Europe 
in the 1820s and the subsequent disillusionment with realities
19
. The same trend can be 
observed in the peculiar brand of Turkophilia and Slavophobia, together with their mirror 
image phenomena of Turkophobia (or rather Islamophobia) and Slavophilism, as direct 
functions of great power politics, and specifically nineteenth century attitudes toward 
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. During the 19
th
 century, in the so-called period of the discovery of the Balkans, 
these political trends were heavily expressed and present in the public of the European great 
powers supported by many public figures, politicians, poets, lobbying or supporting for the 
national(istic) ideas of the Balkan countries. Regarding the politics of the Balkans this 
political phenomena is still very relevant, with many proponents of the ideas of Slavophilism 
(i.e. connections and foreign policy oriented towards Russia), Phillhelenism, Turkophilism 
and Turkophobia, who have certain concepts, prospects and claims over historically 
legitimate national territories. On the bases of these political trends, new geopolitical and 
foreign policy concepts, primarily active on the Balkans, are created. The best example of 
this is the Turkish policy of neo-ottomanism
21
 (or pan-ottomanism) implemented by the 
government of the Prime Minister Erdogan and foreign minister Davutoglu.    
 
I.3. GEOPOLITICAL POSITION, SETTINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE PRIOR 1991 
Located in the southeastern tip of Europe, the Balkans has always had very important 
geopolitical and geostrategical position. Geopolitical position of the Balkans can be viewed 
from the aspects of: historic-cultural, political, military-geostrategic and economical. 
Through the territory of the Balkans the relations between the western and eastern 
civilizations have been maintained, since the earliest times. The great conquest to the East 
(Asia) of the Macedonian king Alexander the Great started from the Balkans.  Later, it has 
represented a gateway of Europe for the Ottoman Turkish conquest by which the Islam came 
on the European soil. Interference of the many peoples, tribes, religions, cultures and 
civilizations resulted with the fact that the Balkans is the only place where the Christianity 
with its Orthodox and Catholic denominations exists and collides with the Islam, representing 
the Balkans as a religious and civilization borderline. This is very important in global context 
of the well known geopolitical theories and concepts for the clash of civilizations.  
Regarding to the relevance of the topic, geopolitical settings of the Balkans during the Cold 
War were established by the end of the Second World War. According to the famous 
percentage agreement proposed by Churchill to Stalin on Moscow (“Tolstoy”) conference in 
1944, the sphere of influence were established in the Balkan countries, therefore making the 
Balkans a region where the significant part of the borderline of the two Cold War rival blocs 
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was set. From geopolitical point of view, related to the geopolitical position and importance 
during the Cold War, it is very important to be mentioned that one of the earliest proxy wars 
between the two rivals took place on the Balkans. Namely, the civil war in Greece from 
1946-1949 where communists were fighting against monarchist regime (both sides 
respectively supported by USSR with its satellites and USA with Great Britain) was one very 
important case, but it have not implied any territorial change and percentage agreement of 
sphere of influence was kept. Another very important case which shows the geopolitical 
importance of the  Balkans is the Tito- Stalin split in 1948, after which socialist Yugoslavia 
became non-aligned country, that later even led to the creating (together with other countries) 
of the famous Non-Aligned Movement. Also, the Balkans, was one of the places where the 
US policy of containment of the Soviet Union was implemented. Becoming members of 
NATO as a part of its southern wing, Greece and Turkey together with Yugoslavia, were 
playing important military (security) role of the containment of the USSR and its satellites.  
Looking with accordance to the Spykman’s geopolitical theory of the Rimland, which was 
basic inspiration of the US policy of containment, geographically and even more 
geopolitically the Balkans was important part of it. This will be discussed later, but however 
it is very important to state that the geographical position and proximity to the Western 
Europe (the core of transatlantic bloc and partnership) and Middle East, resulted with a great 
geopolitical importance and relevance of the Balkans in this period. Even more, it is 
important to underline that besides all these lively activities, the Balkans was stable and 
without any territorial changes. As a main reason of this stability we can state the above 
mentioned geostrategic position and geopolitical importance.  The geopolitical position and 
settings of the Balkans during the Cold War was structured by the 2+2+2 formula
22
. This 
formula meant that 2 Balkan countries were part of NATO (Greece and Turkey), 2 countries 
were part of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2 countries were non-aligned 
(Yugoslavia and Albania) making a balance between the Cold War political and military 
blocs
23
. The main purpose of this geopolitical setting of the structure of the Balkans was 
stability which was necessary, bearing in mind the historically proven internal conflict 
potential of the Balkans and its influence outside of the region. Although the countries of the 
Balkans during the Cold War had their territorial pretensions and claims according to their 
irredentist concepts, they have refrained from any acts that could undermine peace and 
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balance and cause conflict between the two blocs. One clear example of this is the case when 
Yugoslav president and leadership was not supporting the concerns of the Macedonian 
leadership towards the position of the Macedonians in Greece, avoiding deterioration of the 
bilateral relations with Greece, which was afraid of territorial pretensions and the concept of 
United Macedonia. However, there were some provisioned territorial changes in this period, 
which have not completely occurred. The idea of Balkan federation of socialist states 
provisioned unification of Bulgaria, Albania and Romania with Yugoslavia. In the case of 
Bulgaria, under the president Georgi Dimitrov, the process of unification of Pirin part of 
Macedonia towards Socialist Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia was officially started 
(with recognizing full political and national rights of the Macedonians)
24
 alongside the 
negotiations for inclusion of Bulgaria as a seventh state in a Balkan federation with 
Yugoslavia. Also, Yugoslavia as the only country liberated by its strong and large national 
partisan movement, accepted as an ally of the anti-fascist coalition, felt stronger as a regional 
power, therefore creating some territorial claims towards its neighbors, namely Italy and 
Austria. Included within it, the republics such as Slovenia and Macedonia, which have parts 
of their nations living outside (on the other side) of the borders, hoped for fulfillment of their 
national unification. However Yugoslav leadership balanced with suppression of the 
nationalist ideas inside, not letting them have influence on the foreign relations. Besides the 
division between the two blocks, the period of the Cold War was actually the longest and 
most stable period regarding conflicts and territorial changes on the Balkans. As the only 
place in Europe where three different types of foreign policies existed - western and soviet 
aligned and non-aligned states - with the evident importance of the geopolitical and 
geostrategic position, structure of geopolitical settings lead to stability and peace on the 
Balkans for a longer period. With the end of the Cold War and global geopolitical changes, 
the region of the Balkans was heavily impacted and once again became the place with the 
fiercest conflicts and instability.  Hence, for the Balkans it can be said that for a long time it 
represents a scene where the processes of fragmentation and globalization have alternately 
taken place, with general opinion of the western countries that it is a micro space which have 
never been integrated into Europe
25
.        
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The changes that happened after 1991, can be seen on two prospects: global – animated and 
influenced by the global changes and developments and local – genuinely derived from the 
trends inside of the states. Although the developments of the Balkans after 1991, as 
everywhere in the world are result of the combination of the both factors, we will examine 
the implication of the second by application of the geopolitical theories and concepts. 
Regarding the global geopolitical prospects of the changes, we can clearly state that with the 
diminishing of the importance of the ideologies and ascendance of the process of 
globalization resulting with reemergence of the civilization and cultural divisions, the 
Balkans as a multireligious, multiethnic and multilinguistic place was unavoidably impacted. 
In that prospect, immediately after the end of the Cold War and especially during the whole 
period and process of wars, conflicts, territorial changes and geopolitical shifts, realignments 
occurred along religious lines with two Orthodox and Islamic axis emerging
26
. Furthermore 
these religious and civilization lines remained still evident and relevant today, despite the 
relative peace and stability and will be even more important in the future, but definitely more 
in the global context than in the internal one.   
 
CHAPTER II  APPLICATION OF THE GEOPOLITICAL 
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS ON THE BALKANS 
The study of the states in the context of global spatial phenomena, which evolved as a need 
for the power potential and capabilities of the great powers (empires), led to the development 
of the geopolitics with its concepts and theories. Although geopolitics as a part of the realistic 
approach of the international relations was developed according to the needs and strategies of 
the great powers and therefore for studying and covering certain parts of the world, 
notwithstanding its theories and concepts have some general patterns that could be 
universally applied elsewhere. Representing places of interests or research as microcosms, 
application of the basic geopolitical theories and concepts can explain the way of the political 
and historical processes happening in correlation with the spatial phenomena. Regarding that 
all geopolitical theories and concepts have been explained, analyzed and contemplated in 
general terms out of the certain geographical settings on which they have originated, we will 
try to apply them on the politico geographical settings and current geopolitical map of the 
Balkans in order to examine their presence, accuracy and compliance and in that context 
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explain the territorial changes and organization happened after 1991 with all of their patterns 
and characteristics. Besides the approach of observing the Balkans as microcosm on which 
these concepts and theories are applied, in this chapter all of the concepts would be also 
observed and evaluated for the Balkans in broader global context. 
 
II.1. ORGANIC STATE THEORIES ON THE BALKANS 
The concept of the organic state was developed by Friedrich Ratzel, influenced by the social 
Darwinism using similes and metaphors from biology in analysis of political science and 
geography comparing the State with an organism
27
. Summarized this theory regards the state 
as a land with men on it, linked by the State idea and conforming to natural laws, with 
development tied to the natural environment, therefore states like organisms must grow or die 
and the only food they need is in the form of living space (Lebensraum) with resources about 
which states constantly compete between each other
28
. Ratzel even produced seven laws of 
state growth and the theory has been complemented by Rudolf Kjellen who insisted that state 
is an organism composed of five organs, thus coining the term geopolitics. Although there is 
a significantly big difference in the perception and approaches of Ratzel (analogical) and 
Kejllen (literal meaning) the essence of the concept is with the comparison of the state with a 
living organism. Nevertheless, the basic and most important tenets of the organic state theory 
in general, analogically or literally interpreted, are that the state and its people are (like) 
organism with its own needs which means acquiring territory in order the state to grow and 
survive. These two constants – connection of the people with the state as an organism and the 
importance of the territory and living space with resources for growth and survival, are very 
influential in prospect of expansionism which imminently means changeable and non-
permanently settled borders, absorption of smaller units or dissolution of bigger ones and 
inevitable territorial changes.  
On the Balkans, the thinking of the nations (and their states) in organic concepts is present in 
the political and scientific sphere. Namely, within the context of the Balkans up until now for 
the current scientific thought dominates the assumption that the nations are based on ethno-
linguistic model of existence of the organic settled nations
29
. The national building processes 
and foundation of all Balkan states was based on the synthesis or incorporation and close 
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entanglement of two models such as ethno-linguistic and territorial unity
30
. Greek national 
ideology and doctrine is considering the nation as a living organism on a historic stretch 
where the survival is taking place and whose borders are considered flexible and extended
31
. 
As it will be shown in next chapter regarding the great national territorial concepts, this view 
oriented for Greece and wider region of Eastern Mediterranean
32
, served as a basis for the 
harsh nationalist policies for century and a half. Although it is nowhere officially declared, 
the rising ultranationalist and neo-nazi movement in Greece such as Golden Dawn is 
supporter of these views. The views of both Serbian and Croatian extremist nationalist 
movements “Chetnik” and “Ustash” which in the Second World War defined the nations as 
living organism with an organic link between the blood and the soil
33
 were revived in the 
period after 1991 and throughout the 90’s during the wars of the breakup of Yugoslavia by 
their extremist successors and followers. First president of independent Croatia, Franjo 
Tudjman (1990-1999) in his national ideology defined the nation as historic and organic, 
existing as historical creation and distinctive and unique living organism
34
. Given the fact that 
these extreme nationalist movements were intensively involved within the official or by self 
organized paramilitary units in the devastating wars that set the  territorial changes after the 
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, it can be concluded that their acting including the war crimes 
and crimes against humanity of which many of them have been accused and sentenced were 
inspired in considerable extent by these organic state theories as well as views and 
conceptualizations of their nations as living organisms. The organic perception of the nations 
as a living organism in interaction with the territory reflected in the concept of so-called 
blood and soil is present also in Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia but only in minor 
nationalist movements and public addresses. Nevertheless, the organic state theory as defined 
by Ratzel or Kjellen is not in a thorough overlap with the conceptions of the Balkan 
nationalisms. Although nations on the Balkans are not completely following the organic state 
theory they perceive their nations as organism in very strong and inextricable relations with 
their territories. However, the right for territorial claims and expansion are not based on 
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analogies with human organism but rather on the historical rights as the “centuries of 
existence”, as it will be shown latter. 
 
II.2. HEARTLAND OF THE BALKANS 
Undoubtedly, the most influential geopolitical concept which in fact is the essence of the 
geopolitics itself and thus prevailing with its relevance up today is the concept of the 
Heartland. The concept and the term, as it is well known, were coined by the British scholar 
and politician Sir Halford Mackinder. In his conception based upon the British imperial 
interests the Heartland, firstly introduced as the Pivot Area, was geographically placed in the 
deep hinterland of Euroasia
35
, on the inaccessible landmass from where it was easy to reach 
and attack any place on the “World Island”, thus by the possibility of easy outflanking the 
maritime powers the inevitable consequence of possession of the Heartland meant world 
domination. In Mackinder’s point of view, the Heartland (or world citadel as well) was 
primarily region of mobility for land forces, impenetrable by sea power
36
.  According to the 
actual historical events Mackinder had revised his Heartland theory twice. Once in 1919 
where he extended the boundaries of the Heartland including the area of Eastern Europe from 
the littorals of Baltic to the Black Sea as the most crucial part according to his famous dictum 
for command of the World Island and domination of the world
37
.  The other revision came up 
in 1943, although included changes of the boundaries and geographical area comprising the 
Heartland (detaching central and eastern parts of Siberia – Lenaland) was primarily focused 
on the change of the theoretical meaning or perception of the concept of Heartland. Namely, 
in this revision Mackinder changed the conception of the Heartland from an arena of 
movement (i.e., as a region of mobility of land forces) to one of a “power citadel” based upon 
people, resources, interior lines and core industrial infrastructure
38
. Due to this change of the 
meaning of the conception there was a proliferation of the concept Heartland for many other 
parts in the world, which led to definition what is it rather than where is it
39
. This means that 
the use of Heartland in both meanings, defined as a land’s power base in regards as an area 
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where mobility is easy - place from where could be easily attack all other connected places or 
as core area based upon human, natural, industrial resources in combination with favorable 
geographical position and features where in both ways the control of it allows prospects for 
domination, could be applied everywhere globally or regionally. Therefore it could be applied 
to the Balkans at general as we will try to present here.  
Considering the geographical features of the Balkans in the context of the Heartland as an 
area of centrality from where all other places can be attacked and easily dominated, regarding 
the present day (after 1991) established states and borders, Macedonia and Serbia are 
undoubtedly representing the Heartland of the Balkans. Macedonia and Serbia are located in 
the central part of the Balkans, both landlocked and inaccessible by sea power, but possessing 
very favorable relief for easy access to every part of the Balkans therefore possessing the 
main axis and arteries of communication. However, the inaccessibility of the sea power of the 
Heartland of the Balkans is primarily in context of the Balkan maritime states and prospects 
for amphibious landings and invasions but not for the great powers such as US, Russia which 
due to the technological advancements have the capitals of the Heartland within the striking 
distances of their sea based fleets. The position of Macedonia and Serbia as the heartland of 
the Balkans is confirmed in several works, analysis and thoughts of domestic and foreign 
authors, strategists and politicians, as well as by the practical cases from the history and 
ongoing developments on the ground. Macedonia as central state on the Balkans undeniably 
presents the heartland of the Balkans according to Mackinder’s terminology
40
. Also, the fact 
that the central position of Serbia around the main "natural trajectories" on the Balkan 
Peninsula is a constant that cannot be changed
41
, contributes to its heartland position. 
Macedonia possesses the strategically very important Vardar river valley which with its 
composite relief structure of gorges interchangeable with plains and connectivity with the 
valleys of its tributaries from east and west within its watershed represents an axis of 
communications primarily from north to the south on the Aegean Sea and secondary it is a 
place where the interconnection of the communication from east to the west is located. The 
very high geo-strategic importance of the Vardar valley and Macedonia at general have been 
stated many times in the history especially during the Balkan Wars and the First World War 
when a geopolitical solution for the partition of the Macedonian territory as the last remnant 
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of the Ottoman rule was undertaken. High geopolitical and strategic importance of the 
Macedonia can be also seen in former Serbian prime minister Nikola Pasic thought in the 
manner of Maciknder’s dictums: History shows that those who had Macedonia, was always 
the first in the Balkans
42
. Moreover, Macedonia is located in the center of the so-called 
Balkan geopolitical cross
43
, which definitely contends its position as a Heartland of the 
Balkans. Similarly, Serbia possesses the Morava valley which is also an axis where 
transportation routes from east to west interconnect. But most importantly the Vardar and 
Morava river valleys are connected between each other in north-south direction with the pan-
European corridor 10 and thus with their geographical position actually present the heartland 
of the Balkans. Following geopolitical observations are confirming this presumption. Vardar 
valley which ends with its mouth in the Thermaic Gulf (near Thessaloniki), situated in the 
heartland of Macedonia connected with Morava river situated in the central part of Serbia 
which flows into Danube and further continues northwards to former Czech-Slovak border 
ending up on Vistula was identified as the Central European corridor by Milan Hodza in his 
proposal for Danubian Federation
44
. In Hodza’s lecture about Czechoslovakia and Central 
Europe from March 1931 this corridor situated in the heart of the Balkans together with the 
Western European corridor involved in the geopolitics of the European continent, were seen 
as the corridors important for civilization and organization
45
. According to a really important 
author in the field of geopolitics, Yves Lacoste, one of the most important elements in the 
Balkans is the “strategic axis” Morava-Vardar
46
. This very axis, connecting Danube and the 
Aegean sea and being the only really facile route linking the large plains on the central and 
lower Danube with a significant segment of the Mediterranean Sea was, starting with the 19th 
century, the goal of several clearly competing ‘grand strategies’: the Turkish one, the Serbian, 
the Bulgarian, the Albanese, and the Greek one
47
. On all of these strategies of the ‘internal’ 
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Balkan players, the goal of possession of this axis (especially Vardar valley in the case of 
Macedonia) was part of the grand strategies of other ‘external’ players such as Russia (in case 
of San Stefano proposed territory of Bulgaria) and Austro-Hungary. With its position 
Macedonia presents major transportation corridor from Western and Central Europe to 
Aegean Sea and Southern Europe to Western Europe
48
 and also the place where Pan-
European corridors 10 and 8 interconnect. Consequently, Serbia has a similar position with 
the control one of the major land routes from Western Europe to Turkey and the Near East
49
 
and being a place where Pan-European corridors 10 and 7 interconnect. With the position of 
their territories and the transportation infrastructure Macedonia and Serbia connect with road 
and railway network the eastern part of the Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania) with the western 
(Albania, Montengro, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia), as well as the southern part (Greece, 
European part of Turkey) with the European hinterland on the north, which definitely allows 
possibilities for easy expansion in economic and military aspects. Geopolitical and strategic 
importance of the Vardar – Morava axis as a heartland and pivot of the Balkans can be seen 
in the plan for building a channel that will connect them and will make the navigation from 
Danube (hence Rhine and North Sea – Atlantic Ocean) to Aegean Sea (hence Mediterranean 
and through Suez – Indian ocean) possible. The idea of the building of Vardar – Morava 




, and it became again actualized in the recent years 
with the proposals of the Serbian to the Macedonian government and Chinese state owned 
Construction Company which claimed its profitability in 2013
51
. From military aspect the 
territory of Macedonia having advantages of easy defense due to the high mountainous relief 
on the borders and hinterland allows easy access or centrality for attack in all four directions. 
Additionally, the proximity and very short distance of the Aegean Sea (80 km) and Adriatic 
Sea (100 km)
52
 accompanied with the difficult mountainous relief of Greek and Albanian 
hinterlands, gives the Macedonian territory high value for easy rejection of any forthcoming 
amphibious invasion attack whilst in same time it provides great opportunities for quick and 
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successful attack for capture and control of these coasts.     Similarly the territory of Serbia, 
except the province of Vojvodina located in the Panonian Plain north from rivers Danube and 
Sava (which is considered as north physical geographical border of the Balkans), is easy 
defensible due to the relief and with the valleys of the tributaries of Morava towards west, 
east and south provides possibilities and mobility for attack in all of the four directions, 
especially toward the interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and its Adriatic coast 
and northwestern part of Bulgaria where its capital is situated. Hence it can be presumed and 
to some extent concluded that the decision for partition of Macedonia in 1913 besides all 
other reasons, has an very significant geopolitical meaning and implication in preventing a 
formation of one single state with access on the Aegean Sea and control over the all points of 
access such as the river valleys of Aegean basin. Beside all observations on geographical 
features of positioning and relief of the considered Balkan’s Heartland area together with the 
thoughts of geopolitical authors and strategists, some positive examples from the history are 
confirming the assumption that the control and possession of the territories of Macedonia and 
Serbia was crucial for expansion and domination of entire Balkans. Namely, ancient 
Macedonian kingdom of Phillp II and Alexander the Great, medieval Macedonian king 
Samuel, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empire whether emerged from or after conquering 
this Heartland area, successfully and rapidly spread throughout and gained control over the 
whole Balkan Peninsula. Considering the geopolitical power constellation on the Balkans in 
the period after 1991 up today, interesting pattern can be identified for this geographically 
power base for domination – Heartland of the Balkans. While the all other parts or borderline 
(i.e. Rimland – as it is argued below) of this Heartland of the Balkans are integrated in the 
NATO, the two countries that are comprising the Heartland are not members of this military 
alliance, neither they will become in near future although they are aspiring, fulfilling 
conditions, actively contribute (Macedonia) and cooperate (Serbia). Regarding that since the 
Bucharest Summit in 2008 after Greek, publicly stated (by Minister of foreign affairs Mss. 
Bakoyannis) they will block Macedonian for accession
53
, contrary to the ruling of ICJ from 
5.12.2011, NATO members agreed that the country would receive an invitation upon 
resolution of the Macedonia naming dispute for which there is lack of willingness from both 
sides (inspired from positions for defense of the right, freedom and sense of identity from 
Macedonia and geopolitical calculations from Greece), it is evident that Macedonia is not 
going to become full member in long term period. Bearing in mind the fact that after tense 
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relations with NATO due to the intervention (bombardment) in the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, 
Serbia in 2007 has officially declared military neutrality adopted with parliamentary 
resolution from December 2007
54
, seems that the both countries representing the Heartland of 
the Balkans will not be integrated in NATO alliance for long term in the future. Nevertheless, 
the NATO membership of all other states, close cooperation and active involvement in 
euroatlantic integration processes (EU) leave no space for any unexpected geopolitical 
reorientation such as alignment with each other against the rest or realignment with external 
great powers leading to unified possession of the Balkan’s heartland that can deteriorate the 
stability of the Balkans. Another interesting fact about the countries comprising the Heartland 
of the Balkans is that there are many shared similarities in religion (although there is ongoing 
longstanding dispute between both Orthodox churches), language (quite different but from 
same south Slavic group), culture (political and popular), economy, history, beliefs, habits. In 
addition to these linking indicators for the countries of the Balkanic Heartland is the very 
interesting result from a recent poll of the public opinion of the citizens of Macedonia which 
shows that friendliest country is Turkey stated by 16 percent of respondents, followed by 
Serbia with 12.2 percent
55
. Moreover, regarding the attitude towards the five neighbors with 
42.5% of the citizens Serbia is perceived as the friendliest neighbor
56
. As regards with the 
second meaning of the concept of Heartland as a core area based upon the human, natural and 
industrial resources is rather difficult to identify one single heartland of the Balkans. Namely, 
Balkan Peninsula has rather low level of economic development when compared to Western, 
Central and Northern Europe
57
 and moreover the economic integration and interdependence 
between the countries primarily in industrial and resource prospect is rather weak and 
underdeveloped. Except the fact that countries have to some extent moderately developed 
interaction and integration in trade and market aspect, the Balkan does not present a single 
economic entity that has a core area based upon human, natural, industrial resources in 
combination with favorable geographical position and features. In this respect every Balkan 
state has its own core areas that are not thoroughly matching upon the human, industrial or 
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resource bases. For example, the human and industrial resource base of Macedonia is located 
around the capital Skopje in the Vardar valley, while the resource base consisted of minerals 
such as metal ores is dispersed in north-eastern and western together with coal deposits 
located in southwestern region of the country, whereas food production is also dispersed with 
Pelagonia plain as a base of grain production in the south west, Strumica and lower part of 
Vardar valley for vegetables production in the south east of the country. The same is in the 
case with Serbia where human and industrial base is situated near the capital which is located 
on the northern tip of Morava valley in the basin of Danube and Sava, whereas other natural 
resources bases as minerals and food production are dispersed on the east and north 
respectively. Interestingly from geopolitical aspect the biggest resources of coal and lignite 
(over 70% of the mineral deposits and 90% of coal
58
) important for the energy stability 
Serbia have had on the territory of today’s Kosovo. With this lack of the resources Serbia 
additionally was affected from strategic point. This pattern of dispersion of power resources 
bases with concentration of human and industrial infrastructure around the capitals and 
natural resources bases throughout the different parts of the territory is present almost in 
every Balkan state: Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro as a 
result of the genuine historical development of national economies and tendencies of 
centralization experienced in the communism. Even, Greece which has not been under 
communist rule does not thoroughly deviates from this pattern, with food an industrial 
production bas on the north and human resources base around the capital. Albeit Kosovo has 
the richest deposit of coal (14 billion tons of lignite) and mineral ores (lead and zinc) not just 
on the Balkans but also in Europe (sufficient for 13 more centuries according to some 
estimates)
59
, it has positive trends in human resources such as the highest birth rate and 
population growth and is located in the central part of the Balkans (bordered with Macedonia 
and Serbia from three sides) it does not represent the core area of the peninsula that draw the 
interests and willingness of the other states to clash and fought against each other. In short, 
besides several smaller core areas in different regions within the peninsula, the Balkans does 
not have one single core area-heartland of strategic importance in economic and resource 
base prospect that has been fought over its possession and control in history (such as Ruhr, 
                                                 
58
 Thompson, C. Wayne (2012) Nordic, Central and Southeastern Europe 2012. World Today series, Stryker 
Post. p. 489  
59
Flounders, Sara (1998). Kosovo: “The war is about the mines”. July 30
th
, Workers World Newspaper - 
http://www.iacenter.org/folder04/kosovo_mines.htm See also: Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in 
Conflict Resolution. Cambridge University Press, 2007. p.124 
   
 
26 
Saar and Alsas-Loraine or Blue Banana belt in Europe), neither it is objective in the territorial 
claims and national strategies of the states in the present period after 1991.          
   
II.3. RIMLAND OF THE BALKANS 
Another very influential geopolitical concept regarding the control of certain geographical 
spatial area in order to dominate the world is the theory of Rimland championed by the 
American professor of international relations Nicolas Spykman. The concept of the Rimland 
was inspired and developed in close relation and as a response to the Mackinder’s Heartland 
concept. Spykman considered that the Eurasian coastal lands including Maritime Europe, the 
Middle East, India, South East Asia and China were the key to world control because of their 
populations, their rich resources and their use of interior sea lines
60
. High strategic 
importance of possession of this area is expressed in Spykman’s words: “Who controls the 
Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”
61
. This area is 
vulnerable to both sea and land power and it must be operated by the both type of forces for 
survival. Rimland that is actually Mackinder’s Inner or Marginal Crescent with is 
geographical position of surrounding the Heartland and accessible for maritime powers was 
crucial for containing the land powers controlling the pivot area. In that context the 
possession of the geographical area identified as Rimland is primarily in regards of blocking 
the expansion of the power(s) controlling the Heartland. Similarly as Mackinder, in the 
conceptualization of the Rimland, Spykman offered a grandiose division of the world as Old 
World (Eurasia, Africa and Australia) and New World (Americas)
62
, which in geographical 
analogy of the political geographical definition and geographical position can be applied for 
the Balkans.  Despite the numerous reasonable and valid critics for the fragmentation or 
regions that makes the unitary control of it impossible
63
, the advantages of Rimland was 
applied and used in the US policy of containment of USSR communism during the early 
stages of the Cold War. To sum it up, the general abstract definition of the concept of 
Rimland could be comprehended as a maritime accessible fringe of countries that surrounds 
the Heartland allowing possibilities for containing its power and enabling domination in 
certain region. Bearing in mind the mutual close relationship that exist between the both 
concepts everywhere where Heartland could be identified means that there must be a 
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Rimland crucial for balancing or domination. Therefore, concept and own genuine Rimland 
almost thoroughly matching the characteristic of the original one, could be identified and 
generally applied on the Balkans. 
Considering the geographical position, power and political setting of existing states and 
boundaries after 1991 and especially in regards with the already identified and 
aforementioned Heartland of the Balkans the Rimland is comprised primarily of Greece, 
Bulgaria, Albania and Croatia. Montenegrin coast can also be considered as a linking part of 
the Rimland but its internal high scarcely populated mountainous relief poses difficulties for 
any kind of mobility in military prospect for blockade or breakthrough to the Heartland. 
Generally, the Rimland of the Balkans is consisted of the countries that have coasts on the 
littorals of the Black, Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic Seas; are accessible for external land 
powers as well as their territory provides land base for activities intended for containment and 
deterrence of the Heartland. Observing the geographical positioning and the characteristics of 
the relief several advantages of each of these countries for blockade of any attempt for 
domination from the Balkan heartland can be identified. From its coast on the Black Sea, 
Bulgaria possess two great plains of the lowlands of Danube and valley of river Marica 
separated by the Stara Planina (Balkan) which provides terrain for easy mobility westwards 
toward Macedonia and Serbia. Moreover, the Bulgarian territory which cannot be perceived 
as maritime due to its deep penetration into the hinterland of the Balkan Peninsular land 
mass, allows most convenient place for retreat, regrouping and reorganizing for rejection of 
any possible attack from the Heartland. On the other hand Greece can be considered as the 
purely maritime positioned state that controls the entire sea lines from the exit of strategic 
important Dardanelles (and Bosphorus – i.e. Turkish straits), throughout the entire Aegean 
Sea where its territorial waters occupies 35% of its surface (by acquisition of only 6 nautical 
miles while according to Greek claim of the right of 12 nautical miles would cover 63,9%)
64
, 
Mediterranean to the Ionian See close to the entrance in to the basin of Adriatic Sea. Also, 
Greece possesses the great plain of Thessaloniki on the southern tip of the Vardar valley 
which provides territorial base with lower significance for blockade of breakthrough from the 
Balkans Heartland but undoubtedly its greatest importance is the possession of the entire 
maritime encirclement of the Balkans. On the other hand, Albania despite the unfavorable 
high mountainous relief with river valleys that are not linked and do not provide access to the 
hinterland (perfectly shown in the case of unsuccessful Italian invasion on Greece during 
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WWII), its coastland on the 45 miles (72 km) wide Otranto Strait which is entrance gate form 
the Ionian (and Mediterranean) into the Adriatic sea
65
 shows considerably high geographical 
significance in prospect of internal and external context of Balkan geopolitics. However, 
bearing in mind that the conception of the Rimland includes the factor of population the 
unfavorable relief setting of Albania is highly compensated by the qualities of the human 
factor of the Albanian population which is characterized with the highest birth and growth 
rate, youth bulge and most importantly the wide geographical distribution in neighboring 
states of Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Greece with active tendencies for 
expansion more eastwards into the Balkans Heartland. Finally, with the Croatian territory 
which unifies the possession of the largest portion of the Adriatic coastline of Balkan 
Peninsula allowing naval blockade and Slavonia as a part of the huge plain of the Panonian 
lowland – although territories north from river Sava are perceived by some authors as out of 
the northern physical natural border of the Balkans – which is allowing mobility and space 
for attack or retreat eastwards to Serbia, the Rimland of the Balkans as a fringe encircling 
aforementioned Heartland ends up from the western side. It is important to note that 
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (only small “corridor”) have also access on the 
Adriatic sea but their relief and internal composition of the territories do not provide strategic 
advantages in mobility. Moreover, the extremely high significance of geopolitical position of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that will be mentioned in the following chapters, due to 
ethnographic and historical factors makes it suitable candidate for representing another 
geopolitical concept such as shatter belt. Given that prior to the territorial changes resulting 
from the breakup of Yugoslavia the Heartland and most of the western flank of the Rimland 
were unified under the control of a single state, it can be concluded that Bulgaria, Greece and 
Albania are the traditional core of the Balkan’s Rimland. It can be also concluded that this 
territorial placement of Yugoslavia by possessing the Heartland and almost a half of the 
Rimland in geographical strategic military prospect, enabled it to break away from the Soviet 
sphere of influence and successfully resist as a neutral power for such a long time. This may 
explain and give the answer of the previously aforementioned geopolitical setting with 2+2+2 
formula on the Balkans. Moreover, this positioning allowed Yugoslavia to be the bearer of 
the idea for unification of Balkan federation and even have territorial claims towards Italy 
and Austria. Similarly to the original concept, the Rimland of the Balkans is fragmented upon 
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the ethnic-national, religious, linguistic, cultural lines and recently prior to 1991 even 
politically and ideologically. However, given the integration processes until 2008 all 
aforementioned countries are members of NATO which means that despite the differences 
and fragmentation the entire Rimland of the Balkans is unified within a single military 
alliance. Considering some of the political geographic definitions mentioned in the first 
chapter, if we consider Romania as a part of the Balkans it is also NATO member which 
geographical position prolongs the Rimland by bordering the identified Heartland from north-
east. The total encirclement of NATO members of the Heartland or Macedonia and Serbia as 
two Orthodox Christian, culturally close but ethnic, national and linguistically different 
states, ends up with Hungary (although it is not Balkanic nor geographically, neither 
politically and culturally neither it is maritime accessible state) which bordering from the 
north unifies the both flanks of the Rimland from west (Croatia) and east (Romania). The 
strategic use of this identified Rimland of the Balkans can be seen in two cases after 1991: 1) 
during the embargo and bombardment campaign on Yugoslavia (especially in the Pristina 
Airport Incident in the Kosovo crisis, when Bulgaria and Romania closed their airspace for 
Russian air forces) and 2) the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001 when USA and NATO 
blocked and encumbered the arm supplies shipments from Ukraine for Macedonian security 
forces with closing the route exports through Bulgaria and Greece
66
. In broader regional 
context regarding the great powers struggle, the position of Bulgaria in this Rimland of the 
Balkans is very important. Namely, with Bulgarian accession to NATO the Russian 
alternative for penetration on Aegean Sea through direct Bulgarian breakthrough the western 
Thracian barrier and exit on the northern part of the Aegean Sea is completely thwarted on 
the long term
67
. This was well known Russian aspiration is present as a main goal even in the 
greater Bulgaria concept proposed in San Stefano peace agreement of 1878. Finally, Turkey 
also a NATO member (since 1952) and very important ruler and geopolitical actor on the 
Balkans for centuries have very specific position regarding the patterns of division of the 
world in Mackinder’s and Spykman’s (as well as Cohen’s) geopolitical conceptualizations. 
Regardless that the European part of Turkey as part of the peninsular landmass having access 
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on Black, Marmara and Aegean Seas and the extremely important Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles Straits complementing the Rimland, the overall position of the Turkish territory 
especially due to its larger and dominant Anatolian part in Asia Minor separated by the seas 
fits more in the divisions such as Pivot Area, Inner (Marginal) Crescent and Outer (Insular) 
Crescent or “Old” and “New World” with Turkey representing the Outer crescent of the 
Balkans, respectively. Moreover, regarding the growing influence and the role that Turkey 
plays as an actor in the Balkans hinterland and Heartland is analogous of the position and role 
of outer (maritime world) powers globally. By this we can draw a complete map of the 
Balkans in political definition according and in analogy to basic initial geopolitical thinking 
with Heartland (Macedonia and Serbia) as Pivot Area, Rimland (Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, 
Croatia) as Inner Marginal Crescent and Turkey as Outer Insular Crescent.             
    
II.4. TELLUROCRACY AND THALASSOCRACY ON THE BALKANS 
Tied with the natural environment and physic spatial space development of the human 
communities and societies was influenced by the two basic geopolitical ways of thinking: 
tellurocracy - or “rule of the land” and thalassocracy - or “rule of the sea”. Moreover, the 
entire history of the humanity, international relations and even the actual geopolitical struggle 
is seen as a perpetual confrontation between tellurocratic (continental) and thalassocratic 
(maritime) great powers. Even more, the two aforementioned greatest geopolitical concepts 
of Heartland and Rimland are derived from and in compliance with the tellurocratic and 
thalassocratic geopolitical way of thinking. In that context tellurocracy means that in order to 
dominate the world (or certain area – microcosm) it is necessary to rule the land mass while 
on the contrary thalassocracy implies the necessity of the control or rule of the seas. Inspired 
by these tenets many authors starting from Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, German school of 
geopolitik up to present day Dugin and Brzezinski have constructed their geopolitical theories 
and concepts. Within the thalassocratic thinking Alfred Thayer Mahan championed the so-
called “Geopolitics of sea” which states that maritime – sea power would dominate the world 
if it has control over the sea lines especially through possession of the strategic narrow straits 
called choke points where the sea line, shipping and trade routes passes. In global geopolitical 
and geostrategic context the Balkan Peninsula has the aforementioned Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles (i.e. Turkish) Straits on eastern and Otranto Strait (Gate) on western shore as 
choke points, all of them under possession and control of NATO members. The inland 
isolated position of the littoral of the Black Sea and its close hydrographic connection with 
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the Mediterranean Sea has always had extremely high importance
68
. It has crucial importance 
for well known Russian aspiration for access to warm water seas and projecting sea power as 
well as for the western British, French and American blockade. The great significance of the 
Black Sea and the Balkan Peninsula as its western coast with proximity of the straits as its 
entrance and exit gate have been confirmed many time with the Crimean War, Great Eastern 
Crisis and Russian proposed Great Bulgaria in San Stefano Treaty, Cold War. The ongoing 
crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, the US naval drilss with Bulgarian and Romanian navies in 
response to Russian capture of Crimea, shows that in global geopolitical context the Black 
Sea would remain as highly relevant and the Balkans will be in involved due to its strategic 
territorial and maritime position. Significance in prospect of geopolitics of sea continues with 
the Aegean Sea basin which is the only access route from Black to the Mediterranean Sea and 
a place where the maritime and insular contact of the Balkan and Anatolian land mass 
represent an area with extremely important communication in global and regional military 
strategic and economic context, makes this sea the most important part of the 
Mediterranean
69
. Position of the numerous islands and dispute over the delimitation are the 
essence of the Greek-Turkish conflict, which despite the fact that the both states are NATO 
members make Aegean Sea as region of high conflict potential. Finally in the observation of 
the seas enclosing the Balkans, despite the delimitation border dispute between Croatia and 
Slovenia and prospect for the Russian Adriatic alternative through Montenegro, Adriatic Sea 
has the lowest conflict potential and geopolitical strategic significance due to its closed 
position entirely encircled by members of NATO.  In regards with our analytical approach for 
the Balkans as a microcosm to which global geopolitical concepts and theories are applied 
and examined, tellurocracy as well as thalassocracy can be observed whether the territorial 
changes since 1991 and actual geopolitical strife are based on the significance of the land or 
sea possession and domination. Except from the antiquity where the Balkan Peninsula was a 
place of the dominance of thalassocratic powers – Hellenic city states until the clash with the 
tellurocratic power of that time - Macedonia under the reign of Phillip II -after whose victory 
the tellurocracy was established as a dominating ruling principle. Entire set of the territorial 
changes that happened after the breakup of Yugoslavia, inspired by the great nationalist 
territorial conceptions that usually points out historical important heartlands for the birth of 
the nations (ex. perception of Kosovo for Serbia and Albania, mentioned in the next 
                                                 
68
 Mileski, Toni (2005). Makedonija – Rubikova kocka na Balkanot. Filozofski Fakultet, Skopje. p. 67 (on 
Macedonian)   
   
 
32 
chapters), were based on the significance of the land acquisition. Additionally, entire wars, 
decisive battles and operation of Yugoslav wars were waged on land often with very crucial 
importance of the control of strategic points. There was only one small naval battle of the 
Dalmatian channels (Korcula and Split) between 14 and 16 November 1991 concluded with 
Croatian victory. Navy was used for the Yugoslav blockade in support of the unsuccessful 
siege of Dubrovnik and battle for Sibenik where Croatian forces captured Yugoslav navy 
facilities and used in defense. Another place where maritime position has significance is the 
Aegean Dispute between Greece and Turkey with often incidents of violation of the airspace. 
Nevertheless, except Greece that can be identified as the primarily maritime positioned and 
the strongest naval power with Turkey, the entire geopolitical positions and strategies 
whether military or even more upon soft power spread of influence are land based showing 
prevalence of the tellurocracry.  However, sea or naval power and maritime position had no 
significance in the wars neither in actual interstate relations and geopolitical struggles in the 
Balkans which confirms that tellurocracy is the predominant way of geopolitical thinking.        
 
II.5. BALKANS AS A SHATTERBELT, CRUSH ZONE OR GATEWAY REGION 
In the post-cold war contemporary geopolitics several new conceptualizations of the world 
map appeared bringing new concepts and definitions for specific regions and areas. Among 
the influential newly created concepts are the gateway regions and states, shatter belts and 
crush zone as defined in the works of Saul Cohen, Robert Kaplan and other authors. Shatter 
belts are defined as strategically oriented regions that are both deeply divided internally and 
caught up in the competition between great powers of the geostrategic realms
70
. Unlike most 
geopolitical regions that have varying degree of cohesiveness, shatter belts are global 
destabilizers
71
. The concept of shatterbelt has long held the attention and also terms such as 
“Shatter zone” or “Crush Zone” have been used by geographers as Alfred Mahan, James 
Fairgrieve and Richard Hartshorne who were studying them. By 1915 Fairgrieve used the 
term “Crush Zone” to describe small buffer states between the sea powers and Eurasian 
Heartland from Northern and Eastern Europe to the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Siam 
and Korea
72
. Later, during the World War II, Hartshorne analyzed the “Shater Zone” of 
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Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic
73
. From the contemporary aspect Cohen 
predicts that the future may bring additional Shatter belts onto the world scene and the most 
likely candidate is the new/old zone from the Baltic trough Eastern Europe and the Balkans
74
. 
Undoubtedly the Balkans completely fulfils the definition of shatterbelt: deeply internally 
divided by ethnic, national, religious, linguistic and cultural lines and caught up in the 
competition between great and regional powers. Since the mid 19
th
 century the Balkans was 
arena: 1) of direct confrontation between Ottoman Empire, Russia and Austro-Hungary with 
Great Britain, France and Germany being involved indirectly by supporting one of the 
confronted parties; 2) direct confrontation between USA and USSR on the beginning of the 
Cold War (Greek civil War) and 3) moderate confrontation of the interests of USA, European 
Union, Russia, Turkey and Islamic World in the Yugoslav wars after 1991. After the end of 
the wars and the beginning of the process of euro-atlantics integration, USA and western 
powers gained total dominance due to the integration and orientation towards NATO and EU 
of the all countries. However, by the end of the first decade of 21
st
 century with the 
independence of the quasi-state of Kosovo, the blockade, high ethnic and religious conflict 
potential and uncertain stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia the rise and 
struggle of influence of other regional powers primarily Turkey vividly appeared. Moreover, 
the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo with Presevo Valley in Southern 
Serbia and Macedonia can be identified as shatterbelt within (of) the Balkans, due to the 
extremely deep internal division upon ethnic, religious, cultural lines, strategic position, 
conflict potential, weak cohesiveness and stability and most importantly competition of all 
neighboring states as well as involvement of regional and global powers such as USA, 
Turkey, Russia, EU. Territorially compact belt of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sanjdak, Kosovo 
with Presevo Valley in Southern Serbia and Macedonia which in fact present geopolitical 
objects of the actions and competition of the Balkan geopolitical subjects (Serbia, Croatia, 
Albania, Bulgaria and Greece – i.e. all neighboring states) has a role of regional destabilizer.  
On the other hand, gateway states are playing novel role in linking different parts of the 
world by facilitating the exchange of people, goods and ideas whose characteristic may wary 
in detail but not in the overall context of their strategic economic locations or in adaptability 
of their inhabitants to economic reforms and exchange
75
. In that context, the concept of 
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gateway regions is logical extension of the gateway state concept
76
. From historical aspect the 
Balkans was a gateway region between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, because under the 
Ottoman rule it was it’s economically, politically and culturally most developed region with 
former Roman, Byzantine (i.e. Christian European) heritage, bordering Europe. According to 
Cohen’s observations from the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Balkans) Slovenia is perceived as 
gateway state while Montenegro is potential gateway state within the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe
77
. Regarding the former position as the only free market capitalist economic 
system together with its strategic position it can be concluded that in the 90’s and early years 
of 2000’s – the period of transition of former socialist economies - until the disastrous 
financial debt crisis Greece has played role as gateway state on the Balkans. Noting the fact 
that southeast Europe (i.e. Balkans) is the economically lowest developed region, with 
insignificant economic performance, tied in economic exchange relationship only with 
Europe it shows that it does not have the role of gateway region despite the higher economic 
development than the neighboring regions towards east and south. Nevertheless, according to 
Cohen’s idea about the possibility of  shatter belts to mutate in gateways
78
, the strategic 
geographic position of the Balkans towards Middle East, the former Soviet states of Eastern 
Europe and North Africa would play the decisive role in the possible transformation of a 
gateway region between them and Central (and Western) Europe. However, recently 
increased presence with financing large scale investments in infrastructure (dams and 
motorways in Macedonia, Serbia and ports in Greece) from China indicates its attempts to 
turn the Balkans as economic gateway to European Union which confirms the gradual 
transformation of the position of the Balkans as a gateway region of a global geopolitical 
actor.          
II.6. GEOPOLITICS OF AIR IN RELATION WITH  THE BALKANS 
 With the growing pace of the development and advances of the technology in the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century a new stage and conceptualization of geopolitics emerged. Inspired from 
the advances of the usage of the air force Giulio Douhet and Alexander the Seversky 
established the geopolitics of the air. In the manner of tellurocratic and thalassocratic way of 
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thinking about the superiority of land and sea power in regards of world domination De 
Seversky argued about the superiority of air power proposing a unique “airman’s global 
view”. He believed that virtually complete air supremacy, not just local or temporary air 
superiority is possible
79
.  In his view the position, configuration and azimuthally equidistant 
projection centered of the cartographic expression of the North Pole has the crucial 
significance over which the US and Soviet air dominance clash
80
. While most of US air 
dominance stretches over Central and South America and Soviet over Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa, the entire North Pole, Europe, Eurasia and North Africa are the Area of decision 
within the striking range of both air forces. Hence, the Balkans is situated within this area of 
decision. Use of air force bombing over the Balkans was present throughout the entire 20
th
 
century. Aerial bombardments over Balkans took place as early as First World War and later 
again during the Second World War. Regarding the geopolitics of air the Balkans after 1991 
shows some unique features and indicators. Interestingly, the Balkans was the only place in 
Europe that after the end of the Cold War in the 90’s was bombarded by air campaigns. The 
first air campaign on the Balkans started during the War in Bosnia, early as April 1993. As 
follow-on to the monitoring operation of Op. Sky Monitor, NATO aircraft enforced the UN 
Security Council’s No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. Subsequent additions to Operation Deny Flight 
included Close Air Support to UN peacekeepers and air strikes in support of UN 
resolutions
81
. On 28 February 1994 NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its 
history when DENY FLIGHT aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers 
conducting a bombing mission in violation of the No-Fly Zone
82
(the so-called Banja Luka 
Incident). After the Markale marker massacre in Sarajevo, on 30
th
 August 1995 on the 
request of UN peacekeepers NATO launched three weeks long Operation Deliberate Force
83
 
targeted on Bosnian Serb command and control installations and ammunition facilities. These 
airstrikes were a key factor in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war 
in Bosnia
84
. Four years later during the Kosovo crisis, NATO launched the air campaign of 
bombing of FR Yugoslavia which lasted from 24
th
 of March until 11
th
 of June 1999 resulting 
with the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and establishment of UNMIK mission in Kosovo. In 
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this mission named Allied Force, NATO used a wide range of aircraft and naval weapons 
against the FRY including submarine-launched cruise missiles, fighters, fighter bombers, air 
defense aircraft and AWACS
85
, as well as depleted uranium and cluster bombs. Both aerial 
bombing campaign in Bosnia and FR Yugoslavia were conducted from Aviano air base in 
north eastern Italy, with extraordinary high rate of successfulness due to the minor losses (1 
plane shot down in Deliberate Force, 2 in Deny Flight and 3 in Allied Force among which is 
the famous shot down of F-117A Nighthawk) and the complete achievement of the goal of 
defeating the opponent. Bearing in mind the fact that if all recognised and non-recognised 
political and territorial units are taken into account, there are 13 of them with the average size 
of 40,000 sq. km
86
, which is considerably small size of territory each state or entire region is 
highly vulnerable on air attacks and use of conventional weapons. This is actually the main 
reason of the high rate of success of the NATO air campaigns. In regards of the strategic 
position of the Balkan Peninsula in global context it has also high significance. Joint air bases 
that US since 2006 have in Bulgaria (Bezmer and Graf Ignatievo) and Romania have 
extremely crucial significance in regards of possible air campaigns on the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe and the geopolitical struggle with Russia and Iran. For the possible air 
campaign for retaliation of Syria in the summer of 2013, US officially sought from Greek 
government access of the military bases – air base in Kalamatha (on Peloponnesus) for the 
support of the operation
87
. Given the global geopolitical changes after the Cold War 
characterized with permanently high importance of the Middle East and North Africa, as well 
as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, considering the position of the Balkans, it will definitely be 
further highly important in regards of the global geopolitics of air. 
CHAPTER III - BALKAN NATION STATES AND THEIR 
GREATER TERRITORIAL CONCEPTS 
After explaining, application and comparison of the politico-geographical and geopolitical 
features of the countries of the Balkans with the basic geopolitical theories and concepts, next 
element which presents a reason for the specific geopolitics of the Balkans, especially the 
inclination toward conflicts and territorial changes are the great nation states concepts and 
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their territorial claims. The correlation between these greater territorial concepts or simply 
their involvement into the territorial changes and wars that occurred and happened after 1991 
will be the main theme of this and the next topic. Before the start of the review and 
explanation of them in details, it is necessary to outline the common features and patterns of 
these concepts. Without exception all countries of the Balkans have their own greater nation 
state territorial concepts with respective irredentist movements, often backed by strong 
political and official governmental support. Another common feature regarding the great 
nation-state territorial concepts is that all of them are based on the references to the historical 
territories of medieval and ancient empires, of which the Balkan nations are claiming direct 
progeny. Also, all Balkan countries have included their great national territorial concepts in 
the education processes, in the schools and textbooks - especially for history and geography 
as studying and describing the territorial scope of their native homeland. The primary goal of 
this task of education is to instill and bolster consciousness and perception of these greater 
territories as national territory not just of political figures but to every single citizen or 
member of the ethnic and national community. Hence, the greater national territorial concepts 
of the all Balkan countries are relevant and can be found clearly present in the public life, 
namely culture, literature and even sports, as the latter on is obvious with recent call from the 
Albanian president Sali Berisha for forming pan-Albanian football league
88
. Presence of the 
national irredentists ideas, are also very often found among the official sources in the 
countries. Whether these territorial concepts are proposed officially by the governments or 
academic institutions or they are proposed by the political parties or civil society movements, 
they are inevitable part of the political life of the every single country in the Balkans and 
often of the international relations and politics in Europe. Interestingly, another new common 
feature of all of them in context of the strategy of their support, commitment or even 
fulfillment, evolved as a result of the peace and integration processes sponsored by USA, 
NATO and EU. Namely, all of the great national territorial concepts find their place and 
continued their existence in accordance with the integration processes. The countries which 
are candidates and want to join EU and NATO, as it is most obvious case with Albanians, 
where politicians officially state that the unification of all Albanians (provisioned in the 
concept of Greater or “Ethnic” Albania) will be realized within EU and NATO, when all 
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countries where they live will become members and the borders will lose their meaning and 
thus for the first time after 1912 all Albanians in the region will be part of same political 
unit
89
. The same is stated by some journalists and public figures about the unification of the 
Macedonians from the Republic of Macedonia and those who live in the other parts of 
Macedonia within Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. Regarding the great nation state territorial 
concept it is important to be underlined that the Balkan states which are already members of 
EU (and NATO), such as Greece and Bulgaria, besides the political parties or movements and 
groups in the civil society, the official governmental policies are also conducted in 
compliance with these concepts, especially regarding the celebration of historical events, 
presentation of cultural and historical heritage and the so-called “care of compatriots living 
abroad”. Regarding the justification of all of these great territorial concepts there is one 
argument about the naturalness of the national territories. Namely, using geographical 
arguments some of these ideas claim that the natural and physical features of the terrain are 
creating and forming natural unit – land, which has its own (natural) economical, 
geographical meaning and originality. Another argument which is used in justification of 
these entire territorial concepts is the inviolable and undisputed historical right of the claimed 
territories. This argument which evolves from allegations for the indigenousness 
(autochthony) of the people to the territories is supported by historical, cultural, 
archeological, linguistic arguments and facts. Considering the political addresses and actions 
towards these concepts there are two patterns how these territorial concepts are related. The 
first one is in a relation with people still living in the certain territories. In this prospect 
political action is more evident with support by the people living in the other country, thus 
having implications on the political life and relations between the countries as well as within 
the countries. With people living in the other country supporting the irredentist idea for 
unification, this pattern sometimes is more prone for military actions. This characteristic of 
the pattern is most obvious in the cases with Albanian, Serbian and Croatian greater territorial 
concepts. The second one is based on calling upon the historical facts and heritage on the 
claimed territories. Having no compatriots living in the other country whose territory is 
included in the great territorial conceptions, this pattern is not that conflictual comparing to 
previous one. Thus, this second pattern is more present within the political, cultural, 
academic-scientific life of the country – holder of the irredentist idea, without having any 
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largely significant implications for the official relations with the other countries. In this 
prospect this characteristic is more prevalent in the cases of Macedonian, Greek, Bulgarian 
territorial concepts. Nevertheless, all these kind of concepts have radical (militarily) 
supporters which is additional reason for the conflict on the Balkans. Last characteristic of 
the territorial concept is that they are morally argumented as a justful for the normal existence 
of the nations and correction historical injustices. Finally, it is important to be pointed out 
that it this analysis of the great national concepts of the Balkan states would be conducted in 
regards and comparison of the application of the geopolitical concepts and theories from the 
previous chapter as well as their implementation and interrelation with the territorial changes 
after 1991 especially during the Yugoslav Wars. This interrelation would serve as an 
indicator for the extent to which the greater territorial geopolitical concepts of the Balkan 
states acted as a driving force of the territorial changes by fostering the motivation as well as 
for setting the goals and national agenda.  
 
III.1. UNITED MACEDONIA  
On the territory known as Macedonia from the ancient history, lived and still living 
ethnically, linguistically and culturally specific people which have naturally developed 
Macedonian national self-consciousness and nationhood. Although during the history the 
term Macedonia administratively covered different scope of areas, it core has always been the 
watersheds of the rivers Vardar, Bistrica and Struma, the northern coast of the Aegean Sea 
with the Thermaic Gulf (the Gulf of Salonika) and between the mountains Olympus to the 
south, Shar to the northwest and Pirin to the east. On this territory specific Macedonian 
national self-consciousness developed to the extent of attempts with clear national strife for 
statehood and independence from Ottoman Empire, especially during the end of the 19
th
 
century. Rebellions, as well as political movements, as the Interim Government of Macedonia 
from 1880, envisioned creation of independent and free Macedonian state on this territory. 
Also, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization acted throughout the whole this 
territory, preparing the people and conditions for uprising and liberation of this territory, 
under the concept for Autonomous Macedonia. As a last remained part of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe with very favorable geographical position and great economic potential 
along the backward social and educational situation of the population, Macedonia became 
battlefield of political (and religious) propagandas and great national concepts of the 
neighboring liberated kingdoms of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. This resulted with the two 
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Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, and the Bucharest Peace Treaty according to which the 
territory of Macedonia was partitioned among the three Balkan states, and one very small part 
to the newly formed Albania. From the aspect of the aforementioned application of 
geopolitical theories on the Balkans, the partition of Macedonia made possession of the 
Heartland of the Balkans form a single power that was Ottoman Empire for centuries to be 
handed over to the newly established neighboring states, which by not allowing formation of 
independent Macedonian state on this strategic positioned area seemingly contributed for 
temporal balance of power of existing states. After this, strong political movement for 
unification of the Macedonia emerged, envisioning the concept of the United Macedonia. The 
territorial concept of the United Macedonia is comprised by the regions (parts) of Vardar 
Macedonia: present day independent Republic of Macedonia with the area of the monastery 
Prohor Pcinjski in Serbia and the region of Gora between Kosovo and Albania: Aegean 
Macedonia which is now under Greece (its northern part administratively organized in the 
three prefectures of Western, Central and Eastern Macedonia without Thrace); Pirin 
Macedonia which is now under Bulgaria, completely in its administrative unit of 
Blagoevgrad Oblast) and Mala Prespa and Golo Brdo now under Albania in its southeastern 
part. Within these borders Macedonia covers territory of 67,741 square kilometers, or about 
15% of the Balkan Peninsula
90
. Since Macedonian territory was partitioned and occupied by 
the armies of the Balkan states after the wars in 1912-1913, the concept of United Macedonia 
emerged and evolved as a strong political idea of the Macedonian liberation movement and 
intelligentsia. Macedonian intelligentsia in St. Petersburg in 1913 announced and sent a 
memorandum of the independence of Macedonia to the British and Russian foreign ministers 
and European public, accompanied with the Map of Macedonia (made by Dimitrija 
Chupovski) including all of these territories
91
. Between the two world wars The Comintern, 
the Balkan Communist parties, and the Macedonian revolutionaries, had emphasized a 
Macedonian political and civic consciousness and nation and embraced the cause of 
liberation and reunification and this was to occur through a socialist revolution, paving the 
way for a Balkan Communist federation, with reunited Macedonia as an equal partner
92
. 
Moreover, the Comintern specifically called for an independent united Macedonia
93
. Thus, 
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the movement for United Macedonia grew much stronger within the political organizations as 
well as the  Macedonian masses in the period before and right after the Second World War. 
Until the end of the Second World War the concept of unification of Macedonia was 
inevitable part of efforts of Macedonian political liberation movements, including the 
communists which have organized the armed struggle against the fascist occupiers. On the 
first assembly of the Anti Fascists National Assembly of Macedonia (ASNOM) held in the 
monastery of Prohor Pcinski on 2
nd
 of August 1944, delegates from Pirin and Aegean Part of 
Macedonia, under Bulgaria and Greece were present and also these regions of Macedonia 
were mentioned in the public addresses of the opening of the constitutional session. The idea 
of United Macedonia was supported by Metodija Andonov – Chento the first president of 
ASNOM who even planned to plead for it on the Paris Peace Conference
94
 (along with many 
prominent political and public figures in socialist Macedonia), who was sentenced in jail 
because of that, thus becoming a symbol of the repression of the communist regime. Closest 
to the partial realization of the unification of Macedonia took place in the period immediately 
after World War II when the Bulgarian President Georgi Dimitrov in 1947 signed the Bled 
Agreement which envisioned union (unification) of Pirin Macedonia and Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia in Yugoslavia
95
. In this period the national rights rights of Macedonians were 
recognized and they received broad cultural autonomy in Pirin Macedonia in Bulgaria. 
Moreover, in the Civil War in Greece (1945-1949), the Greek communists partially accepted 
the idea of united Macedonia within a Balkan federation that was to include Macedonian 
inhabited territories thus winning their sympathies in the districts of Kostur/Castoria, 
Lerin/Florina, and Voden/Edhessa
96
. This support for unification of Macedonia led to a 
enormous support of the Macedonians (with around 14,000 fighters) to the Greek Communist 
Insurgency and after the defeat and expulsion of the refugees it became one of the issues of 
contention between Macedonia and Greece. Although this territorial concept and idea of the 
Macedonian land within the mentioned regions was present in the official historical and 
school books, academic and popular literature, as well as the public life of the people, 
especially after the repatriation of the Macedonian political refugees from the Civil War in 
Greece, its support was politically suppressed (and forbidden) by the communist regime. 
Henceforth, the idea and the support for the United Macedonia become a primal object of the 
Macedonian emigration. Many Macedonian emigrant organizations have the unification of 
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Macedonia as a first political goal and task. In the countries where Macedonians lived in 
Europe, North America and Australia a political movement was formed under the name 
“Movement for Liberation and Unification of Macedonia” (Dvizenje za osloboduvanje I 
obedinuvanje na Makedonija - DOOM) which published magazine called “Macedonian 
Nation”, provisioning political platform for unification and informing about the life of the 
Macedonians from all parts of Macedonia. In the years of the end of the communist regime in 
Yugoslavia, and the democratization in the late 80’s and early 90’s, all patriotic and right-
wing political parties registered and active in Macedonia, have the concept of United 
Macedonia as a political goal, inevitable in their political programs and public addresses. 
Currently ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE (founded on the initiative of the leader of DOOM - 
Dragan Bogdanovski) in its first party resolution in 1990 called for United Macedonia
97
 and 
was even proclaiming that the next congress will be held in Salonika (Thessaloniki), where 
actually the historical Macedonian revolutionary movement - VMRO was founded in 1893. 
This revival and mentioning of the concept of the United Macedonia together with the 
independence was immediately seen as a threat of territorial pretensions for Greece, which 
has objected Macedonian accession in UN arguing that Macedonia has territorial claims and 
it represents security threat for the Balkans. Despite the inability of Macedonia, and officially 
clearly stated unwillingness for any territorial changes (change and removal of the Article 48 
of the Constitution which provisioned care for the Macedonian minorities in the neighboring 
countries), the concept of United Macedonia present in the everyday public life in Macedonia 
is still used as one of the main arguments in the ongoing name dispute and blockades 
imposed from Greece to the Macedonian integration in EU and NATO. Although the concept 
is not officially supported by any Macedonian government, neither one of the prominent 
political parties, it is still present in the public life and the activities of the civil society such 
as nongovernmental organizations, magazines, cultural manifestations especially in the 
period after the Greek veto on Macedonian accession on the NATO summit in Bucharest 
2008 and the 100
th
 anniversary of the partitioning of Macedonia by the Bucharest Peace 
Treaty Agreement of 1913. After the independence of Macedonia the only activity regarding 
the unification of Macedonia, was made by the leader of political party MAAK, Strasho 
Angelovski, who in 1997 in UN headquarters in Geneva sought through legal means a 
revision of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913. Not a single military, diplomatic or official 
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political act, neither formation of paramilitary organizations aimed for armed unification of 
Macedonia or public protest and manifestations happened since the independence of 
Macedonia. Moreover, despite the single efforts for righteous unification of the partitioned 
parts of Macedonia, there is no such an official and clearly adopted poltical, geostrategic and 
geopolitical platform, concept and strategy for the concept of the United Macedonia.  
Additionally, the idea is not fully accepted and supported in the society, where left-wing and 
self-declared pro-European political parties and public figures are strongly opposing and 
criticizing any attempt and mentioning of the concept of United Macedonia. From the 
perspective of aforementioned geopolitical conceptualization in the previous chapter, United 
Macedonia would encompass and connect (link) the Heartland of the Balkans with the 
Aegean Sea including its entire watershed with the basins of the Vardar, Struma and Mesta 
rivers. From strategic perspective this would cut off, break and disable unification of the 
Rimland which will lead to quite strong position of Macedonia isolating Greece deep on the 
south and cutting of its territorial relations with other Balkan states thus making containment 
and blockade of Macedonia rather difficult.    
III.2. GREATER ALBANIA  
Early as 1877/78, during the Great Eastern Crisis in Europe the territorial concept of greater 
Albania emerged from the proclamation of the political organization called Prizren League
98
. 
This platform proposed four Ottoman villayets of Ishkodra, Yannina, Kosovo and Monastir to 
gain full autonomy into a single territorial unit
99
, and ever since its establishment became 
inevitable part of Albanian political activity and actions on the Balkans in geopolitical 
context. Prizren League was in fact a response to the Berlin Congress and attempt to stop the 
allotting Albanian inhabited lands to newly established Slav states
100
. The concept of greater 
Albania in addition to the existing Republic of Albania includes Kosovo, Preshevo valley in 
southern Serbia, western part of Macedonia, northwestern Greece and southern Montenegro. 
During the Second World War as a protectorate of fascist Italy, Albania extended its borders 
eastwards on most of modern day Kosovo (except of southeastern and northern part) and 
western part of Macedonia. Although during the Cold War, Albania was isolated country, 
numerous Albanian minority in socialist Yugoslavia despite the high level of autonomy in the 
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province of Kosovo, was demanding a status of a republic. Given that constituent republics of 
Yugoslavia according to their constitutions in the Marxist-Leninist spirit have guaranteed 
right of self-determination up to secession, many scholars and politicians argue that the real 
aim of the political demand “Kosovo Republic” was in fact an act of Albanian separatism 
inspired and oriented towards unification in the greater Albania. The irredentist concept of 
Greater Albania had a great and wide support among the Albanian Diaspora which lobbied 
and gathered enormous financial aid and assets for the armed insurgencies of the Albanian 
paramilitary rebel organizations which has followed in the end of the  90’s and beginning  of 
the new millennia. While the support for the idea of ‘Pan-Albanianism’ exists mostly among 
the Albanian diaspora from former Yugoslavia especially in Germany, Switzerland and US, 
‘Greater Albania’ has not been so appealing to the Albanians living inside the Albanian 





Nevertheless, the Greater Albanian concept have also been revived and reemerged on the 
Balkans after 1991 inside as well as outside of Albania. Calling upon the arguments that 
Albanians suffered the biggest territorial partitioning and primarily concerning the situation 
in Kosovo, the Albanian Academy of Sciences in 1998 officially issued the Platform for 
solution of National Albanian Question proposing unification of the historical lands on the 
geographical space embracing the territories from Nis, Leskovac and Vranje in North, as far 
East as Kumanovo, Prilep and today Bitola, and as far South as Konica, Yoanina, and 
Preveza
102
. The wars in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia as well as the consolidation 
process of democratic transition in Albania strengthened the basis and established the 
platform of Greater Albania as the core political program of Albanian politics and parties 
outside Albania. The developments and the greater progress of Albanian armed struggle 
backed by the Western powers, primarily USA, made it as most lively and fulfilling great 
national territorial concept in the geopolitical affairs on the Balkans. The Albanian irredentist 
concept with the enhancement of the Albanian position of the Balkans and the strong rise of 
its nationalism, as it is case elsewhere, it is supported by the theories of ancient Illyrian origin 
of Albanians. Intelligibly the concept of greater Albania has different names among the 
Albanian political organizations and people, ranging from “historical Albanian territories”, 
“native Albanian lands”, “ethnic Albania” (Shqiperia Ethnike) to the newest formulation and 
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contemplation of the concept as “Natural Albania” by Koco Danaj
103
.  This irredentist 
concept today includes the territory of Albania, Kosovo, western and northwestern part of 
Macedonia including the capital Skopje, Preshevo valley with municipalities Preshevo, 
Bujanovac and Medvedja in southern Serbia, southern Montenegro including the capital 
Podgorica and entire northwestern part of Greece (so-called Chameria or Southern Epirus). 
Despite that Albanian greater territorial concept is complex set of actual and historical 
presence of Albanian population tied with nationalist mythology, it predominantly relies of 
the numerous and steadily growing Albanian minorities living in the neighboring states. 
Hence, the maps of the greater Albanian territorial concept also include regions of Sanjdak 
(part of former Kosovo Villayet), parts of Jablanica and Toplica districts in Serbia (near Nis 
and Leskovac) parts of central Macedonia where very few or no Albanians live at all. This is 
result of the former historical presence of Albanian settlements in Jablanica and Toplica 
districts in southern Morava valley that have been expelled after Serbian independence, and 
the fact that Novi Pazar and parts of Central Macedonia where parts of villayets mentioned in 
Prizren League although Albanians never lived in those areas. From the perspective of the 
support of external great powers except from fascist Italy during Second World War, idea of 
greater Albania did not have supporters until the end of 20
th
 century. Since the 90’s during 
the Kosovo War and insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, the Albanian struggle had a wide 
strong support from USA and western allies. Bearing in mind that Albanian armed struggle 
was world widely presented as struggle for freedom and human rights, despite their official 
proclamations for “expulsion of the Slavic occupiers from the Albanian territories” (see the 
statements of KLA in Kosovo in 1998 and communiqués of NLA in Macedonia in 2001 in 
Chapter IV) the support of USA and western allies has actually indirectly reflected toward the 
realization of the idea of Greater Albania. Very important indicator of the potential of the 
concept of Greater Albania is the significantly high public support shown in the polls. 
Namely, majority of Albanians in Albania (63%), Kosovo (81%) and Macedonia (53%) 
support the idea of Greater Albania
104
. Even more important is the open support and  
intention that show the highest ranking Albanian politicians as it was case in the speeches of 
Albanian president Sali Berisha given in Macedonian capital Skopje and Albanian city of 
Vlora on the celebration of 100
th
 anniversary of independence of Albania on 28
th
 of 
November 2012, where he spoke for the "Albanian lands" stretching from Preveza in Greece 
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to Presevo in Serbia, and from the Macedonian capital of Skopje to the Montenegrin capital 
of Podgorica
105
. In context of the realization of Greater Albania much significant is the 
mobilizing power of the Islamic Community over the Muslim minorities in Macedonia with 
the most tangible evidence by the statement of the head of the Macedonian Islamic 
Community, Sulejman Rexhepi who stated that unification of Albania was God’s will calling 
for rewriting the authentic Albanian borders and assuring that Islamic Community (IVZ) will 
contribute with its full capacity to the national cause
106
. Finally, last indicator that shows the 
liveliness and high potential of the Greater Albanian concept is the high birth and population 
growth  rate that Albanians have (highest on the Balkans) accompanied with the expansion of 
compact settling in different areas. The most tangible example of this was the Albanian 
majority municipalities according to the new territorial organization of Macedonia and 
perception and practice of their decentralized competences, which will be explained in the 
next chapter.    
III.3. GREATER SERBIA 
As one of the Balkan states that started the struggle for liberation early as the beginning of 
the 19
th
 century, foundations of the Serbian greater territorial national concepts are one of the 
oldest on the Balkans. In the development of the Serbian national revival and struggle and 
thus to the greater territorial concepts contributed several facts and circumstances, such as 
pan-Slavism and solidarity of all other subjugated Christian peoples under Ottoman rule, 
interest of great powers such as Austro-Hungary or Russia which bordered Turkey and have 
pretension to strategic important territories on the Balkans. The basis of the doctrine of 
greater Serbia has their roots in well known Ilija Garashanin’s plan Nachertanije from 1844 
which envisioned uniting of all south Slavic peoples in one greater state formation Serbia. 
The idea of greater Serbia later was gradually developed by the works of other prominent 
Serbian scholars, statesman, geographer and linguists such as Vuk Karadzic, Jovan Cvijic, 
Vaso Cubrilovic pointing out different aspects of the idea as definitions of Serbs and their 
lands according language (including Catholics-Croats and Muslims), expulsion of Albanians, 
homogeneity of Serbia supported by Chetnik movement etc. As it is case with other great 
national concept of the Balkans, Serbian is also calling upon the  historical territories 
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possessed by the medieval Serb kingdoms. With the development of the idea the concept has 
changed its territorial scope encompassing territory of Serbia with Kosovo as a core, then 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia whilst the first stages of 
development even included some parts of Bulgaria. The creation of kingdom of Yugoslavia 
under the Serbian Karadjordevic dynasty after the First World War, was seen as partially 
sucessful realization of the concept of Greater Serbia. The Serbs were content with this 
outcome of creation of Kingdom of Serbs, Croat and Slovenes later called Yugoslavia and 
regarded the new state as a sort of Greater Serbia since they once again had Kosovo under 
their control and the kingdom was ruled by a Serbian king
107
. However, the creation of 
socialist Yugoslavia temporarily banned the idea of greater Serbia, which became actual and 
revived again in the end of the 80’s with the rise of nationalism. The road to revival of greater 
Serbia concept prior to the break up and Yugoslav crisis arise with the release of the famous 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The memorandum is a well-
organized list of complaints and criticisms against the Yugoslav system as it existed at the 
time. Main theme of the argument in the Memorandum is that Serbia was wrongfully taken 
advantage of and weakened under 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, and that as a result, 
Serbians are the victims of genocide in Kosovo
108
 among other things . The Memorandum is 
written in such a way that it acts as a call to arms for the Serbian people, and justifies any 
actions taken that will insure the security of 'threatened' Serbia. These viewpoints established 
the basis (or fueled) of the motivation for modern reemergence of the concept of Greater 
Serbia that was the Serbian nationalist point of view which assumed that Serbia was exploited 
by other Yugoslav republics and that situation must be corrected without hesitation
109
. 
However, the true revival of the concept of Greater Serbia in political reality came up in the 
wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia in January 1991 when Slobodan Milosevic announced 
intent to annex all Serb lands in a greater Serbia, in the event Yugoslavia ceases to exist
110
. 
This inspired Serbian nationalist and radical’s as Vojislav Seselj to revive, revise and openly 
fought for the Greater Serbia concept. According to Seselj’s Radical Party proposal during 
Yugoslav Wars, Greater Serbia included all territories of Yugoslavia east and south from the 
Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac - Virovitica line.  This proposed greater Serbian state was 
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supported for national and economical reasons, as it would give Serbia a large coastline, 
heavy industries, agricultural farmland, natural resources and all of the crude oil (mostly 
found in the Pannonian Plain), particularly in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, by various 
Serbian politicians associated with Slobodan Milošević in the early 1990s who publicly 
espoused such views: Mihalj Kertes, Milan Babić, Milan Martić, Vojislav Šešelj, Stevan 
Mirković. Also, it would gather over 98% of Serbs of Yugoslavia in one state. In his speeches 
and books, Šešelj claimed that all of the population of these areas is in fact ethnic Serbs, of 
Orthodox, Roman Catholic or Muslim faith. Bearing in mind that Seselj and his Radical Party 
were involved in the Yugoslav wars with their paramilitary volunteer formations besides the 
Yugoslav army’s support for Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, this greater Serbian concept has 
important role being a driving force and goal in the wars and territorial changes on the 
Balkans after 1991. However, outside of Šešelj's Serbian Radical Party, the line as such was 
never promoted in recent Serbian political life. From the perspective of previously 
aforementioned application of the geopolitical concepts on the Balkans, this concept of the 
Greater Serbia (during the Yugoslav Wars) would encompass entire Heartland and the whole 
northwestern flank of the Rimland. It would also include the  largest population and resource 
bases of the peninsula. Thus, it would be dominant state on the Balkans, but however the lack 
of the access to the  Aegean sea, allows formation of unified Rimland of Black (Bulgaria), 
Aegean (Greece) and Adriatic (Albania) coasts that would successfully block the greater and 
further power projection outside of the region. 
 
III.4. GREEK MEGALI IDEA  
As one of the politically, culturally, spiritually (religiously) and traditionally most advanced 
country on the Balkans Greece has always had great influence on a large portion of the 
Balkans and over the different neighboring peoples and ethnicities. This fact reflected with 
the relatively early emergence of Greek great national ideas and platforms. The term and the 
concept of Megali Idea (Big Idea) firstly appeared in 1844 during the debates that preceded 
the promulgation of the constitution, with means of establishment a Greek state that would 
encompass all Greek-inhabited areas, including the Greek populations that remained living 
outside of the 1830 restored Kingdom of Greece under the Ottoman Rule on the northern and 
eastern (Asia Minor) coasts of Aegaen Sea. This proposed Greek state would include regions 
of Thessaly, Epirus, southern parts of Macedonia and western Thrace all on the Balkan 
peninsula. Besides the Greek populations settled over a wide area in the southern Balkan 
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Peninsula, there were extensive Greek populations in the Ottoman capital, Constantinople 
(Istanbul), itself; along the shores of the Sea of Marmara; along the western coastal region of 
Asia Minor, particularly in the region of Smyrna (İzmir); in central Anatolia (ancient 
Cappadocia), where much of the Greek populace was Turkish-speaking but employed the 
Greek alphabet to write Turkish; and in the Pontus region of northeastern Asia Minor, whose 
geographic isolation had given rise to an obscure form of Greek that was not understood 
elsewhere in the Greek world
111
. In the essence of the Greek Megali Idea was the goal of 
restoration and revival of the Byzantine empire with Constantinople (Istanbul) replacing the 
Athens as capital. This was a visionary nationalist aspiration that was to dominate foreign 
relations and, to a significant extent, to determine the domestic politics of the Greek state for 
much of the first century of its independent existence
112
. The highly important strategic 
geographical position of Greece also contributed great powers to be creators and supporters 
of the Greek great national territorial concept. Namely, the proposed Greek Plan (or Greek 
Project) for geopolitical resolution of the eastern crisis, by the Russian emperor Catherine the 
Great in early 1780’s and with support of the Jospeh II of Austria, envisaged the partition of 
the Ottoman Empire between the Russian and Habsburg Empires followed by the restoration 
of the Byzantine Empire centered in Constantinople as a restored (form of) Greek statehood. 
This actually served as basis of the linkage with the Byzantine Empire as essential goal and 
meaning of the concept of Megali Idea. The great powers as Great Britain, France and Russia 
assisted the establishment of the independent Greek Kingdom after the war in 1829 and also 
supported the gradual and steadily enlargement of Greece by constant acquiring of territories 
in the following 20
th
 century. Starting from the Congress of Berlin the enlargement of Greek 
territory has gradually extended northwards and eastwards acquiring Ionian islands, Thessaly, 
Crete, Epirus, Macedonia, Western Thrace, finishing with acquisition of Dodecanese islands 
in 1947. The largest territorial expansion and closest to accomplishing of the Megali Idea in 
the period between 1918 until 1923 when according to the Treaty of Sevres, Greece acquired 
Eastern Thrace (present day European part of Turkey) and even the Ionia or the region 
around Izmir on the eastern coast of the  Asia Minor, that later returned them back to Turkey.  
Period after the First World War and Treaties until the Second World War, marked the 
official end of the Megali Idea as the chief operative goal of Greek foreign policy
113
. It 
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appeared that, as a consequence of the Lausanne Treaty and the exchange of minorities, the 
ethnological limits of the Greek people largely coincided, at last, with the territorial limits of 
the Greek state
114
. The security of that state, rather than the liberation of the "unredeemed" 
part of it, became the major objective of official Greek foreign policy
115
.  After 1991 all 
Greek government's official line disavows any expansionist views, but the "Idea" has never 
really died. Actually the concept of Megali Idea is still present in the especially in the civil 
society, politics, culture and science particularly as its pertain to the formation of Greek 
foreign policy. Maps of “historical Greece” including territories and cities in present day 
neighboring Macedonia, Albania, Turkey are issued and present in the Parliament. Prominent 
public figures such as politicians and even priests give public addresses mentioning 
acquisition of territories of neighboring states considered “as Greek”. Analyzed from the 
position of territory in regards of the applied geopolitical concepts, Greater Greece would 
definitely be the strongest and master of the Zone of Straits, entire Aegean, Black and Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea. The fact that the Heartland and entire landmass of the Balkans on the 
north remains outside this proposed state, the blockade for northward expansion on the 
Balkans would be easily effectuated, but nevertheless thus Greece would be very important 
and dominant regional player of the southeastern Europe and Middle East. 
 
III.5. GREATER BULGARIA  
In the 19
th
 century another great national and territorial geopolitical concept emerged on the 
Balkans on the wake of the ruining and the diminishing of the power and possessions of the 
Ottoman Empire. That was the concept of Greater Bulgaria, which similarly as the  Greek 
and Serbian one was articulated, supported and championed by the great powers in 
accordance with their imperial strategies for accomplishing their interests and aspirations. In 
its essence the concept of greater Bulgaria as defined by the Bulgarian nationalism and 
accepted by the science, culture and in the politics encompass the regions of Macedonia, 
Thrace and Moesia. The foundations of the greater Bulgarian concept of Bulgaria bordering 
Black as well as Aegean Sea were established by the San Stefano treaty after the Russo-
Turkish War in 1877/78
116
. According to this treaty the self-governing principality of 
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Bulgaria have territory including the plain between the Danube and the Balkan mountain 
range (Stara Planina), the region of Sofia, Pirot and Vranje in the Morava valley, Northern 
Thrace, parts of Eastern Thrace and nearly all of Macedonia. It had also access on the Aegean 
Sea (except Thessaloniki and nearby Khalkidhiki peninsula) and Black Sea and the furthest 
territorial extension to the west included territories of present day southern part of Albania 
with very close proximity to the Adriatic Sea.  The treaty with this projection of Bulgarian 
state was composed by the Russian Graf Ignatieff and signed on 3
rd
 of March 1878 which is 
celebrated even today as Liberation Day. Although Congress of Berlin in the same year 
reduced and returned back much of these territories under the control of Ottoman Empire, 
these projected boundaries of the concept of Greater Bulgaria immediately became critical 
point of Bulgarian foreign policy. Since the creation of the Bulgarian statehood until the end 
of the Second World War all of the war campaigns that Bulgaria waged were with the goal of 
capturing the territories provisioned by the San Stefano treaty, especially Macedonia. 
Similarly like Greece and Serbia, although the Bulgarian church was established in 1870 
(before the statehood) in the religious millet system of Ottoman Empire it has established 
quite widespread and successful religious and educational network in all south Slavic 
inhabited regions under the Ottoman Turkey territorially matching almost entire proposed 
greater Bulgaria. The second Balkan war was started by Bulgaria against all other allies due 
to its dissatisfaction with the territorial gains in Macedonia. During the First World War 
Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and acquired much of territory provisioned by this 
concept brining closer to the ideal of San Stefano
117
. Namely, the entire present day Republic 
of Macedonia with exception of the part of Macedonia south of the line of the Macedonian 
(Salonika) front while in exchange it acquired much of eastern Serbia. However, Paris Peace 
Conference and Treaty of Neuilly took over all of the newly acquired territories including 
even those controlled prior the war. This prompted Bulgaria to join the Axis during the 
Second World War, when Greater Bulgaria was re-created as a state by Nazi Germany as a 
reward by granting territories in Greece (eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace) and 
Yugoslavia (present day Republic of Macedonia, except the western part and southeastern 
parts of Serbia and Kosovo). During this period the state creation with the newly re-acquired 
territories was referred as a “Whole Bulgaria”. With the exception of the previously peaceful 
return of Southern Dobrudja all of these territories were returned after the Allied Victory and 
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the concept of Greater Bulgaria was abandoned as a central point of the foreign policy. 
However it was never really removed from Bulgarian foreign policy, politics, science and 
culture. Except the first period of the communist rule of Georgi Dimitrov when attempts for 
creation of Balkan Socialist Federation with Yugoslavia (and unification of Macedonia) were 
actual, the entire period of the communist rule in Bulgarian education, culture, science and 
politics the dream of San Stefano was inevitably present. The most notable remnant of this 
Greater Bulgarian concept in the foreign policy that reemerged after 1991 and is actual and 
vivid even today is the attitude towards Macedonia, Macedonian national identity and 
language. Although Bulgaria was first to recognize the independence of Macedonia, until 
1999 when a declaration of good neighboring policy was signed many interstate agreements 
could not be signed due to the Bulgarian denial of the existence of the Macedonian language.  
However, the policy of giving Bulgarian passports on short procedure only to Macedonian 
citizens declaring Bulgarian ethnicity, constant denial and contesting of Macedonian ethnic, 
national, linguistic, cultural and historical identity and most recently conditioning of 
Bulgarian vote of support for start of the negotiation process in EU have clear background 
from the idea of Greater Bulgaria which considers Macedonia as a Bulgarian land. In addition 
to this, the geopolitical oriented posture of the foreign policy towards Macedonia can be seen 
in the national doctrine named as “National strategic program no.1” issued in 1998 where it 
is stated that Macedonians are Bulgarians and Bulgaria should act firmly and clearly in front 
of the international public and diplomatic circles that there is lack of ground and inability to 
recognize the Macedonian nation, language and state together with Bulgarian state policy of 
securing the  right of self-determination of “Macedonian Bulgarians”
118
.  Public 
proclamations of this policy continue to be maintained on the official level within the high 
European institutions such as the organization of debates that talk about the rights of the 
Macedonian Bulgarians and Bulgaria stretches from Ohrid to the Black Sea, which is 
organized by Bulgarian MEPs
119
. Although Bulgaria after 1991 have never officially claimed 
territorial claims towards any neighboring country, the essence of the foreign policy towards 
Macedonia, despite the  official recognition of the independence, is actually continuation of 
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territorial interests of Bulgaria
120
 evolving from the Greater Bulgarian concept. Moreover, the 
close relationship that Bulgarian nationalists (as Krasimir Karakachanov) and government 
(official meeting in 2013) have with the political leaders of Albanians in Macedonia suggest 
about one negative scenario that Bulgaria should get and control part of the  territory of 
Macedonia after its partition on Albanian and Macedonian entity that should function with 
Bulgaria similarly and according by the formula of close relations between Serbia and 
Republic of Srpska
121
. The territory of Greater Bulgaria proposed on the San Stefano Treaty 
if established in reality would be another strategically positioned dominant ruler of the 
Balkans. It would encompass almost more than a two thirds of the identified Heartland (entire 
Macedonia and Morava valley in Eastern Serbia) and with the access on the Black and 
Aegean Sea it also controls the entire eastern and southern flanks of the Rimland of the 
Balkans. The huge territorial land mass would definitely dominate entire eastern, central and 
southern Balkan Peninsula thus making control and rejection of any blockades and invasion 
much easier due to the cut off the main transportation corridors and communications and 
unfavorable dense mountainous relief of the  western part of the Balkans (Albania, 
Montenegro, Greece, western  Serbia and Bosnia) . Finally, despite the lack of direct control 
of the Zone of Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) with its access on western and 
southwestern Black sea shore as well as northern and northeastern Aegean coast, immediately 
close to the  Straits, greater Bulgaria would also definitely be master of the season this 
strategically important region. 
 
III.6. GREATER CROATIA  
Finally, another greater state territorial concept exists on the northwestern tip of the Balkans 
which is the Croatian one. Like all of the other greater territorial concepts Greater Croatia has 
originated during the period of national revival and nationalism in the early 19
th
 century. The 
very first foundations of the concept can be traced in the works of Pavao Ritter Vitezovic 
from late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 century claiming that all Slavs are Croats therefore legitimating 
the expansion of Habsburg Empire on the Balkan therefore claiming historical rights of 
Illyria. By this conceptualization the main bearer of the Greater Croatian concept was the 
Illyrian Movement of the 19
th
 century that through the pan-South Slavic unity struggled to 
establish Croatian national presence within the Austro-Hungarian empire. This pan-slavic 
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Illyrian movement led by A.Starcevic and Lj.Gaj intended unification of Kingdom of 
Dalmatia with Croatia as a single linguistic unit
122
 merging within the joint Hungarian-
Croatian diet. This established the scope of Greater Croatia that besides modern day Croatia 
comprised of Dalmatia, Slavonia, Posavina, Zagorje and Istria, includes larger parts of 
Bosnia, Herzegovina and Vojvodina. With the creation of Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
commitment for the concept of Greater Croatia acquired new dimensions and with the rising 
ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs in the 1930’s an autonomous single unit Banovina 
of Croatia was created after peaceful negotiations. This territorial unit  (banovina) 
encompassed all areas where ethnic Croats lived and gained large scale autonomy but 
nonetheless it was not full accomplishment of the Croatian national ideal for independence. 
However, this paved the road of the first real fulfillment of greater Croatian territorial 
concept that in the same time will establish the tenets of actual greater Croatia concept 
exploited in the wars after 1991. Following the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by 
the powers of Axis in 1941, with a proclamation the puppet state of Independent State of 
Croatia was established but without clearly demarcated borders. The main bearers and 
supporters of the greater state idea was the collaborationist Ustash movement, which wanted 
Greater Croatia which would reach as far as the Drina and even the gates of Belgrade
123
. 
Regarding that this proposed territorial scope of Greater Croatia included numerous 
population of non-Croat origin, advocates of the idea claimed that Muslims living in Bosnia 
are Croats and Serbs living in Croatia are slavicized Vlachs
124
.  This projection was actually 
fully realized as the Independent State of Croatia included much of present day Croatia 
except regions of Istria, Baranja and Medjimurje, Croatian populated as well as non-Croatian 
populated areas far eastwards in entire Bosnia and Herzegovina to river Drina and entire 
region of Syrmia in present day autonomous province of Vojvodina in Serbia including even 
city of Zemun which today is part of the Serbian capital Belgrade. According to negotiated 
Rome Contracts, large parts of Croatian lands on the  Adriatic coast (cities of Split, Sibenik, 
Zadar) and islands were annexed by Italy but in exchange Croatia gained right to annex 
whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, after the capitulation of Italy in 1943, 
Croatia with assent from Germany, acquired these territories. The creation and the territorial 
scope of Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War actually established the 
modern form of the concept of Greater Croatia. Given that nationalism was suppressed by the 
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official socialist Yugoslav state policy of “Brotherhood and Unity” and irredentist concepts 
were forbidden, similarly like the others, support for Greater Croatia actively persisted and 
was articulated together with the idea of independence of Croatia by the Croatian Diaspora 
especially the exiled Ustash movement members in western Europe, Australia, USA and 
Canada. Nevertheless, complete revival of the Greater Croatia concept came up with the 
aftermath of breakup of Yugoslavia especially during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from 1992 to 1995. Regarding the fact that the war of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
principally a territorial conflict, Croatian leadership primary goal was territorial extension in 
accordance with the concept of Greater Croatia. On the two occasions such as Karadjordjevo 
and Graz agreement highest Croatian leaders agreed on partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with the highest Serbian political leaders and commanders. This led to a Croat-Bosniak war 
and creation of the Croatian Republic of Hezeg-Bosnia. By 1995 Croatia and Croat Bosnia 
became ethnically pure regions and thus a unified de-facto Greater Croatia consisting of 
Republic of Croatia and Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was in operation since 1992 with 
no outcry from the international community
125
. The support of demising the Dayton accord 
and instead making a deal with Serbs of partitioning Bosnia in order to acquire territory was 
officially stated and supported by the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. This leads to the 
conclusion that together with Greater Serbian and Albanian concepts, the Croatian one has 
also played active and important role in the wars and geopolitical instability of the Balkans 
after 1991. As the last remnants of the influence of Greater Croatia concepts are the efforts of 
creation of Croatian federal entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina (on the form of Republic 
of Srpska) that has supporters among a small part of Croatian society and politicians, but it 
does not have official support of the state of Croatia. Regarding the analytical 
conceptualization of the Balkans from the application of the geopolitical theories from the 
previous chapter, Greater Croatia would definitely strengthen the position of Croatia but due  
to its peripheral position on the Balkans it would not have significance or possibility for 
domination of the peninsula neither on other bordering regions such as central Europe. 
Greater Croatia would encompass the western and northern flanks of the Rimland and with 
total or partial possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina it will be much closer to the Heartland 
but without control of main communication axis and strategic advantageous important areas 
and by having Italy on the entire opposite coast in the Adriatic sea it would not have 
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possibility for power projection or domination. Nevertheless, Greater Croatia would be a 
strong and good balancer of any other greater Balkan state possessing the Heartland (central 
part) and capable of dominating the Balkans such as Greater Serbia or Greater Bulgaria.                                    
CHAPTER IV - TERRITORIAL CHANGES ON THE 
BALKANS AFTER 1991 AND THEIR GEOPOLITICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The last decade of the XX century was characterized with dramatic changes on global 
geopolitical scope that have completely and radically shook the foundations of the post war 
world international relations and geopolitical world order. On the global political landscape 
more than dozen new nation states emerged as a result of the breakdown of the federations in 
the socialist block. Notwithstanding, the process of political, economic and social changes 
that acted as factors for the global shifts had stricken and affected the Balkans the most and 
more than any other region in the world. The ethnic conflicts that erupted as a result from the 
democratic changes that finally allowed release of accumulated frustrations due to the heavily 
suppressed nationalism and historical (ancient) ethnic hatred by the socialist state policies of 
friendship and fraternity got the fiercest and worst extent in the form of the wars on the 
Balkans. Recurrence of the ethnic intolerance and hatred reflected in the wars on the Balkans 
where the acquiring of territory became primary goal. Thus, the territory was a central point 
in the wars and occurrences on the Balkans after 1991 with actions such as ethnic cleansing, 
establishing borders and renaming toponyms oriented toward enhancing and strengthening 
the control of possessed territory. While the ethnic hatred, ideas for independence or 
unification were the primary reasons and driving force for the wars, given the opportunity 
and possibility for their fulfillment the greater national territorial irredentist concepts fit in 
within the plethora of factors as a motivational and strategic orientation force as well as a fuel 
of the conflicts in that context. The complexity and specificity of the territorial changes that 
took place on the political map of the Balkans after 1991 as a consequence of the wars of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia can be classified on several categories depending the borders and 
international recognition, such as: 1) external and internationally recognized territorial 
changes – emergence of the independent sovereign states from the  federal republics of 
Yugoslavia, that are  members of UN; 2) de-facto external and partially recognized territorial 
changes – emergence of international protectorate later independent state from the province 
of Kosovo; 3) internal and internationally recognized territorial recomposition as 
federalization – as it is case with Bosnia and Herzegovina and its federal structure of 
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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with cantons, Republic of Srpska and District of 
Brcko; 4) internal, informal, internationally accepted and territorial organization de-facto 
functioning as federation due to the process of decentralization – as it is case with the 
territorial organization of Macedonia and more recently Serbian municipalities of Northern 
Kosovo. Besides the internal reconfiguration of the political map of the Balkans the crisis and 
the territorial changes brought a broader global geopolitical significance by the inclusion and 
recurrent involvement of the old and new great and regional powers as well as a complete 
change of the geopolitical settings and balance of the region. This is most obvious by the 
positions taken as well as the active involvement and role played by the greater regional and 
global actors and superpowers. The new events and territorial changes have also made a 
tremendous change of the pattern of geopolitical actions starting up a new period of more 
instability and dynamic processes of activities, shifts, struggle and introduction of soft-power 
spread of influence of the external global and regional great powers. Unlike the cold war 
period of almost a half of a century long stability and balance of powers with primal role of 
the ideology, the period after 1991 that lasts until today is characterized with expressive 
instability especially in the overall security situation and territorial integrity with the recurrent 
emergence of the ethnicity, religion, culture and identity as a main factor and force for the 
interstate relations and geopolitical activities.  
 
I.1. THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT NATION STATES  
Undoubtedly, the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia presents the biggest event that resulted with 
the territorial changes by the emergence of the independent nation state evolving from its 
federal units.  So far in the discussions for the reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia eight 
factors are identified: 1) economic crisis; 2) so-called “ancient ethnic hatred” between 
Yugoslav peoples; 3) nationalism; 4) cultural differences among Yugoslav peoples; 5) 
changes in the international politics; 6) the role of different persons in creation and 
destruction of the Yugoslav state; 7) Premodern character of the Yugoslav state, which is 
often compared with kingdoms (tzardoms) instead of nation states; and 8) Structural-
institutional reasons
126
. All of these factor have acted with intertwined and mixed influence 
throughout the entire process of the disintegration of Yugoslav federation. Nevertheless, in 
regards of the territorial changes in addition to these eight factors there are two more closely 
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related factors: 1) administrative territorial organization of the federal units – republic and 
provinces and 2) dispersion of population of nations outside of the borders of the republics 
and provinces defined as their nation states, primarily Serbs, Croats and Albanians. 
According to the constitution of 1974, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
organized as a federation of six constitutive republics with their own constitutions defined as 
national states and with inalienable right of self-determination up to secession as well as two 
autonomous provinces. The territorial organization of Yugoslavia together with this 
constitutionally guaranteed right for self-determination up to secession served as basis for the 
territorial changes that resulted with emergence of the new nation states. As additional factor 
to this, in 1991, the EC, the US, and USSR made it clear that they would not recognize any 
changes of borders that were brought up by force. Since no agreement was possible between 
the republics, the consequence was that if new international states were to emerge from 
Yugoslavia, they would have to be based upon the republics of Yugoslavia
127
. Another factor 
that served as a driving force towards the territorial changes and secession in the same token 
was the new political constellation that took place in 1990. The crack of Yugoslavia began to 
show during the elections of 1990, where in the most republic right-wing nationalist and 
secessionist options favoring independence won the majority of the votes. Each of the 
republics had elections for their domestic governments, and several elected governments that 
were not communist – even though the federal Yugoslav government was still under single-
party communist rule
128
. The strong opposition of the independence and separation by the 
Serb population living in Croatia and Bosnia, together with the fact that the majority of the 
commanding stuff of the Yugoslav People’s Army was comprised of Serbs, quickly erupted 
in devastating wars. However, the territorial changes and Yugoslav wars were not sudden and 
immediate event regarding that through entire existence of Yugoslavia, and especially after 
the death of the president Tito, there were nationalist and separatist incidents, movements, 
demonstrations and protests such as the Croatian Spring in 1971, Demonstrations in Kosovo 
in 1981, Memorandum of Serbian academy of sciences and arts in 1986 etc. Moreover, as it 
was showed in the previous chapter, the irredentist greater territorial nationalist concepts and 
ideas for independence were lively supported by the political emigration of the Yugoslav 
peoples. All of these factors directly and indirectly paved the road for the total and 
devastating dissolution of Yugoslavia. Considering the duration of the process of territorial 
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changes that occurred in former Yugoslavia as well as their external and internal dimension 
with dubious formal and international recognition, it lasted almost 17 years from 1991 to 
2008. Regarding the unclear and unspecified actual (de facto) status with the live processes of 
separatism that still exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia could be 
argued that the processes of territorial changes that have started in 1991 on the Balkans and in 
the former Yugoslavia is still not completed.      
 
IV.1.1. SLOVENIA  
Slovenia declared independence on 25
th
 of June 1991 which was immediately followed by 
Yugoslav Federal Parliament refusal and Federal Executive Committee decree for 
empowering defense minister and interior minister to deploy frontier units of JNA to 
safeguard state frontiers
129





, the short war of Slovenian independence broke out.  The war was fought 
between Slovene Territorial Defense (TO) and Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). By 4
th
 of 
July, Slovene Territorial Defense (TO) units surrounded JNA bases in Slovenia and armed 
skirmishes between them reached the peak and cease fire was agreed with taking control of 
border crossings by Slovene forces and peaceful withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in the 
barracks and cross the border to Croatia. On the same day Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 
and Serbia formally recognized the independence of Slovenia because it could be used to 
uphold secession along national lines, there being no other national peoples dwelling in 
significant numbers in Slovenia then Slovenes
131
. Only after 10 days of war, the Brioni 
accord was signed by which the independence of Slovenia was formally recognized although 
agreed to suspend the activities stemming from declaration of independence for a three month 
period. Finally, on 18
th
 of July total withdrawal of JNA from Slovenia was ordered by the 
Yugoslav presidency
132
. The main reason of the successfulness of the emergence of 
independence of Slovenia is due to the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of Slovenia, the 
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independence could be established without too many problems and difficulties
133
. Another 
reason why the Slovenian independence war lasted only 10 days without significantly large 
number of casualties and damages besides but in accordance with the ethnic homogeneity and 
thus small and insignificant number of Serbian is the lack of interest from Serbian and other 
nationalisms towards Slovene territory which is not part of the greater Serbian or Croatian 
concepts, that were actual in that time. In this context, relatively quick and successful 
emergence of the independent state of Slovenia can be analyzed from the geopolitical 
conceptualizations and definitions of the Balkans aforementioned in the first  two chapters. 
Slovenia which in physic geographical as  well as in political and cultural aspect is not 
considered as part of the Balkans or it is defined at its far northernmost periphery outside of 
any strategically identified areas such as Heartland or Rimland its position is not important in 
prospect of domination of the internal geopolitics of the Balkan. Moreover, historically 
except from the period of Yugoslavia, Slovenia have never had significant or closer ties with 
other Balkans states neither have greater important involvement in the Balkan geopolitical 
affairs. Additionally, as geographically farthermost republic bordering member of EEC and 
the broader region of the hinterland and core area of Western and Central Europe, prospect 
for greater military conflict is certainly minor.  
 
IV.1.2. CROATIA  
On the same day as Slovenia on 25
th
 of June 1991 Croatia has also declared independence 
and early as the period of July and August the outbreak of the fighting between Serb 
paramilitaries and Croatian National Guard took place
134
. Unlike in Slovenia, Croatia had 
numerous Serb minority comprising around 12,2% spread around the entire country but 
mostly in the strongholds of the regions of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja in the north east 
close  to border with  Serbia and Hungary, Lika in Dalmatia close to the Adriatic coast, 
Kordun and Bania in central Croatia, that have violently opposed independence. The Serb 
population that have predominated these several regions of Croatia looked upon Serbia as 
their nation-state and Serbia upon them as national constituents of Serbia
135
.  This situation 
meant that large scale military conflict would inevitably follow. The fighting in Croatia pitted 
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Croatian nationalist forces against Serbian paramilitaries backed by the powerful federal 
army, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and it was vicious that gave birth to the term 
‘ethnic cleansing’
136
. The Croat forces were not nearly as well equipped as the JNA, nor were 
they backed by a stronger force, as were various Serbian groups supported by the JNA
137
. 
With each battle the underprepared Croatian forces lost territory to the JNA and Serbs
138
. By 
December 1991, about one-third of the original Croatian republic was under JNA control, or 
effectively, Serb control
139
. By January 1992 a UN cease-fire was signed that established a 
UN peacekeeping force in Croatia called United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR)
140
, 
which was the first such mission of United Nation on European soil. The details of the cease-
fire maintained the status quo which meant that 30 percent of the former Croatian republic 
would be controlled by Serbs and the Republic of Serb Krajina. The territory declared itself 
to be the sovereign Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK)
141
. It was not internationally recognized 
and it was a client state of Serbia as 99,8% voted in favor of staying in Yugoslavia with 
Serbia and Montenegro as well as both of its leaders Milan Babić and Milan Martić publicly 
expressed views that SAO Krajina belonged with Serbia
142
. Territorially Republic of Serb 
Krajina (RSK) did not presented compact and integral entity with a shape of an elongated 
ellipse and it was comprised of the three enclaves: Knin Krajina of Northern Dalmatia and 
Central Croatia (Lika, Kordun and Banija regions), western part of Slavonia and the entirely 
separated (cut) part of Eastern Slavonia on the easternmost part of Croatia on the right bank 
of Danube by the border with Serbia (regions of Baranja and western Syrmia - Vukovar). 
Moreover, according to the testimony of the former Krajina president, Milan Babic, he 
explained that the RSK municipalities were in an underdeveloped part of Croatia and when 
Croatia stopped providing financial support to them, they had to turn to Serbia for 
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. Babic had also testified that “under no circumstances could [the RSK] exist” 
without support from Serbia or Yugoslavia
144
. However, regarding that Republic of Serb 
Krajina was bordering Serbian controlled territories in Bosnia and Serbia, it was actually 
fused with Serbia and rest of the Yugoslavia. Serb-occupied areas in Krajina and Western 
Slavonia were recaptured by Croatian forces in 1995 during two military offensives that 
resulted in widespread abuses against Serb civilians (including killing and cruel treatment) 
occurring as part of an ethnic cleansing operation
145
. Eastern Slavonia was transferred from 
Serb control to UN authority in January 1996. In January 1998 Croatia regained full 
sovereignty of the region. In the entire process and independence war of Croatia the greater 
territorial irredentist concept of Greater Croatia have played minor role in comparison with 
the concept of Greater Serbia, regarding that unifying of the Serb populated areas (lands) in a 
greater Serbian state formation, already proposed by Slobodan Milosevic in case of 
Yugoslavia ceases to exist in January 1991
146
, was officially declared goal of political and 
military leadership of the Republic of Serb Krajina, paramilitary units and it was also 
confirmed by the results on the referendums held. By 1998 Croatia took control over the 
entire territory that it had prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and declaration of 
independence. Despite the four years of fierce war, at the end Croatian republic emerged as 
independent state with its thorough territorial integrity. Besides the internal factors, the 
crucial factor for this final result of the independence of Croatia is due to the decisive 
influence of the international community and outer geopolitical actors. Actions and ativities 
that UN took during the entire conflict of Yugoslavia had very important effect. In July 1991 
both the USA and the European Community (EC) imposed arms embargoes on the SFRY
147
. 
In September 1991, as fighting between Serbia and Croatia intensified, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 713 (1991) imposing an arms embargo on the SFRY
148
. The weapons embargo 
that UN imposed on Yugoslavia had asymmetric impact as it disadvantaged Croatian as well 
as Bosnian forces due to the inability to buy and supply with weapons and arms while Serbs 
gained advantage as they were supported by the federal army JNA which was one of the best 
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equipped military forces in Europe
149
. Moreover the most important facilities of the defense 
were located in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—with about 60 per cent of all production 
sites were located in Serbia
150
. Nevertheless, the UN sent 14,000 peacekeepers to keep the 
truce in Croatia
151
 and while it had impact of maintaining status quo that on short term 
allowed existence of Republic of Serb Krajina on 30% of Croatian territory, on longer term it 
actually spared Croat forces and contributed allowing them to reequip and better prepare for 
the final moves of retaking control of the entire Croatian territory. By 1995, the Croatian 
forces had regrouped, reorganized and rearmed with help and training from the West and the 
United States
152
 and they took the final and decisive action called Operation Flash for 
liberating south central portion of the former Croatian territory which had been the Republic 
of Serb Krajina since 1992. However, the crucially deciding geopolitical background for the 
positive final outcome of the emergence of the independent Croatia besides the western 
support and help in military aspect, was the political support in regards of recognition of the 
independence that is even more important. On the 27
th
 of August 1991, the European 
Community and its Member States, at the same time as convening a peace conference on 
Yugoslavia, created an Arbitration Committee chaired by Mr. Robert Badinter president of 
the French Constitutional Concuil (therefore also known as ‘Badinter Commision’) and 
furthermore comprised of the presidents of German, Italian, Belgian and Spanish 
constitutional and arbitrational courts and tribunals
153
. The final four opinions were delivered 
on the 14
th
 of January 1992 and they were concerned with the question of whether the 
Republics of Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, who had formally requested recognition by 
the Community and its Member States, had satisfied the conditions laid down by the Council 
of Ministers of the European Community on the 16
th
 of December 1991
154
. The terms of this 
'examination' were relatively indulgent and the Committee ruled that two Republics, 
Macedonia and Slovenia, fulfilled all of the conditions
155
. In the case of Croatia a reservation 
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was made in relation to the rights of minorities
156
. The request for recognition made by 




 of January 1992 
Opinions Nos. 5 and 7 on the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia were issued by the EC and 
its member states with Croatia failing to satisfy recognition criteria
158
. Despite the opinion of 
the Badinter Arbitration Commission that Slovenia and Macedonia have met all the 
conditions, on 15
th
 of January EC recognized the independency and sovereignty of Slovenia 
and Croatia
159
. From the geopolitical perspective very important was the role that single 
actors played with their position in regards of the recognitions and the resolution of the 
Yugoslav crisis. In this context the most important was the position of the just reunited 
Germany which push hardest for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia within the European 
Community. On December 20
th
, 1991, the German government announced that it would 
unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states and although Germany had 
made its position clear months earlier, the announcement sent shock waves throughout 
Europe, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia
160
. As it announced earlier, on 23
rd
 of 
December 1991, Germany had unilaterally recognized Croatian and Slovene sovereignty
161
. 
Germany continued to push hardest for recognition of independence and it was crucial for the 
same decision taken by the European Community in January. This opened the way for the 
United States, to recognize the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (it will be more analyzed further below), three months later, on 7
th
 of April 
1992
162
. The involvement of the UN, EC and US in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and 
different positions over the recognitions of each of the secessionist Yugoslav republics 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have extraordinary significant 
although in each case different impact. General and overall impact of the international 
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recognitions by the UN and the western geopolitical players such as United States and 
European Community meant that the dissolution of Yugoslavia and territorial changes 
resulting with emergence of independent nation states would be conducted and implemented 
over the lines of the territories and (administrative) borders of the federal republics that 
constituted Yugoslavia. In that prospect, recognitions guaranteed and secured the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the republics on the international level. Therefore, the 
recognition of Croatia from Germany, EC and US despite failing to satisfy the recognition 
criteria meant halting and slowing down the war, thus giving enough time for regrouping and 
reorganizing of Croatian forces for the final actions which can be considered as legitimate 
regarding that international community recognized Croatia with its territory that it has as 
federal Yugoslav republic. Moreover, international recognition meant that Serb held 
territories declared to be Republic of Serb Krajina would not have any international support 
and recognition, therefore the Croatian military action (Operation Flash in 1995) and ceasing 
of existence of this quasi-state formation were completely legitimate and justified. It can also 
be argued, if cases of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are compared, that the number 
and share of the minority within or the general extent of the ethnic homogeneity the country‘s 
population has also determining influence in the final outcome and design of the territorial 
changes. While Croatia had only 12,2% Serbs in 1991 and the mass replacement of them that 
was experienced after the operation Flash in 1995 caused sharp drop to 4,5% in 2001 (and 
4,4% in 2001)
163
, was more possible to be done and also easily (with tacitly acquiescence) 
accepted by the international community, that was not the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Macedonia which are much more ethnically complex and heterogeneous. Thus Croatia 
avoided and did not experienced internal territorial changes and recomposition on formal or 
informal (de-facto) federal basis as it will be shown in cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Kosovo. Consequences of the operations for return of the control and 
destruction of Serb quasi-state formations on the territory of Croatia in 1995, which coincides 
with the end of the war in Bosnia, are regarded as an expected geopolitical outcome that 
directly results from the arangement of the geopolitical forces on the global level. Namely, 
the denial of the historic goal of Greater Serbia for the Serbs in 1991-1992 and the de-facto 
creation of ethnically pure Greater Croatia for the Croats (including cleansed areas inhabited 
by Croats in Bosnia) by 1995 are considered as a natural outcome of the Great Power politics 
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and a preponderance of power at the end of the Cold War
164
. Regarding the geopolitical 
conceptualization of the area of the Balkans, the independence of Croatia in its integral pre-
1991 territory, openly backed and supported by the western powers and international 
community had definite geopolitical significance and meaning of preventing and disabling 
the real possibility of creation of Greater Serbian political state formation that by acquiring 
the territorial scope that have been controlled by Serb forces in period between 1991 – 1995 
would definitely mean complete destruction of all neighboring states, subjugation of their 
populations as well as domination of the Balkans. Serbs militarily controlled the entire here 
identified Heartland of the Balkans, and with Republic of Serb Krajina and territories held in 
Croatia they reached the Adriatic Sea cutting off the western flank of the Balkanic Rimland. 
Without decisive international and western powers action and with its military might Serbs or 
the remnant center of Yugoslavia comprised by Serbia and Montenegro in short time could 
devastate and acquire the most of the Yugoslav Adriatic coast and therefore take control of 
the entire western flank of the Rimland. Considering the qualities of human factor of the 
number and dispersion of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the 
military superiority in equipment, resources and capabilities and finally the high motivation 
backed by the strong rise and wide support of Serb nationalism, the prospects for creation of 
Greater Serbian state were very likely. Thus, the position of Croatia was crucially important 
to be preserved in order to stop and prevent the creation of greater Serbia. Therefore the 
support for independence of Croatia seems the only strategic way to preserve the balance on 
the Balkans by keeping Serbian factor - that is historically prone to instable relations with the 
West and closer ones with the East as well as prone to frequently and more easily entering 
wars – weaker and less decisively significant. Finally in geopolitical context, the strong 
decline of the Soviet (Russian) power and influence have also extremely benefiting impact in 
the American and Western management of the crisis and establishing their geopolitical 
dominance on the Balkans. Despite, the small and individual Russian support for the Serb 
position and forces, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its geopolitical position in 
Europe, Russia was not capable to be involved more decisively and thus the first stage of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and emergence of the independent nation states of Slovenia and 
Croatia with full/total international and western support opened the way for United States to 
enter and establish the dominant geopolitical influence on the Balkans. 
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IV.1.3. MONTENEGRO  
Process of the emergence of the independent nation states from the former federal republics 
that come up as a consequence of the break up and disintegration of Yugoslavia concluded 
with the independence of Montenegro in 2006. Under the brokering of EU, Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia was successfully reorganized into a loose federation or state union of Serbia 
and Montenegro on 14
th
 of March 2002
165
. Thus, Montenegro have definitely paved its road 
toward independence although it was de-facto independent by having separate customs and 
police border control on the border with Serbia as well as different currency (Deutche  Mark  
and Euro) since the  beginning of 2000’s. Montenegro had also gradually and continually 
estranged from the Milosevic regime and thus worked on so-called independence on 
installments throughout the 90’s although previously with an overwhelming majority of votes 
of 95,96% it decided to remain equal part of united Yugoslavia on the referendum of 
independence held on 1
st
 of March 1992 . The agreement for the state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro put off until 2006 the holding of any referendum on whether the two republics 
should separate from each other completely
166
. Finally, on 21
st
 of May 2006, Montenegro 
held referendum for independence where with narrow majority vote in favor of 55,5% the 
state declared  its independence
167
. Despite the traditionally and long historical close alliance 
with Russia as well as the large amount of Russian investments, Montenegro have clearly 
oriented towards integration in NATO and European Union thus putting an end for the 
possibility of Russian access on the Adriatic Sea. Therefore Montenegro with its position on 
the Adriatic Sea became the final link for the full integration of the Rimland of the Balkans 
under the control and allegiance of the euroatlantic powers such as USA, EU and NATO. 
 
IV.2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND ITS INTERNAL TERRITORIAL 
DIVISION  
As the disintegration of Yugoslavia started with the process of declaring independence and 
outbreak of the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, the crisis have fiercely struck Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which was the most ethnically and religiously diverse republic located in the 
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center (heart) of Yugoslavia. Bosnia has always been described as a microcosm of the 
Balkans, a human mosaic made up of the genes of innumerable peoples
168
. It was also a place 
where the three main religions and denominations in Europe and Mediterranean World such 
as orthodox and catholic Christianity and Islam, clash and intertwined co-exist. According to 
the census of 1991 prior the war the ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
comprised of Muslims by nationality (Bosniaks) with 43,47%, Serbs with 31,21%, Croats 
with 17,38% as well as the highest number of self-declared Yugoslavs with 5,54%
169
. 
Although Serbs were mostly concentrated in the northern-central Bosnia (Posavina and 
Bosanska Krajina) and eastern Herzegovina, Croats in (western) Herzegovina and Muslims in 
central Bosnia and far in the northwestern corner and easternmost regions close to border 
with Serbia, generally entire territory of the country was populated by mixed structure of the 
ethnic groups. After the first multiparty parliamentary elections, throughout 1990 and 1991 
the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina steadily worsened and was driving towards 
a war. Almost a year before breakout of the war in March 1991, Serbian president Milosevic 
and Croatian president Tudjman met in Karadjordjevo where during the meeting they have 
secretly negotiated partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between what in effect would be 
Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian states
170
. Following that track on the meeting between 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban held on 6
th
 of 
May 1992 in Graz, Austria  they have agreed on mutual cooperation and division of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
171
. Bosniak Muslim representatives were not invited on the both meetings 
and because they were not included in these talks the partition was agreed on their expense. 
Divison of Bosnia and Herzegovina was projected to be along the Neretva River with Mostar 
and everything south of it under Croat control. Finally, in between the expanded and greater 
Croatia and Serbia, it was provisioned to be a small Bosniak buffer state. These two 
agreements between two warring parties that in the same time were fighting in Croatia show 
clear and vivid geopolitical background. On one hand they showed that the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was primarily territorial conflict with final goal of acquiring territorial gains and 
thus the only possible geopolitical solution would be division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 
this it became obvious that greater geopolitical territorial concepts of Greater Serbia and 
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Greater Croatia would have considerable influence motivational as well as a driving force in 
the development and settlement of the conflict. On the other hand, these two agreements 
confirmed the rule of the geopolitics that the adversaries who are fighting each other in the 
same time as were Serbs and Croats, having interest in compliance on other place could 
openly cooperate without obstacles. In accordance on the agreements Serb and Croat began to 
act and prepare the ground for the already agreed territorial division and expansion, which 
was inevitably driving towards a war. Similarly as in Croatia, Serbs have proclaimed several 
Serb Autonomous Regions (SAO) with intent of later unify them to create Greater Serbia, 
while Yugoslav army (JNA) started to deliver arms to Serb paramilitaries and police which 
was heavily Serbianized in order to increase the Serb political control. Bosnian Croats have 
also been acting towards separation. In accordance with the  Karadjordjevo Agreement (and 
prior to Graz Agreement) Bosnian Croat leadership undertook activities in late 1991. On 12
th
 
of November 1991, Mate Boban and Dario Kordic held a joint meeting of the crisis teams of 
Herzegovina and of the Travnik Regional Communities, which decided that Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina should institute a policy achieving their own age-old dream of a common 
Croatian state, which should proclaim a Croatian Banovina in Bosnia and  Herzegovina as 
initial phase leading towards the permanent settlement of the Croatian question and the 
creation of a sovereign Croatia within its ethnic and historical borders
172
. This was first 
official and open introduction of the Greater Croatian geopolitical territorial concept and the 
territorial scope of the previously mentioned unit of Croatian Banovina in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was serving as a basis and goal to achieve. Six days later on 18
th
 of November 
1991, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban proclaimed the existence of the Croatian community 
of Herzeg-Bosnia as a separate political, cultural, economic and territorial entity on the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
173
, which later would be proclaimed as a republic. In the 
same time primarily Muslim and to lesser extent Croat political factors were advocating 
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On February 29-March 1, 1992, Bosnia held a 
referendum on its sovereignty and independence which was scheduled in accordance with the 
European Community's response to Bosnia-Hercegovina's request for international 
recognition
174
. Serbs had largely boycotted the referendum and the final results were 99,7% 
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in favor of independence out of 63,4% turnout
175
. The referendum and its results were 
immediately and almost completely overshadowed by the well known events such as killings 
of the Serb orthodox wedding in downtown Sarajevo which began on Sunday, 1st of March, 
and developed during the course of that night
176
. Amidst the ongoing crisis and raging war 
Bosnian government declared independence on 3
rd
 of March 1992
177
. The decision to declare 
independence was followed by declaring autonomous Republic of Srpska in Bosnia by the 
Bosnian Serbs
178
. Many experts argue that it was the role of the international factors on the 
recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the referendum that played 
and gave the crucial impact and impetus on the final outbreak of the war. On 6
th
 of April 
1992 European Community and one day later United States recognized the independence and 
sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina
179
 and on the 22
nd
 of May it was accessed to United 
Nations. As Bosnia and Herzegovina was on the brink of full-scale war, panic had seized the 
population and oppositely to the western hopes that recognition would head off the civil war, 
such actions have sparked the war by provoking Milosevic‘s order to deploy the army and 
prompting Serbian invasion of eastern Bosnia by full scale attack of irregulars, Arcan’s forces 
and army reservists on Muslim cities and towns along Drina
180
. Recognition of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which is seen in close compliance with the one of Croatia is widely criticized 
and analyzed as having considerably important impact on the Bosnian war. Among the most 
outspoken critics of German decision and pressure is Ambassador Zimmerman who argues 
that recognition of Croatia necessitated the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina which in 
turn sparked the conflict in Bosnia, although the fact remains that it was the U.S. government, 
at Zimmerman’s urging, that pushed the idea of recognizing Bosnia in March 1992
181
. 
However, the two different issues of recognition were at issue: the German and EC decision 
to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and U.S. decision to push for the recognition of Bosnia and 
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. Nevertheless, both issues of recognition by the external actors and 
international community had considerable geopolitical influence with multiple impacts on the 
entire crisis situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia in general. The 
German campaign for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia appears to have influenced 
Milosevic’s decision of 5
th
 of December 1991 to redeploy JNA troops in Bosnia but this 
German initiative have also helped convince Milosevic to give up the idea of achieving 
Greater Serbia through military means although it came as a response to a combination of 
factors
183
. Nevertheless, the recognition (and cease-fire) of Croatia which came as a result of 
German initiative, had considerable impact in worsening the situation towards war as the 
winding down of the war in Croatia freed up Croat and Serb forces, above all Croat units 
from western Herzegovina, to undertake operations in Bosnia
184
. Also, reconfiguration of the 
JNA created a distinctively Bosnian Serb army and Milosevic’s decision for its creation was 
taken in anticipation of a civil war seen as inevitable in the light of the German move toward 
recognition
185
. Moreover, Milosevic and his advisers were convinced that recognition of 
Croatia would lead to recognition of Bosnia by the EC and the United States so their response 
was to prepare for war and to provide Belgrade with some basis for denying involvement 
once the war broke out
186
. However, instead of slowing or halting the war, as in the case of 
Croatia, recognition had apparently accelerated the pace of Bosnia’s decline and 
destruction
187
.  Regarding that the three main ethnic and religious groups in Bosnia were 
territorially oriented, even the international community international community involved in 
the resolution came up with proposals of constitutional and territorial rearrangement of the 
country in order to met the ambitions of the parties and thus prevent the war escalating 
further. On 18
th
 of March 1992 Jose Cutileiro’s plan that was dividing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into three ethnic cantons was signed, but it was rejected by the Bosnian 




.  Nevertheless fighting broke out on 6
th
 of 
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April and two days later on 8
th
 of April the Yugoslav army entered the fray
189
.  Full scale war 
escalated quickly throughout the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides the already started 
armed conflict in which Serbs were fighting against the others in  the mid of June 1992, Croat 
and Bosniak that were allies to that point started a war between each other in which Bosnian 
Croats were supported by Croatia and acted according the plans for partitioning of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from Karadjordjevo and Graz agreements. Civil war in Bosnia turned to be 
a total war between all three parties. Unenviable weak position of the Muslims in the Bosnian 
War from geopolitical perspective opened a gateway not just for reemerging involvement of 
Turkey in the geopolitics of the Balkans after almost a whole century of absence but also for 
a totally new involvement for Islamic geopolitical factors for the Middle East such as Saudi 
Arabia and Iran in Europe. Since 1992 Turkey have openly been involved and supported the 
Bosnian Muslim side by several diplomatic initiatives including political diplomatic and 
military measures on different international platforms such as United Nations, Organization 
of Islamic Countries and regional conferences where it considered to bring the suffering of 
the Bosnians to the agenda
190
.  Turkey was loudly advocating for lifting the arms embargo 
and according to the chief of stuff it secretly delivered weapons to Muslims
191
. Moreover, 
during and by the end of the Croat – Bosniak war in February 1994 Turkey was actively  
involved on demand and welcoming of the both sides as mediator in the final settlement of 
cease-fire and agreement on federation
192
. Perhaps as many as four thousand Islamic 
fundamentalist fighters from throughout the Muslim world flocked to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the open invitation of Alija Izetbegovic to help ensure the creation of the 
only (fundamentalist) Islamic state in Europe
193
. Regarding the interest of Bosnian president 
and Muslim leader of Iranian Islamic revolution in the years prior the crisis, Iran and its 
intelligence have also trained and equipped with arms the Bosnian Muslim forces. Even after 
the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1997 Iran had approximately two hundred 
agents in various institutions
194
 and up today Iran have the largest diplomatic and intelligence 
network in Europe, exactly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During and after the war up to day 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina became a biggest place in Europe where radical Islam is genuinely 
developed and actively financed through construction of mosques, religious schools and 
scholarships, charities, by the Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar. 
Strong rise of Islamic fundamentalism led after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, 
one of the main goals of US policy in Bosnia to become the reducing of the influence of Iran 
and the various mujahedin forces there
195
. From geopolitical perspective the war in Bosnia 
opened the way and introduced the Islamic factor not just on the Balkans, but in Europe too. 
Thus, the Bosnian war to the greatest extent confirmed the theories and presumptions of the 
geopolitics of culture (and chaos) and clash of civilizations presented by Samuel Huntington, 
Robert Kaplan and other authors. The atrocities of the war in Bosnia, especially those of the 
siege of Sarajevo, led to greater involvement of international and western factors in the 
attempts of preventing the war. As it was aforementioned in the second chapter, UN imposed 
arms embargo and no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO for the first time in its 
history intervened in Bosnia with several operations such as Maritime Guard for securing 
arms embargo, Deny Flight for securing the no-fly zone and preventing violation of airspace 
and Deliberate Force using air bombing on Serb positions. On the ground the war was raging 
territorial acquisition prior the peace agreement was primary goal. Geopolitically, the 
problem of Bosnia was difficult to resolve for the Serbs: the Bosnian Muslims in the Podrinje 
region separated Serbs in northern and western Bosnia from Serbia proper and Serbs in the 
northeastern part of Bosnia were physically separated from Serbs in eastern Herzegovina
196
. 
The Croats in the Bosnian Posavina region dominated key communication links between 
Bosnia and Croatia
197
. As Serbs have never fully secured control of the narrow Brcko 
corridor
198
, Croatian forces were constantly attempting to gain control of it and thus cut off 
the direct geographical and territorial link between Bosnian Krajina and Republic of Serb 
Krajina in Croatia with Serbia. Croats have also dominated communication lines to Ploce and 
Neum. Bosniaks and Croats also dominated communication links along the Narenta Valley. 
By 1992, the Croats and the Bosniaks living in compact settlements in central Bosnia were in 
danger of being encircled by Serbs. Likewise, the Bosniaks and Croats in western Bosnia 
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were surrounded by Serbian populated areas. The Serbian attack on Bosnia in April 1992, 
was conducted as part of the JNA's plan called "Most (Bridge)" which attempted to create a 
land bridge between Serbia and the Serbian occupied areas in Croatia, the Krajina, and south 
Dalmatia
199
. According to the territories controlled by Muslims and encircled by heavily 
equipped Serb forces, United Nations in April and May 1993 declared Srebrenica as a “safe 
area”, status which was extended to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac
200
. As it is 
well know later in 1994 safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa would fall and be seized by Serb 
forces which would commit the massacres and mass killings in July 1995. Finally on 14
th
 of 
December 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed which put an end of the disastrous 
Bosnian War and totally reorganized the constitutional and territorial structure of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. According to the Dayton Agreement the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
divided in two entities Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina populated mostly by Bosniaks 
(Muslims) and Croats and Republic of Srpska populated mostly by Serbs and one self-
governing Brcko District which is jointly administered as a condominium by the both entities 
and it is under direct sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republic of Srpska as well as 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina functions largely as federal units with their own 
government, police and even their own armies until 2005. Moreover, the entity of Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina is comprised of 10 cantons with their own governments and 
ministries and significantly large degree of decentralization
201
. However, some of Bosnian 
Croats are still dissatisfied and resentful with their position due to the lack of formal 
territorial entity despite they are among the three constitutionally equal nations. Due to the 
outnumbering by the Bosniaks in the decision making process of Federation Bosnia-
Herzegovina especially since 2005 political parties and figures are advocating for creation of 
a third Croat entity or restoration of community of Herzeg-Bosnia. Territorially both entities 
occupy almost equal halves of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina although they have 
lack of compact and reasonable territorial structure. Republic of Srpska has an oval shape in 
which Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina deeply penetrates, with the two flanks separated by 
the Brcko District which territory also separates two small parts of Federation Bosnia-
Herzegovina on the Sava River by the border with Croatia. This kind of the territorial 
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organization with the autonomous Muslim-Croat federation out of 51% of the territory and a 
boomerang-shaped Republic of Srpska of the remaining 49% of the  land but divided by the 
Brcko corridor at the corner of the reverse, upside-down L-shaped territory
202
, remained 
highly unstable territorial solution of the conflict due to the lack of the territorial reasonability 
which reflects with complete impractical and inefficient governance as well as constant 
discontent which can serve as a source for territorial pretensions and nationalism. This is 
largery confirmed by the fact that the Dayton Accords left all three parties feeling insecure in 
their gains: Bosnian Muslims secured their independent state, but one with less than a third of 
the territory of the former Bosnian Republic; the Bosnian Serbs which controlled 46% of the 
territory prior to the accords gained their own mini-state, but one whose legitimacy was under 
constant attack; and finally Bosnian Croats achieved recognition  of  their right to self-
determination and joint defense of the federation but at the expense of having to dismantle 
their own mini-state in Bosnia previously mentioned Herzeg-Bosnia
203
. However, regarding 
the fact that Bosnian Croats maintain close links with their mother-state Croatia by carrying 
Croatian passports, vote on Croatian elections (ex. in 1995) and even used Croatian currency, 
licence plates and routed their telephone calls through Croatia indicates their strong position 
with the power of destruction of the federation, as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera 
have pointed out
204
. Moreover, Dayton maintained the central focus on territory, but did so in 
a way so as to create vulnerable enclaves of mixed populations: a country of corridors and 
buffer zones was to prevent Serb and Croat secession
205
. Lastly, in regards of the territorial 
division related withe greater Serbian and Croatian concepts there are contradictive 
allegations that on one hand the Dayton agreement is actually a compromise that partially 
accomplish and secures their goals and territorial gains while on the other hand on paper it 
prevented the creation of Greater Croatia (and Serbia)
206
. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina 
remained completely unresolved issue that is constantly actual in the geopolitics of the 
Balkans as it is example with the Republic of Srpska secessionist movement in regards of the 
secession and resolution of the status of Kosovo. Nonetheless, the emergence of the 
independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Bosniak Muslims as a constituent 
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nation as well as majority have another geopolitical significance in the fact that it establishes 
the Bosniaks as geopolitical actor on the Balkans with their nation state which represents a 
basis for creation and development of a new greater territorial geopolitical concept of a 
Greater Bosnia as a nation and mother-state of all Slavic Muslims on the Balkans 
encompassing Bosnia and Herzegovina unified with the region of Sandjak which is currently 
within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro.  Considering the geopolitical conceptualization 
of the Balkans territorial changes of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not intact neither 
Heartland nor Rimland, regarding the position of Bosnia as a buffer zone between them. 
Unresolved internal situation of Bosnia and Hezegovina places it as a part of a shatterbelt of 
the Balkans. This could give the answer why the war of the  Bosnia and Herzegovia although 
it have been the most devastating and disastrous conflict in Europe after the Second World 
War  did not spread throughout the entire region of the Balkans.          
   
IV.3. KOSOVO SECESSION AND SOUTHERN SERBIA INSURGENCY 
In the heat of the events of the breakup of Yugoslavia, another hotspot emerged with the case 
of the Albanian – Serb conflict erupting in Kosovo and Southern Serbia. Unlike the sudden 
and unexpected breakout of the crisis and wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, vivid course of events and constant deterioration of situation preceded Kosovo 
crisis.  Following Tito’s death in 1980, a period of political instability commenced in the 
SFRY and in Kosovo, by the continual deterioration of the situation between Albanians and 
Serbs. The manifestation of Albanian nationalism became more frequent with many private 
assaults against Serbian persons and properties reported as well as various other cases of 
rapes, beatings, destruction of graves, murders and defacing of some monasteries and 
churches all for reasons of ethnic hatred
207
. The pattern was emerging that of systematic 
pressure on the Serbs and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo, sell everything they had and go to 
Serbia
208
. Most indicative was that the percentage of the Serbian population in Kosovo fell 
from 23,6% in 1961 to 13,2% in 1981
209
. This situation was mentioned in the famous 
memorandum of the Serbian academy of sciences and arts from 1986 that served as a 
fostering factor of the rising Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia at the end of the 80’s and 
beginning of the 90’s. Moreover, in 1990 Serbian historians alleged that in the previous two 
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decades some 400,000 Serbs were forced to leave Kosovo, but nevertheless they were 
ignored both by the Kosovo and federal government which led to the resentment that the state 
could not and did not want to protect its own citizens rising
210
. In  1981 the secessionist 
tendencies of the Albanian population culminated in the so-called March riots or the student 
demonstration with wide popular support where the central message was the demand for 
Kosovo to became a republic of Yugoslavia (and thereby to have constitutionally guaranteed 
right of self-determination up to secession) and the final aim of the protesters was union with 
their mother-state – Albania
211
. This was first and vivid sign of the involvement of the 
geopolitical territorial concept of Greater Albania in the Kosovo issue. All this led to an 
general situation where independence movements developed amongst Albanians while 
Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia on a nationalist platform, exactly on the Kosovo 
issue. This was evident from his famous and well known visits and speeches of assuring 
Serbs that no one will ever beat them and the celebration of the sixth hundred anniversary of 
the Kosovo Battle between Serbs and ottoman Turks. Milosevic accused Kosovo Albanians 
of violating the rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo, and the Serbian parliament began 
preparing amendments that would strip Kosovo Albanians of the autonomy granted to them 
in the 1974 SFRY constitution
212
. Back and-forth atrocities ensued; Albanians responded to 
Serbian oppression with violence against the Serb minority, and Milosevic reacted by 
ordering 25,000 Serbian police officers into the province
213
. Throughout the violent 
escalation, Kosovo Albanians made efforts to free themselves from Serbian control. In 
September 1990, most Albanian members of the Kosovo Parliament met outside of its 
building and passed a resolution declaring Kosovo independent within the SFRY
214
. Slightly 
more than a year later in September 1991, Albanians in Kosovo organized an illegal 
referendum in which 87% of voters took part, and 99% voted in favor of Kosovo as a 
sovereign and independent republic
215
. Few days later Kosovo was recognized by Albania
216
. 
Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians organized parallel government structures, including a 
local government assembly, schools, and clinics
217
. In the same time on 1
st
 of March 1992, on 
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an unofficial referendum Albanians from the Preshevo Valley in Southern Serbia with 98% 
of votes declared their desire to join Kosovo by a peaceful annexation to their compatriots
218
. 
A 1946 decision by the Yugoslav government to separate the Presevo, Bujanovac and 
Medvedja municipalities from Kosovo and place them under direct Serbian Republic 
jurisdiction created a grievance that continues to inflame passions among the local 
Albanians
219
. Thus the Presevo Valley which is strategically important for Serbia because the 
main transportation corridors passes through, remained outside Kosovo despite the numerous 
Albanian population which refer the region as Eastern Kosovo. In the first half of the 90’s the 
conflict in Kosovo was pulsing with a slower pace due to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that were under way. But unlike those wars Albanian diaspora in Europe and 
North America was actively preparing resources for the intending war conflict and also 
lobbied in the political centers in the western powers. Appearance of the Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK) section of Kosovo Albanian political elite at the 1992 European 
Community Conference on Yugoslavia
220
, is an obvious example of that. As situation 
continued to deteriorate, in 1993 the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was founded and began 
to grow. Nevertheless, the issue of Kosovo was not on the agenda of the international factor’s 
efforts for resolution of Yugoslav crisis and thus Albanians were still not considered as a part 
of that great game. The last event that preceded and directly influenced the break out of the 
war in Kosovo was the civil unrest and rioting in Albania in March 1997 when  military 
arsenals were sucked and the country and its neighborhood were flooded with more than a 
half million looted weapons many of which were supplied as small arms to KLA (UCK)
221
. 
Moreover, the total anarchy and collapse of the law and order provided KLA a stretch of 
ungoverned territory in northern Albania in which they could arm and train a guerrilla 
force
222
. Finally, by 1998 open conflict had broken out between KLA and Yugoslav security 
forces
223
. Unlike the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war in Kosovo have 
more character as insurgency with guerilla warfare, partisan attacks and diversion and 
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individual terrorist acts. Although Yugoslav security forces were overwhelmingly superior 
and extremely powerful in regard of the Albanian insurgents which besides the training 
camps in Northern Albania had their stronghold in the mountainous region of Drenica in the 
central part of the province between the two main valleys Kosovo and Metohia, they had the 
advantage in their guerilla warfare due to the extremely wide support of the Albanian 
population which presented overwhelming majority and except in the far north it is 
geographically dispersed throughout entire province. One example of this is seizure and 
kidnapping in the Belacevac Mine in central Kosovo in 1998 thus threatening the supply with 
electricity of the most of the province. Regarding the historical significance of Kosovo for the 
Serbian national sentiment, as well as for the Albanian, the Kosovo War was actually a clash 
and conflict between the greater Albanian and greater Serbian geopolitical territorial 
concepts. Regarding that Kosovo was part of the sovereign recognized territory of Serbia, 
greater expansionist extent in the war  has the concept of Greater Albania. The KLA was 
perceived by many as a proponent of greater Albania. In July 1998, Kosovo Liberation Army 
spokesman Jakup Krasniqi publicly announced that the KLA’s goal was the unification of all 
Albanian-inhabited lands
224
. On New Year’s Eve 1998, while on Albanian national 
television, the KLA’s General Staff called for “1988-1999 to be the years of the unification of 
the Albanians and of the freedom and independence of Kosovo”
225
.  As the Yugoslav security 
forces were much superior in any prospect and together with Serb paramilitary units started 
mass abuses of human rights, the situation worsened and called for a greater international 
involvement in the prevention and settlement. Although, the talks in Rambouillet held in 
February 1999, initially ended up successfully with Serbian side accepting restoration of 
autonomy of Kosovo, it rejected the presence of NATO troops. The international monitors 
(ratificators) from the OSCE left Kosovo on 22
nd
 of March 1999 and the next day stated the 
NATO air bombing on Yugoslavia, which is analyzed in the second chapter in the part of the 
geopolitics of the air on the Balkans. After 78 days of air bombing campaign the war was 
concluded by the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement which had considerable impact on 
territorial organization and the following insurgency in Southern Serbia in 2001. On 10th of 
June 1999, the SC, by adopting Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII, placed Kosovo, a 
province within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), under joint administration of the 












. Thus Kosovo became a protectorate of the United Nations. The Resolution 
1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia
227
 thus defining Kosovo as part of Serbia (which itself was a constituency of 
Yugoslavia). Accordingly, Serbia was constantly calling upon this as a guaranteeing of 
Kosovo status as inextricable part of its territory. Kumanovo Agreement which was officially 
called as military technical agreement, have also provisioned definition of 25 km of air safety 
zone and 5 km ground safety zone around Kosovo’s boundaries into FRY which Yugoslav 
forces could not enter without NATO permission. After the end of Kosovo War in 2000 and 
2001 a splinter group of KLA calling itself Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac (UCPMB)  emerged and began launching attacks against Serb security forces
228
. 
The UCPMB aimed to internationalize the plight of ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia, with 
the goal of securing NATO intervention on their behalf. This was the model the KLA had 
used in Kosovo and the UCPMB reasoned that it could be replicated in Presevo. Between 700 
and 1,000 UCPMB guerrillas began operating inside the three-mile Ground Safety Zone 
(GSZ), created by the military technical agreement signed by NATO and Belgrade in June 
1999
229
. These guerrillas enjoyed the de facto protection afforded by a NATO ban on heavy 
weapons within the GSZ
230
. As fighting escalated in the spring of 2001, and with an Albanian 
insurgency gaining steam in Macedonia, it became clear that the Albanian insurgents in 
southern Serbia and Macedonia were using the demilitarised zone to facilitate their attacks 
and smuggling of weapons
231
. The emergence of the UCPMB also coincided with rising 
violence in the divided northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica, where Serbs – angry over the 
ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Kosovo Albanians – began to establish a de facto partition of 
Kosovo
232
. Presevo Valley Albanians were anxious that they would be pushed to the side 
during any future discussions on the final status of Kosovo, and wished to link the fate of the 
Valley with any final settlement for Kosovo
233
. As a result, the Presevo Valley also 
represented a bargaining chip aimed at counterbalancing Serbian efforts at partitioning 
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. However, the fall of the Milosevic regime and the change of the government in 
Belgrade had impact on completely different solution. After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in 
October 2000, and his replacement by new governments in Belgrade, the West strove to build 
a new positive relationship with Serbia, and the Presevo conflict was settled essentially on 
Belgrade’s terms
235
. NATO made clear that it did not intend to redraw borders, and that 
military provocations by Albanian militant groups would be treated as a direct security 
threat
236
 and allowed entrance of the Yugoslav security forces into the ground safety zones. 
However, as the talks for the final status of Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina continued 
the situation on ground worsened by the unrest of 2004 with wide scale attack on Serbs which 
led to a even greater extent of ghettoization, living in enclaves and concentration in Northern 
Kosovo therefore strengthening the internal territorial division. The talks on the final status of 
Kosovo were driving towards stalemate and in 2007 the special envoy of UN, Martti 
Ahtisaari proposed his plan and recommendations considering the actual situation of 
complete separate governing of Kosovo and Serbia without any exercise of Serbian authority 
as well as the irreversible nature and inability of any attempt of reintegration of Kosovo into 
Serbia
237
. Although plan proposed wide scale self-governing in all segments even to security 
forces, adoption national symbols and representation in international organization it avoided 
explicit reference to independence and instead it provisioned the supervised or conditional 
independence – the approach that Europe have taken to recognition of states to secede from 
Yugoslavia in 1991
238
. Independence and recognition were preconditioned on a commitment 
to protect human rights and to afford special political protections to Kosovo Serbs
239
. In that 
prospect the Ahtisaari plan proposed wide decentralization, which will especially improve the 
status of the Serbs in regards of the territorial organization. The political and territorial status 
of the Serbs and other minorities was even more improved with the creation of several 
smaller municipalities with Serb and non-Albanian majority throughout entire Kosovo 
(especially southern and eastern parts). Decentralization as a solution for the internal 
organization of Kosovo, which was also an issue of contention and high tensions in 
Macedonia in 2004 as it will be explained below, was within the mainstream of European 
thinking how to manage potential interethnic conflict without war, ethnic cleansing or 








 Perrit, H. Henry (2010) The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan. 
Cambridge University Press. p. 165 
238
 Ibid, p.169 
239
 Ibid 





 but it has pretty unstable and highly uncertain impact on the final outcome 
whether it would lead to integration into state’s political structure or towards greater 
secessionist tendencies and partition. Despite the efforts of the United States and European 
Union members of the Security Council in rewriting the draft versions of the proposal in 
order to met the objections of Russia as a member which holds the right of veto, the talks for 
adoption of the plan failed. Thus, on 17
th
 of February 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo adopted 
declaration of independence with unanimously vote for independence of Serbia. The 
recognitions of independence from United States, Great Britain, France (UN Security Council 
permanent members with veto power) and Turkey followed the next day, while recognitions 
of other geopolitically significant actors and members of EU such as Germany and Italy 
followed in the next two and three days. Apart from Albania which was the only country that 
recognized the independence of Kosovo from the first declaration in 1990, the neighbors of 
Kosovo such as Macedonia and Montenegro followed on the same day on 9
th
 of October 
2008. As of February 2014 Kosovo has received 109 diplomatic recognitions as an 
independent state out of which 107 from the members of United Nations, 23 out of 28 EU 
member states, 24 out of 28 NATO member states and 34 out of 57 members of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The declaration of independence was boycotted by the 
Serbs members of the Kosovo Assembly and it is widely rejected and opposed together with 
the Kosovo institution by the Serbs living in the Northern Kosovo. Serbia which considers 
Kosovo as sovereign part of its territory according to its constitution also rejected the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo as unilateral and requested advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice which decided that the declaration of independence of Kosovo 
did not violate the international law
241
. Nevertheless, Serbia continues to deny recognition. 
China and Russia as the two other permanent members with veto power of the UN Security 
Council do not recognize Kosovo as independent state. Moreover, Russia rejects and consider 
the declaration as illegal and uses the precedent of unilateral secession of Kosovo as 
argumentation for support of its geopolitical position and backing of the secessionist 
movements such as Ossetia and South Abkhazia in the War in Georgia of 2008 and most 
recently in the secession of Crimea and eastern regions in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis of 
2014. As a result Kosovo is still not accessed as a member of the United Nations. Thus 
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Kosovo still has an ambiguous status of quasi or de facto sovereign state with partial but not 
full international recognition. The process of territorial division and ambiguous status 
continued as UN administration was replaced with the EULEX and prior to Brussels talks 
between Belgrade and Pristina for normalization of their relations. The Serb majority 
populated region of Northern Kosovo which directly borders central Serbia fiercely boycotted 
the Kosovo and EULEX institutions often by violent and armed  attacks (as in the case of the 
attempt of Kosovo Police to assert on the two  border crossings in the north and imposition of 
customs taxes for imports from Serbia), thus de facto and completely functioning as 
independent entity and therefore placing Kosovo in a state of partition. Moreover, Serbs in 
Northern Kosovo decided to observe the direct rule of Belgrade which they believe as the 
only legal authority on the whole Kosovo despite the absence of Serbian authorities and 
freedom of movement and functioning of international (UNMIK) officials according to the 
Kumanovo Agreement.  The problem of the Serbs living in Northern Kosovo was one of the 
most difficult in the talks between Belgrade and Pristina under auspices of European Union in 
Brussels in 2011. Finally, on 19
th
 of April 2013 in Brussels delegations led by the prime 
ministers from Belgrade and Pristina reached an agreement in 15 points with considerable 
significance of territorial political organization of the Serbs in Northern Kosovo. According 
to the agreement all parallel Serb institutions were abolished and instead an 
Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities was established with separate status 
of the Police and its command as well as judiciary of Northern Kosovo integrated in the 
framework of Kosovo police and legal and institutional framework. Thus, Kosovo gained full 
territorial and institutional integrity while Serbs in the northern part gained de facto 
autonomous and federal status within the institutional framework of Kosovo. Nevertheless, 
international position of Kosovo continues to be contested in the territorial dispute over the 
sovereignty with Serbia. In regards of the geopolitical concept of Greater Albania after the 
independence Kosovo have undertaken several moves for building closer ties with Albania in 
de facto unification. Closer linking of Kosovo with Albania was developed through 
construction of infrastructure as the high-way
242
, replacing the former Serbian telephone code 
with the Albanian
243
 etc. The most important move in that context was the joint meeting of 
governments of Kosovo and Albania in 2014 in the House of Prizren League – the birthplace 
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of the idea of Greater Albania - where several agreements for strategic cooperation in 
facilitating commerce, infrastructure, transportation, building inter-connection power line 
were signed as well as declarations of special importance was given to the rights of Albanians 
living outside the official borders and special support for Albanians in Presevo Valley 
(Southern Serbia) was expressed
244
. From geopolitical perspective the involvement of the 
United States as a world’s super power was from the greatest significance in the Kosovo 
crisis and independence. Despite the leading role of  United Nations and their administration 
in the early phases and  later of European Union and its administration and role as mediator 
between the Belgrade and Pristina, the influence of United States in the final settlement of the 
status of Kosovo is predominantly decisive in any aspect. This leads some authors and 
analysts to conclude that the case of Kosovo together with the Albanian insurgency and 
constitutional (and territorial) rearrangement of Macedonia with the crucially decisive 
American support confirms that the geopolitical concept of Greater Albania is in compliance 
with American geopolitical and strategic plans, goals and objectives and therefor it is actually 
an American project
245
. Moreover, United State have built its largest army military base on 
the Balkans in Kosovo. That is the Camp Bondsteal which houses 7000 troops and civilian 
employees, has a 52 helipad airfield for helicopter aviation and serves as a headquarters for 
Multinational Task Force East
246
. Camp Bondsteel is the largest and the most expensive 
foreign military base built by the US in Europe, since the Vietnam War
247
. This base 
strategically lies close to the planned Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil (AMBO) pipeline 
also known as the Trans-Balkan, the pipeline project will transport the Caspian oil from 
Bulgaria to Albania via Macedonia and one of the objectives of the base is that it is expected 
to protect the AMBO
248
. Thus with the intervention and secession of Kosovo, United States 
besides its political dominance have also permanently secured its military presence in the 
Balkans, that is extremely geopolitically strategic important in the clash with Russia over 
political, territorial and economic energetic (through the gas and oil pipelines) that is 
escalating through the years of the new millennium especially with the ongoing crisis in 
Ukraine. Due to its weakness, Russia played insignificant and minor role during the war in 
Kosovo and NATO intervention where besides the incident of the Pristina Airport in June 
1999 it succeeded to deploy its peacekeepers throughout entire Kosovo independently from 
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NATO troops. But as the Russian position and power improves and rises in the recent years, 
Russia showed open political support and backed Serbia in the denial of the recognition of 
Kosovo and it accession in the international scene. Moreover, Russia intended to build joint 
center for emergency co-ordination near the southern Serbian city of Nis (close to Kosovo) 
that is perceived by many as a military base, first one since the end of the Warsaw Pact
249
. As 
it was aforementioned in the second chapter Serbia declared military neutrality and non-
alignment and it is become more hesitant toward any closer military alignment with Russia as 
it closer approaches to integration in European Union which was vividly expressed in the 
recent ongoing Ukrainian crisis. Nevertheless, the case of the territorial changes of Kosovo 
have considerable impact of the Russian reemergence as geopolitical player on the Balkans as 
well as enhancing its position in regional conflicts and its sponsored and supported 
secessionist movements in former Soviet space and finally by all of this towards its global 
geopolitical position. In the case of Kosovo other geopolitical players such as Turkey, 
European Union have secondary role supporting Kosovo secession and independence in 
compliance with the  American position. Turkey and its reemerging and rising influence on 
the Balkans according to the neo-Ottoman foreign policy lines places Kosovo and Albanian 
factor on highly important place as it was evident with the statement of Turkish prime 
minister Erdogan for belonging of a common history, culture and civilization during his visit 
of Kosovo in 2013
250
 which stirred controversy and official reaction and condemnation in 
Serbia
251
. Islamic factor have played minor to moderate role in strengthening the Albanian 
position during the conflict in the 90’s due  to the strong political influence of the  Albanians 
in the institution of the Islamic communities in Kosovo and Macedonia. However, recently 
there is significant rise of the radical Islam in Kosovo that is evident with the large number of 
volunteer fighters in the ongoing Syrian War. Regarding the geopolitical conceptualization of 
the Balkans after 1991 according to the geopolitical concepts and theories from the second 
chapter, secession of Kosovo that is surrounded from three sides by Serbia and Macedonia 
that comprise the Heartland of the Balkans, meant detaching a significant chunk from it. But 
as the strategically important Albanian populated Presevo Valley where the main 
transportation axis of the Balkans and European corridor passes, remains under control of 
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Serbia the position of the Heartland of the Balkans remained intact. Considering the richest 
mine deposits that Kosovo possesses and thus presenting resources Heartland of the Balkans, 
its secession means weakening the position of Serbia as Balkanic heartlandic power in 
economic and power projection (domination) prospects. Nevertheless, as long as Southern 
Serbia remains under the Serbian control the inability of Kosovo to cut off the main 
geographical and geopolitical axis of the Balkans (and Europe) by acquiring Presevo Valley 
would mean preservation of the situation of geopolitical balance of powers on the Balkans. 
 
IV.4. MACEDONIA AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE TERRITORIAL 
ORGANZIATION  
The independence of Macedonia have undoubtedly arisen the greatest geopolitical turmoil of 
the Balkans. Emergence of the independent Macedonian state have definitely awaken the 
greater territorial, nationalist and chauvinist ideas, interests, goals, objectives and appetites of 
all Macedonian neighbors that were settled and calm since the partition of Macedonia in 1913 
and after the Second World War when with the partitioned Macedonian territory divided 
among Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Albania to a lesser extent, the so-called 
Macedonian question was considered as solved and definitely settled. Geopolitical balance on 
the Balkans established by the partition of Macedonia with the emergence of the independent 
Macedonian state have definitely been shaken and neighboring states have seen threat on 
their borders with the existence of this independent country evolving as nation with genuine 
and specific autochthonous national identity from the partitioned geographical, historical and 
ethnographical region of Macedonia. As all of Macedonia’s neighbors had at one time or 
another denied the existence of a Macedonian people and its right to a state, claiming its 
people and territory as their own all of them viewed the small, independent republic as a 
threat to their past gains or future aspirations there and rejected it as an artificial creation
252
. 
Thus Macedonia faced and still faces unprecedented severe obstacles in its recognition and 
affirmation as an independent state in the international community. In this context are the 
ongoing issues such as the name dispute with Greece, constant and continual denial and 
contestation of the Macedonian national, ethnic, linguistic and historic identity and 
Macedonian national minorities by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, as well as consistent 
interethnic conflict and crisis with the Albanian minority and its secessionist movement that 
erupted as armed conflict and insurgency in 2001 which thoroughly redefined the internal 
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constitutional, political and territorial structure and organization of the country.  When on 
25
th
 June 1991, the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia, and a month later it opened hostilities 
against Croatia thus the spilling of blood sealed the fate of Yugoslavia, one day later on 26 
June the Macedonian national assembly discussed independence but its members were 
divided, as did the population in general
253
. But the disagreement was not, as many people 
have assumed, between nationalists and ‘‘Yugoslavists.’’, rather, it was between moderate or 
cautious nationalists under the president Kiro Gligorov, who in view of grave internal and 
external threats urged restraint, and the radical or ‘‘impatient’’ nationalists, whom the party 
VMRO-DPMNE led and who tended to minimize the threats and wanted independence 
immediately
254
. However, once the northern fighting widened to include Croatia and 
threatened Bosnia-Herzegovina, even the cautious had to agree that the Yugoslav idea was 
dead
255
. Macedonian sovereignty and independence even within a loose association no longer 
formed a viable option
256
.  At this point, Macedonians had only two possibilities. First, they 
could, as Belgrade and Athens wanted them to do, join a third, or ‘‘reduced’’ Yugoslavia in a 
new federation in which without the Croatians and the Slovenes to counterbalance the Serbs, 
however, they could have become extremely weak and vulnerable
257
. Consequently, they 
rejected this option from the outset. Second, they could declare complete sovereignty and 
independence—the only route acceptable to most of the population, including the 
Albanians
258
. The political leaders resolved to give the people the final say. In the referendum 
on 8
th
 of September 1991, 72.16 percent of 1,495,080 registered voters cast ballots; 95.08 
percent of voters, or 1,021,981 people, supported independence, and only 3.63 percent, or 
38,896 opposed it
259
. Unfortunately-a sign of internal troubles to come—Albanians boycotted 




 September 1991, the national 
assembly passed the declaration of independence, and on 17
th
 of November it adopted a new 
constitution
261
, which was also boycotted by the ethnic Albanian members of the Parliament. 
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After the successful referendum for independence of Macedonia and the promulgation of the 
first Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on 17
th
 of November 1991, Greece 
immediately objected and initiated its strong policy of negating Macedonia’s right to its 
constitutional name based on the statement that the name Macedonia implies territorial 
pretensions
262
. Besides the argumentation that the name Macedonia implies territorial 
pretensions towards Greece it also supported this claim by calling upon the articles of the 
constitution that provision change of the borders and care of the Macedonian minorities 
living in neighboring countries.  Even though Macedonian Constitution was evaluated as a 
good one and in accordance with all democratic standards by the Arbitrage Commission of 
the Presidents of the Constitutional Courts of the European Economic Community member 
countries (EEC), this fact was not enough for the European Community to recognize the 
independence of Macedonia. On 15
th
 of December 1991, this Arbitrage Commission under 
the Presidency of Robert Badinter, gave an opinion to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
EEC that all conditions for recognition of Macedonian independence are met and made a 
proposal for admission of Macedonia to UN
263
.  In this contex is very important to stress that 
the previously mentioned Commission in its Opinion no.6 clearly stated that the republic had 
given the necessary guarantees for respect of human rights and international peace and 
security and the name Macedonia does not imply any territorial pretensions and claims 
toward any other country
264
.  Despite the opinion of the Arbitration Commission led by 
Robert Badenter that Slovenia and Macedonia have met all the conditions, as it was already 
aforementioned EEC recognized the independency of Slovenia and Croatia, but not of 
Macedonia. Thus the space for geopolitically calculated actions toward Macedonia was left 
open. The year of 1992 was much turbulent for Macedonia in geopolitical and prospect in 
regards of the attainment of the independence on the international scene, relations with its 
neighbors as well as the internal affairs. Territory of Macedonia was much in concern of its 
neighbors as well as from within by the Albanian minority. On 11
th
 of January on an illegal 
referendum with support of 74% out of 92% eligible to vote, ethnic Albanians voted for 
autonomy and several local leaders in predominantly Albanian populated municipalities in 
western Macedonia declared the region as Republic of Ilirida
265
. With the proclamation of the 
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Republic of Ilirida ethnic Albanian leaders stated their objective as the unification of all 
Albanians in the former Yugoslavia while in the interim they favored the federalization of 
Macedonia in which Ilirida would cover approximately half of the republic’s territory
266
. 
Thus the objectives of the concept of Greater Albanian towards Macedonia became evident 
and openly stated.  In the same tame on the beginning of January, Bulgaria was the first 
country to recognize the independence of Macedonia
267
. Bulgaria’s recognition of Macedonia 
as an independent state, however, was overshadowed by statements from the country’s 
authorities who rushed to clarify that this recognition should not be interpreted by the 
political authorities in Skopje as Bulgaria’s recognition of a distinct Macedonian nation in the 
Balkan region
268
. Therefore although Bulgaria was first to recognize the independence of 
Macedonia, of significance was the truth that Bulgaria recognized Macedonia as a state and 
not as a nation thus leaving open door for possible future unification
269
. Hence, as it was 
previously mentioned Bulgaria set up its foreign policy on the ground and objectives of the 
concept of Greater Bulgaria. By recognizing Macedonia under its constitutional name, Sofia 
aimed to show the West that Bulgaria had overcome its past irredentism by denouncing 
territorial claims on a region which Bulgaria’s authorities used to see as Bulgarian and had 
sought to incorporate into the Bulgarian state
270
. Nevertheless, relation between Macedonia 
and Bulgaria were not easy and cordial as one of the issue of contention was the so-called 
language controversy that was the question which language should be used in Bulgarian-
Macedonian interstate agreements
271
. When Bulgaria proposed that agreements between 
Bulgaria and Macedonia should be signed as “the official languages of both countries – 
Macedonian and Bulgarian”, the Macedonian government did not like the descriptor 
“official” which implied that the Macedonian language was a political convention rather than 
a language distinct from Bulgarian
272
. Nevertheless, this issue was solved exactly on this 
basis with the Declaration for good neighboring relations signed on 22
nd
 of February 1999. 
The Bulgarian authorities staunchly supported the political position of the past, according to 
which Macedonian nation in the Balkan region with its own language and history did not 
exist
273
, which emerges and is in the closest compliance with the objectives of the 
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geopolitical concept of Greater Bulgaria. On the beginning of 1992, Macedonia made some 
changes by adding amendments to its constitution: clear declaration that Macedonia does not 
have any territorial pretension to its neighbors and it is not going to interfere in their internal 
affairs; erasing Article 48 which regulated Macedonian minorities’ rights in the neighboring 
countries
274
. However this was not enough for recognition by EEC, and on 21
st
 of June 1992 
at the Lisbon Summit of EEC, under the Greek influence
275
, a declaration was adopted which 
stated that the European council expresses its readiness to recognize the country within its 
existing borders according to its Declaration dated on 16
th
 of December 1991 under a name 
which does not include the term Macedonia
276
. This very offensive decision was immediately 
rejected by the Macedonian parliament on 1
st
 of July 1992, and the Parliament, at the same 
time, sent letters for recognition under the constitutional name to EEC (EU), OSCE, UN and 
their member states
277
. In the same time Macedonia was acquiring its independence through 
peaceful means thus being the only former Yugoslav state gaining independence on a specific 
way without armed conflict with Yugoslav army or Serb paramilitary units. In February and 
March 1992, Macedonian president Gligorov conducted successful negotiations with JNA 
with regard to its withdrawal from Macedonia and on 27
th
 of March an appropriate agreement 
was signed with the Yugoslav general Nikola Uzelac and federal secretary of defense Bozidar 
Adzic
278
. In the negotiations Serbia agreed to withdraw all Yugoslav army units from 
Macedonia by 15
th
 April 1992 and although Yugoslav forces stripped military installations of 





. Soon after the withdrawal of JNA, Milosevic contacted Greek prime minister 
Mitsotakis with proposal to  divide Macedonia between Serbia and Greece, which Mitsotakis 
explicitly confirmed to the author of the book and German journalist-correspondent Viktor 
Meier in conversation in June 1992 indicating that it had been proffered about six months 
earlier, i.e. almost at the end of 1991 but he had rejected and  instead informed the European 
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. This proposal for division of Macedonia was also proffered to Bulgaria which 
refused
281
 due to its view point that existence of independent Macedonian republic on its 
borders is preferable for Bulgarian national security rather than federal republic under 
Belgrade’s political control or state partitioned between Serbia and Greece which might 
revive the military conflicts between Balkan states of the early twentieth century
282
. By this 
obviously the concept of Greater Serbia tried to involve and gain in the resolution of 
geopolitical turmoil caused by the emergence of the independent state of Macedonia. 
Regarding the territorial claims over Macedonia of all of its four neighbors, the conflictive 
potential of Macedonia was the highest on the Balkans as it was proven with the case with the 
Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 which were fought over the gains and finally led to the 
partition of Macedonia in 1913. Moreover, conflict over Macedonia may entail and cause a 
greater Balkan War with highly possible inclusion and involvement of Turkey, which despite 
fighting for the Muslim population would fight against Greece (and possibly Bulgaria) over 
their open ongoing disputes taking in account its weakness due to involvement in the conflict 
in Macedonia. Proposals for division of Macedonia in 1992 would definitely lead to a large 
scale regional conflict and thus all involved players in the geopolitical turmoil over 
Macedonia decided to continue and support their position and objectives through political, 
diplomatic and economic means. In the beginning of 1993, on 25
th
 of January, Greece sent a 
Memorandum to UN regarding Macedonia’s application for membership, openly declaring 
their views about the problem and trying to explain how Macedonia (with its name) 
represents a security threat to Greece and the region through certain historical facts from the 
end of the WWII and Greek civil war 1946-1949
283
, when Macedonians living in Greece (so-
called Aegean Macedonia) fought on the side of the communist in regards of recognition of 
national rights and possible unification with Macedonia in greater Balkan socialist federation. 
The rights and properties of Macedonian refugees expelled from Greek Civil War living in 
Macedonia and abroad, as well as the reference of Aegean Macedonia in historical books and 
political life in Macedonia together with ‘usurpation’ of the Greek historical and cultural 
heritage is considered as territorial claim and pretension by the Greek officials
284
. At the core 
of the Greek-Macedonian dispute laid the Greek claim to exclusive ownership of all things 
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92 
and matters Macedonian: geography, history, traditions, symbols, and, most important, the 
Macedonian name itself
285
. This became a highly volatile and emotional issue in Greece 
because its romantic-nationalist mythology identified and linked it not only with the glories 
of the ancient city-states, but also with the heritage of the dynastic ancient Macedonian 
kingdom and empire and the medieval multi-ethnic Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth and 
this mythology grounded the previously mentioned Megali Idea (Great Idea), the ideology of 
modern Greek imperialism
286
. The name dispute is also an emotional issue for the majority of 
the Macedonian citizens. Regarding that the reference of Aegean as well as Pirin Macedonia 
is coming from the geopolitical territorial concept of United Macedonia, Greek and Bulgarian 
fears of the questioning of their territorial integrity through the urging and mentioning the 
issue of the rights of Macedonian national minotiy living within their borders indicate that 
emergence of the independent Macedonian state was considered as possible basis for 
adopting foreign policy on the basis of this greater territorial concept of United Macedonia. 
Although as it was mentioned in previous chapter it was revived and was highly vividly 
present and actual in Macedonian political, societal and cultural life in 90’s it has not had any 
official state support by the government due to the significantly weak geopolitical central 
position surrounded by much stronger neighboring states in military, economic, political and 
human prospects. Hence, with the emergence of independent Macedonia it became object of 
geopolitical clash, collision and struggle between the greater territorial geopolitical concepts 
of United Macedonia, Greater Albania, Greater  Bulgaria, Greater Serbia and the Greek 
Megali idea.  On 7
th
 of April 1993, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 817 and the next 
day on 8
th
 of April, according to it, Macedonia became the 181
st
 member of the UN under the 
provisional reference name “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. According to the 
Resolutions 817 and 845, on13th of September 1995 the Interim accord between Macedonia 
and Greece was signed, as a most important agreement by which the relations between the 
two countries were clearly defined and finally normalized
287
. Macedonia was forced to 
change its national flag, while Greece lifted the unilaterally imposed embargo and trade 
blockade by closing the border, which together with the UN sanctions and embargo on Serbia 
had a disastrous impact on Macedonian economy losing about 60% of its trade thus 
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. Greece even became largest foreign investor in 
Macedonia in the following years. From geopolitical perspective the trade blockade of 
Greece on Macedonia that lasted from 1992 to 1995 regarding the fact that Macedonia as a 
landlocked country was totally dependent on imports from the closest sea port of 
Thessaloniki was very powerful geopolitical tool for pressure. According to US estimates the 
sanctions against Serbia may have cost Macedonia about $2.9 billion, and the Greek 
embargoes $1.5 billion which led the U.S. Department of State to conclusion that ‘‘as a result 
of these border closures Macedonia’s GDP of 1995 declined to 41 percent of its 1989 level
289
. 
Immediately after signing the Interim Accord Macedonia joined OSCE (15
th
 of October), the 
Council of Europe (9
th





. However, United States did not recognized Macedonia until early 1996
291
. By 
the end of the 90’s Macedonia received recognition from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
demarcated the border in 2001, signed the declaration with Bulgaria in 1999 and played 
significantly important role in Kosovo Crisis by providing logistic support and opening its 
territory for NATO intervention on Yugoslavia and also receiving 380,000 refugees from 
Kosovo
292
. While Macedonia settled its relations with its neighbors and attained its 
independence on the international scene, the internal interethnic conflict between Albanians 
and the Macedonian government throughout the 90’s was steadily worsening and driving 
towards a greater armed conflict which escalated in 2001. Throughout the 90’s political 
leaders of the ethnic Albanians have constantly demanded status of constitutional nation 
rather than national minority, which meant equal status with the Macedonians as holder of the 
statehood thus acquiring federal and equal autonomous status within Macedonia that will 
consequently made secession and unification with all other Albanians in one state possible. 
Besides the representation in political institutions such as parliament, government, 
municipalities, primary and secondary education as well as state and private media on 
Albanian, ethnic Albanians considered themselves as discriminated and continued to seek 
equal constituent status and often called for federalization or cantonization. Several occasions 
of parallel Albanian institutions such as the University established in Tetovo in 1994, display 
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94 
of flags of Albania in front of municipal buildings in Gostivar and Tetovo in 1997 which 
were against the laws were suppressed by police actions that erupted in violent clashes. 
Extreme Albanian nationalists, mostly in Kosovo and responding to NATO’s military 
intervention and defeat of Milosevic´s Serbia there, used Albanian grievances as a pretext to 
launch armed incursions against Macedonia
293
. In early 2001, by the end of January and 
beginning of February terrorist acts as grenade attack of police station in village of Tearce 
and skirmishes in village of Tanushevci on the border with Kosovo took place and the 
National Liberation Army (NLA or with Albanian abbreviation UCK same as Kosovo’s 
KLA) claimed responsibility. Their real aim was to destabilize the new state, detach its 
northwestern Albanian areas, and annex them to Kosovo and eventually to a ‘‘Great 
Albania’’
294
. This could be confirmed by the first three communiqués of the so-called 
National Liberation Army which referred to Macedonian police and security forces as 
occupiers of Albanian lands. Namely, after the grenade attack NLA issued Communiqué in 
which is stated that the attack was limited and was a proclamation to the Macedonian 
occupiers and their albanophone collaborators and the uniform of the Macedonian occupiers 
will be further attacked until the Albanian people are liberated
295
.  This rhetoric evidently 
reveals that the initial purpose and objective of the Albanian insurgency in Macedonia in 
2001 was acquiring territory for eventual and subsequent unification in a Greater Albania. 
Nevertheless, as conflict escalated and international factors such as US and EU involved in 
mediation and prevention thus recognizing and legitimating the Albanian insurgents and their 
paramilitary organization NLA, it changed the rhetoric that the armed struggle was for a 
greater human rights. In subsequent communiqués, statements of its spokesperson and 
commander’s interview circulated in national and international media until the conflict came 
to a close in August 2001, the so-called NLA asserted that it favored the preservation of 
Macedonia’s territorial integrity and respected NATO’s interests in Macedonia and also 
described its objectives in Macedonia: status of constituent nation for Albanians, 
institutionalization of Albanian as the second official language and equal participation of 
Albanians in state administration
296
.  As it was mentioned the insurgents used Kosovo as their 
safe place for the leadership of insurgents as well as launching attacks but also was notable 
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for its role in the crisis with the Prizren Declaration where leadership of NLA met political 
leaders of Albanians in Macedonia under auspices of special envoy of general Secretary of 
NATO Peter Feith (and another US Diplomat Robert Frowick) and declared that there would 
be no ethnic division of Macedonia
297
.  Moreover, some members of the Macedonian 
academy of sciences and arts and the prime minister Ljubco Georgievski proposed an 
exchange of territories and population between Macedonia and Albania as a solution of the 
crisis which was strongly condemned by the Macedonian society and even by the ethnic 
Albanians themselves who have said that in this scenario half of the Macedonian Albanians 
would remain on the other side of the imaginary dividing line
298
. Involvement of the US and 
EU was strongly criticized by Macedonian society considering that they are supporting 
helping the Albanian terrorists and thus the halting of the action of Macedonian security 
forces (similar interference of US and NATO officials were reported by the Macedonian 
chief of stuff) and organizing the rescue and evacuation of the terrorists (together with 26 
American citizens)  provoked mass demonstrations in front of the parliament in Skopje
299
. 
The fears of full scale civil war spread around the country and were eased by the firm 
intervention of United States and European Union which mediated cease fire and called for 
political solution.  With aid and under great pressure from American and EU diplomats, the 
Macedonian and Albanian leaders in worked out the Ohrid Framework Agreement which was 
signed on 13
th
 of August 2001 by the leaders of the four biggest Macedonian parties, by 
which the fighting ended. The Ohrid accord called for constitutional and legislative changes 
to expand civil rights for minority groups. Such rights included greater representation in the 
civil service, the police, and the army; official use of Albanian in districts with an ethnic 
Albanian majority; and stronger local self-government
300
. The preamble of constitution was 
changed in context that Macedonia is a state of Macedonian nation and parts of the Albanian, 
Turkish, Romani, Serb, Vlach nations that live in Macedonia and thus with the Framework 
Agreement, the concept of Macedonia as a nation-state (national state of the Macedonian 
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people) has been greatly abandoned
301
. Among the several provisions from the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement the most significant was the census of 20% of an ethnic community 
on local and national level for acquiring special right such as official use of its language and 
power of suspense veto so-called “Badinter principle” which is voting with double majority 
on matters concerning rights of minorities
302
. Since no community besides the ethnic 
Albanians constitutes more than 20 percent of the population, only the Albanians have these 
special constitutional status and rights on the state level. Under the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement a census of population was organized in 2002, after which a new territorial 
division of the country was determined and a new law for local government was enacted
303
. 
According to the new law of local government the double majority voting or the so-called 
“Badinter Principle” was introduced as a rule in the new municipal councils together with a 
wide range of decentralized competences in education, social, health, security policing 
services were transposed to the local level. However, the most conflictive was the new 
territorial organization of the municipalities by which the number of municipalities was 
decreased from 123 to 84. Several municipalities and towns such as Struga, Kichevo 
(implemented in 2013) in western part of Macedonia with slight Macedonian majority or 
almost equal share of Macedonians and Albanians became overwhelmingly Albanian 
majority populated by attaching smaller neighboring rural municipalities with predominantly 
Albanian population. Incorporation of smaller rural predominantly Albanian municipalities 
was done to the capital Skopje by which it officially became bilingual and Albanian majority 
municipality of Chair was created within it
304
, as well as in the already Albanian dominant 
Tetovo and Gostivar where the share of Macedonians was lowered to 20% and below 19%. 
Moreover, by attaching Albanian villages two rural municipalities in the center of Macedonia 
such as Dolneni and Chashka the share of Albanians was increased over 20% to 33%. 
Regarding the high birth and natural growth of Albanians, the mobilizing unifying power that 
the Islamic Community in Albanian nationalist objectives of other muslim minorities such as 
Turks, Bosniaks, Romas and Macedonian Muslims (it was already case on local elections in 
Dolneni, Struga, Kicevo in 2009 and 2013) and the low birth, fertility, natural growth and 
migration rates of Macedonians especially in rural areas it is highly expected that Albanian 
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would acquire political control and power in central part of Macedonia by becoming majority 
or merging all Muslim inhabitants in these municipalities. Finally, with this territorial 
organization a belt of Albanian majority led municipalities along the borders with Albania 
and Kosovo was created or the entire area of former Albanian occupied zone in Second 
World War is covered by municipalities led by Albanians. This way created territorial 
organization had raised the political tensions in 2004 and a referendum initiated by World 
Macedonian Congress and backed by then major opposition conservative right wing party 
VMRO-DPMNE for support of the territorial organization from 1996 was held. Prime 
Minister Hari Kostov has threatened to quit his post if voters approve the referendum and 
reject the proposed municipality changes and Western powers diplomats have suggested 
failure to carry through the reforms will make it more difficult for Macedonia to join the 
European Union and NATO
305
. Prime Minister Kostov and the government, the European 
Union and the United States have officially urged Macedonians to boycott the referendum
306
.  
Even more United States one day before the referendum announced its recognition of 
Macedonia under its constitutional name as expression of support of the country’s territorial 
integrity and government position for boycott of the referendum as a measure of appeasing 
Macedonian fears of division of the state and thus reducing the interethnic tensions raised 
within the country that threatened greater conflict and the survival of Ohrid Framework 
Agreement implementation process
307
. Despite that 427 117 citizens or 95,06% of the votes 
were for, the referendum had turnout of 26,58%
308
 which was far below the necessary 
threshold of 50% to be valid and thus failed. Finally with the law of flags of the ethnic 
communities passed in 2005 it was legally allowed the national flag of Albania (as well as 
Turkey and Serbia for the respective minorities) adopted as a flag of Albanian community to 
be publicly used and installed in front of municipal and city halls and other public buildings 
where they present majority, which is 16 out of 84 municipalities
309
.  By the end of December 
2005, Macedonia was granted the status as candidate for membership in European Union. 
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The practice of the political power according to this law of decentralization by Albanian 
mayors so far presented that they do not respect the so-called Badenter Principle of double 
majority voting for smaller communities – minorities within the municipalities and use the 
Albanian as a first official language although it is against the law. Hence, the tendencies 
toward federalization are becoming more evident. The most evident case that this territorial 
organization of local self-government is in fact oriented towards fulfillment of the 
geopolitical territorial concept of Greater Albania was the recent local elections in 2013 
where the municipal borders of Kichevo were changed and it gained Albanian majority. The 
ethnic Albanian parties mobilized the Diaspora - citizens residing abroad to come and vote 
with slogans ‘Kichevo is ours’
310
. Moreover, Albanian political leaders and candidates gave 
public addresses (to diaspora) that with voting for the Albanian candidate the citizens are 
making Kichevo part of the (map of) ethnic Albania which starting from Tirana and going 
through Sturga where the mayor is Albanian, then Kichevo, Gostivar, Tetovo, Skopje (Chair) 
and Kumanovo all of that is Albanian administration where Albanian flag waves and thus 
merging of Kichevo would be unifying of the Albanians which is fulfillment of the unified 
Albania that are dreaming for
311
. Hence, the territorial organization of the local self-
government in Macedonia became result of “local geopolitical engineering”
312
. This 
territorial organization and way of functioning of the local-self government together with the 
established principle of forming the national government ruling coalition with the party that 
won majority of votes of the Albanians and recent and ongoing political demands for 
consensual election of political positions such as the president makes Macedonia de-facto 
federation. Regarding the high conflictive potential due to the collision of geopolitical claims 
of the neighbors over Macedonia consociative democracy and de-facto federal structure could 
have impact on fostering secessionism and escalating conflicts. Finally, for the actual 
geopolitical position of Macedonia in regards of the broader context of the Balkans is 
important the blockade of the accession process for integration in NATO and European 
Union due to the name dispute with Greece. Namely, after Greece’s veto on Macedonian 
accession to NATO summit in Bucharest 2008 and the verdict of International Court of 
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Justice in favor of Macedonia that Greece violated the Interim Agreement
313
, NATO and EU 
officials adopted the view and decision that invitation and begin negotiations for membership 
of Macedonia will be delivered and started as soon as mutually acceptable solution to the 
name dispute would be found. Such a precondition is very unlikely to be fulfilled regarding 
that majority of Macedonian citizens oppose compromise and any change of the name while 
Greek red lines for a compound name with a geographical qualifier for use in relations to 
everyone and for all purposes (erga omnes)
314
  are considered as unacceptable by 
Macedonian government and citizens. The number of countries that recognize Macedonia 
under its constitutional name so far is 133 including Russia, China and US as permanent 
members of UN Security Council with veto power, but however as NATO and EU call for 
resolution of the dispute US and western powers are urging Macedonia for compromise on 
the name dispute. Since 2012, Bulgaria has also conditioned its approval and support for 
starting negotiations for Macedonia's membership in the EU by signing the Agreement for 
neighborly relations that will resolve the open issues over history,  language, identity, 
minority rights and ‘anti-Bulgarian’ rhetoric of Macedonian media
315
. Such blockades of the 
integration process of Macedonia have considerable impact on the internal stability and 
security of the country as well as broader geopolitical situation of the region. Regarding that 
Macedonians are becoming more hesitant and skeptical towards euroatlantic integration while 
Albanians with overwhelming majority are favoring for unconditional rapid integration (thus 
accepting compromises with Greek and Bulgarian demands), the internal division and 
fragmentation is steadily rising and thus affecting fragile interethnic relations that are 
constantly disturbed by series of interethnic violence and murders that escalated in 2012. 
Considering this, it can be concluded that position as members of EU and NATO with veto 
power of Greece and Bulgaria is used as a tool for pressure for fulfilling their geopolitical 
goals and objectives towards Macedonia. It is also highly possible that if Albania and Serbia 
become members of these organizations could also use this practice, as it is frequently stated 
in internal political debates in Macedonia. Hence, the integration of Macedonia in EU and 
NATO which is considered as a strategic aim by the Macedonian government and regarded as 
the only lever unifying the deeply divided Macedonian society would be determinant of the 
development of the geopolitical position, turmoil and struggle over Macedonia in the further 
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future. From the aspect of involvement of great and regional powers in geopolitical game 
over and within Macedonia undoubtedly the most influential is the dominance of the US 
especially after the crisis and constitutional rearrangements by the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement in 2001. United States have its biggest embassy on the Balkans in Macedonia and 
by frequent support, meetings and close cooperation with ethnic Albanian political leaders it 
has also a significant influence even in the internal affairs of the country. In regards of the 
blockade of integration process Macedonian government recently started with attempts of 
establishing closer economic cooperation with China, Russia and India (BRICS) but it has not 
the potential to jeopardize the dominant role of US. From the regional powers the most 
evident and vivid is the rising influence of Turkey. Turkey was one of the first countries to 
recognize independence of Macedonia and it is the only NATO member that officially states 
in all of its official documents that recognizes the country under the constitutional name 
‘Republic of Macedonia’
316
. In recent years according to its geopolitical concept of neo-
ottomanism in foreign policy Turkey is fostering investments, closer cultural and political 
cooperation with Macedonia openly expressing strong political support as well as supporting 
the Turkish minority and Muslims in the country who traditionally see themselves allegiant to 
Turkey as their protector and (civilization) leader. From the perspective of the 
conceptualization of the Balkans according to the geopolitical concepts and theories the 
territorial change that occurred with the emergence of the independent state of Macedonia as 
a central state it in fact contributed to creation and determination of the Heartland. Despite 
the weak internal cohesiveness the de-facto federalization upon the territorial organization of 
the self-government it still does not disturb the balance of the position of the Heartland due to 
that the Albanian led municipalities do not possess the north-south axis and corridor that 
connects the states of the Balkan Heartland neither they possess the territory of the 
intersection and crossway with the east-west corridor. However, the demographic tendencies 
of rising Albanian and Muslim population and declining Macedonian and Christian 
population could lead to change of the political power within the country in the future and 
thus disturb the geopolitical balance on the Balkans with breakthrough of Albanian factor that 
besides Kosovo with Macedonia would gain control of significant parts of of the Heartland. 
Finally, the weak cohesiveness and internal instability with several open issues and therefore 
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without definitely and firmly settled status puts Macedonia in the shatterbelt of the Balkans 
together with Kosovo, region of Sanjdak and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus it seems that 
preservation of Macedonia as independent and unitary state is the best solution that on hand 
maintain the geopolitical balance and provide basis for long stading peaceful coexistence on 
the Balkans. Notwithstanding, Macedonia with its central position will remain crucially 
important in the development of the geopolitical affairs of the Balkans in the future.    
 





From the presented definitions of the Balkans, the analysis and conceptualization of the 
geopolitical landscape and map of the Balkans after 1991 through the application of the 
geopolitical theories and concepts, outline of the greater territorial concepts of the Balkan 
nation states and finally the analysis of the events that occurred as a consequence the 
territorial changes and emergence of the new independent nation states several conclusions 
can be drawn as well as predictions can be given.  
Despite the generally acknowledged positioning of the Balkans on the easternmost of the 
southern European peninsulas definitions of its exact boundaries in physical and political 
geographical context do not coincide and are often ambiguous and dubious. In the definition 
of the Balkans and the countries consisting it often is included the historical allegiance to the 
Ottoman Empire although territories that belonged to Austro-Hungarian and other empires 
are included on the political map of the Balkans. Nevertheless, the significance of the 
Balkans as a birthplace, gateway and crossway of many civilizations, religions, cultures and 
peoples throughout the history contributed to the emergence and development of a specific 
and distinct political culture that is crucially significant for the geopolitical position of the 
Balkans as ethnically, religiously and culturally heterogeneous area. Geopolitical position, 
settings and significance of the Balkans prior 1991 that were characterized as an area of 
balance between the two ideological blocs according to the formula of 2 western, 2 eastern 
and 2 non aligned countries was irreversibly disturbed and shifted leaving the space for 
civilization, political, ethnic, cultural cleavages and clashes that resulted with instability and 
territorial changes on the geopolitical landscape. 
Application of the geopolitical theories and concepts on the geopolitical map of the Balkans 
after 1991 shows several significant findings that can be used for review, examining and 
explanation of the territorial changes, events which happened as well as the geopolitical 
affairs and tendencies that are still actual and ongoing. Although not in complete and exact 
compliance with the Ratzel’s and Kjellen’s conceptualizations consideration of the nations as 
living organisms is vividly present and widely accepted in the political, social, scientific-
academic and cultural life and debates on the Balkans, almost in every country thus revealing 
one reason why the Balkans is prone to conflicts and readiness of actors and significant parts 
of the societies to stand and struggle. Considering both different definitions and meanings of 
the Mackinder’s Heartland theory Macedonia and Serbia can be clearly identified as a 
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Heartland of the Balkans due to their central geographical position (and favorable relief- 
internal geography) as well as the possibilities and advantages for military attacks in regards 
of easy mobility and (in)accessibility providing opportunities for domination of the entire 
region which in fact evolves from that position. Moreover, both countries share common 
features in physical geography such as the communication axis and corridors, common 
political features in regards of their geopolitical position toward the prospects of euroatlantic 
integration and alignment as well as some common religious and cultural characteristics. 
Regarding the correlated Spykman’s theory of the Rimland in regards of encirclement of the 
Heartland by land and sea power in order to contain its power, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, 
Montenegro and Croatia can be identified as the Rimland of the Balkan according to their 
geographical position. Several cases of the Balkan wars in the 90’s which are presented are 
confirming the validity of this conceptualization. Examining the positions, capabilities and 
the patterns of conducting military and foreign policy objectives, except from a very short 
period in the ancient history where the thalassocracy (rule of sea power) was actual, the 
Balkans and its states are based on the telurocratic (rule of the land power) thinking. 
According to the recent and later emergence of geopolitical concepts such as gateway region, 
crush zone and shatterbelt some countries of the Balkans such as Montenegro and Slovenia 
are considered as gateways although entire Balkan is regarded as a gateway region for global 
powers such as China towards Europe or USA towards Middle East. Although it is not 
considered as a shatterbelt in global context due to their internal divisions, high conflictive 
potential as a result of multiethnic and religious heterogeneity, unclearly settled status as 
objects and arenas of interference of the geopolitical objectives of the local, regional and 
global subjects and actors the entire compactly linked region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Sandjak, Kosovo with Presevo Valley in Southern Serbia and Macedonia can be identified as 
a shatterbelt of the Balkans. Lastly, the Balkans was the only place in Europe after the cold 
war and 1991 that experienced foreign intervention and air bombing campaign thus 
confirming the capabilities and successfulness of the geopolitics of air. Moreover the 
geographical position of the Balkans is favorable for possible use of the air bases in ongoing 
crisis in Syria and Ukraine, which implicate that the Balkans would be important in the 
geopolitics of air in global context in the future. Hence, the Balkans as a microcosmic 
projection of the world conceptualized by the application geopolitical theories and concept 
originally related on global level provides the firm ground for conclusion that the area of the 
Balkans and its configuration in physical, political and human-social geographical or 
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geopolitical sense itself is prone to conflicts which like in the past will definitely be present in 
the future.   
Almost all of the nations living on the Balkans are having greater territorial geopolitical 
concepts of their homeland that serve as a basis for their geopolitical and foreign policy goals 
and objectives as well as for their nationalist and irredentist movements and ideas. All of 
them share common features of their presence and significance in the political, cultural and 
social life as well as official education. Moreover most of them originated in 19
th
 century as 
basic platforms for independence and establishing statehoods of Balkan nations, then were 
suppressed or with lesser significance during the Cold War and communist regimes when 
they were supported mostly by the nationalist emigration and diasporas. Finally, all of the 
greater territorial geopolitical concepts of the Balkan states were revived and became again 
relevant after 1991. The concepts of United Macedonia, Greater Albania, Greater Serbia, 
Greater Croatia, Greater Bulgaria and Greek Megali Idea that exist on the Balkans were 
greatly and actively involved in the events and the geopolitical turmoil and affairs that 
happened on the Balkans after 1991 as it is shown in the last chapter. Thus, they are another 
reason and cause of the propensity of the Balkans for conflicts and moreover according to 
their relevance and significance is highly possible that they will continue to foster the actual 
conflictive geopolitical tendencies on the Balkans    
The dramatic changes and events that gripped the world by the end of the Cold War did not 
passed by the Balkans which after 1991 was the place with the greatest activity and most 
territorial changes in the world. Territorial changes on the Balkans took place on external and 
internal level and they were respectively formally and informally, officially and 
internationally recognized and accepted. Undoubtedly, the breakup and disintegration of 
Yugoslavia was the most important event that resulted with the territorial changes on the 
Balkans. The process that started in 1991 with the secession and emergence of the 
independent nation states from the federal units or Yugoslav republics lasted until 2006 and 
2008 with the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo, but regarding the internal territorial 
divisions, de-facto federalizations and lively secessionist tendencies according to them within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Southern Serbia and finally Macedonia it is not 
completely concluded and therefore it provides possibilities and causes for further conflicts. 
Emergence of the independent nation states from former Yugoslavia resulted with brief 
armed conflict in Slovenia, disastrous and devastating wars in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo, although Macedonia and Montenegro attained their independence 
through completely peaceful way. The war in Croatia produced the short lasting quasi and 
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puppet state of Republic of Serb Krajina while during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
was primarily territorial conflict emerged republics of Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia. Within the 
wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina concepts of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia 
had significant influence on the geopolitical goals of the parties involved. The conflict and 
secession of Kosovo and insurgency in Southern Serbia were case where Greater Albania and 
Greater Serbian concepts clashed with decisive and successful breakthrough of the Albanian. 
Lastly, the independence of Macedonia revived the old geopolitical rivalries and thus caused 
the greatest geopolitical turmoil and disturbance that included almost all of greater 
geopolitical territorial concepts, except the Greater Croatian, at one place. Thus Macedonia 
faced extraordinarily severe obstacles in the process of its establishment as independent state 
on internal as well as external regional and global level. Constitutional redefinitions, internal 
territorial organization and its functioning together with the internal and external tendencies, 
relations and prospects for euroatlantic integration of Macedonia will definitely be source of 
conflict issues that will determine the future development of geopolitical relations and 
processes on the Balkans. In global and regional context the territorial changes and conflicts 
on the Balkans after 1991 contributed to international interventions and the establishment of 
the United State as dominant factor and player, but also for reemergence of traditional players 
present in the history that were absent during the Cold War such as Turkey, Germany or 
Russia which influence declined in the first decade after the Cold War but now is again 
rising. Events after 1991 also led to the introduction of completely new external geopolitical 
players and actors such as the Middle Eastern powers that introduced and support the radical 
Islam which is factor with rising significance on the Balkans, then United Nations and 
European Union. Although all of Balkan states especially those that emerged as independent 
after 1991 are oriented towards integration of European Union and NATO, the use of the  
position as its member for fulfilling conflictive geopolitical goals and objectives in regards to 
other Balkan states such is the recent case of blocked and conditioning of  Macedonia by 
Greece  and Bulgaria may lead to a occurrence or escalation of conflicts. Thus European 
Union is becoming internal actor and player in the geopolitical rivalries and struggles on the 
Balkans and the integration process could become cause and source of conflicts instead of 
being final and permanent solution that will bring peace on the Balkans. The Balkans after 
1991 establish itself as an active hotspot on the global map that will definitely be relevant and 
important in the global geopolitics further in the future.                             
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